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Cross-Framework Defense Map

AC-7 — Unsuccessful Logon Attempts

Trace this SP 800-53 control to NIST CSF outcomes, CUI requirements, D3FEND defensive techniques, ATT&CK relationships, and related learning resources.

AC — Access Control · NIST SP 800-53 Release 5.2.0

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NIST SP 800-53 control context

AC-7 — Unsuccessful Logon Attempts

The need to limit unsuccessful logon attempts and take subsequent action when the maximum number of attempts is exceeded applies regardless of whether the logon occurs via a local or network connection. Due to the potential for denial of service, automatic lockouts initiated by systems are usually temporary and automatically release after a predetermined, organization-defined time period. If a delay algorithm is selected, organizations may employ different algorithms for different components of the system based on the capabilities of those components. Responses to unsuccessful logon attempts may be implemented at the operating system and the application levels. Organization-defined actions that may be taken when the number of allowed consecutive invalid logon attempts is exceeded include prompting the user to answer a secret question in addition to the username and password, invoking a l

Read the official statement, discussion, parameters, enhancements, and assessment methods →

Outcome layer

NIST CSF 2.0 informative references

These CSF Subcategories list this base control or one of its enhancements in the imported NIST informative reference.

CUI protection layer

NIST SP 800-171 and SP 800-172

SP 800-171 requirements sourcing this control

SP 800-172 enhanced requirements sourcing this control

No relationship is present in the currently imported source datasets.
Defensive engineering layer

MITRE D3FEND techniques

Adversary layer

MITRE ATT&CK relationships

Curated mitigation mappings

Inferred behavior relationships

Experimental: These relationships are inferred through D3FEND and must be validated against architecture, telemetry, and threat context.

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Relationship boundaries

Use the map without overclaiming.

A CSF informative reference is not an equivalence statement. A source-control relationship is not proof of implementation. A D3FEND semantic relationship is not a product claim. An inferred ATT&CK link is a hypothesis for engineering analysis.

Bare Metal Cyber is an independent educational publisher and is not affiliated with or endorsed by NIST or MITRE. Informative references and cross-framework relationships support navigation and analysis; they do not establish compliance, applicability, equivalence, control inheritance, or guaranteed mitigation effectiveness.