Restrict File and Directory Permissions (M1022)

Defensive objective

Restrict File and Directory Permissions is the defensive objective identified by MITRE ATT&CK® as M1022. In practical terms, the objective is to apply least-privilege permissions to files and directories so unauthorized users and processes cannot read, alter, replace, or execute protected content.

The mitigation should be treated as a control objective rather than a product label. An organization still has to identify the systems, identities, data, workflows, and adversary behaviors that are in scope, then choose technical and procedural safeguards appropriate to its architecture.

A useful implementation makes the boundary of Restrict File and Directory Permissions explicit: where it applies, who owns it, what evidence demonstrates operation, what exceptions remain, and which detection, response, and recovery layers address residual risk.

Scope and design decisions

Endpoint mitigations reduce opportunities to execute untrusted code, alter protected platform state, weaken security tooling, or abuse operating-system and hardware capabilities.

For Restrict File and Directory Permissions, begin with the decision points that make the relevant adversary behavior possible. Map the required access, privilege, trust, exposure, configuration, and dependencies before choosing enforcement. This prevents a broad control statement from hiding uncovered platforms or alternate paths.

• Define secure baselines by platform, role, workload, and consequence.
• Use prevention, tamper protection, telemetry, and recovery as independent layers.
• Stage restrictive controls against representative business workflows before broad enforcement.
• Protect administrative interfaces and policy distribution from the same systems they govern.
• Include unsupported, intermittent, remote, and specialized systems in the exception model.

Implementation priorities

The implementation priorities below turn M1022 into an operating capability. They are intentionally technology-neutral so they can be applied to on-premises, cloud, hybrid, endpoint, application, identity, and service-provider environments.

Sequence the work so visibility and rollback exist before disruptive enforcement. High-consequence controls should be introduced through representative testing, documented change authority, and a time-bounded exception process.

• Inventory sensitive paths
• remove broad write access
• protect startup and configuration locations
• monitor ownership and permission drift.
• Assign an accountable control owner and named operational team.
• Document scope, prerequisites, dependencies, and known exclusions.
• Pair prevention or restriction with protected telemetry and response procedures.
• Review the control after incidents, major architecture changes, and material threat shifts.

Validation and evidence

Validation should show that Restrict File and Directory Permissions is deployed where intended, resists unauthorized change, produces usable evidence, and affects the targeted path. A policy document or enabled feature is not enough by itself.

Use at least one controlled positive test, one controlled negative test, and one legitimate business workflow. Confirm timestamps, identity attribution, field meaning, retention, alert delivery, escalation, and recovery. Evidence should support both operational troubleshooting and an independent assurance review.

• Baseline, application-control, exploit-protection, and security-agent policy exports
• Process, module, driver, script, boot, configuration, and tamper telemetry
• Agent health, coverage, version, and policy-assignment records
• Controlled adversary-emulation and legitimate-workflow test results
• Exception, compatibility, rollback, and remediation evidence

Common failure modes

Restrict File and Directory Permissions can appear complete while leaving meaningful bypasses. The following conditions should be treated as test hypotheses, not merely checklist cautions.

Where a failure mode cannot be removed immediately, record the residual risk, compensating visibility, response expectation, accountable owner, and date by which the decision must be reconsidered.

• Coverage is assumed from license counts rather than verified agent health and policy assignment.
• Prevention is disabled after a compatibility event and never restored.
• A writable path, unmanaged interpreter, or alternate execution surface bypasses the intended control.
• Administrators can silently weaken the control without independent evidence.
• Testing demonstrates blocking but not reliable recovery or evidence preservation.

Ownership, exceptions, and review

The business or risk owner decides how much residual risk is acceptable; the control owner designs and maintains Restrict File and Directory Permissions; operators respond to control health and security events; and assurance functions independently evaluate evidence. Those roles may be performed by different teams, but they should not be left implicit.

Every exception should state the affected asset or population, business reason, approving owner, compensating controls, monitoring requirement, expiration date, and reassessment trigger. A change in exposure, privilege, data sensitivity, threat activity, platform support, or recovery capability should force review before the ordinary cadence.

• Name the risk owner, control owner, operator, and independent reviewer.
• Set measurable coverage, health, effectiveness, and response indicators.
• Require expiration dates for exceptions and temporary workarounds.
• Retain evidence of approval, testing, incidents, remediation, and closure.
• Reassess after material threat, architecture, identity, data, or supplier changes.

Using this mitigation with ATT&CK

ATT&CK associates mitigation objects such as M1022 with adversary techniques and sub-techniques for which the defensive objective may be relevant. A relationship is a research and engineering lead—not a guarantee that one implementation prevents every procedure represented by a technique.

Start with the observed or prioritized adversary behavior, inspect the official relationship and its supporting context, then determine whether this mitigation changes a required precondition, blocks an action, limits consequence, improves recovery, or creates evidence. Preserve the distinction between preventive coverage, detective visibility, response readiness, and resilience.

Bare Metal Cyber will add a separately validated relationship layer in a later release. This foundation release does not fabricate or overstate technique coverage where the official relationship edge has not yet been imported and reviewed.

Attribution, version, and scope

© 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation.

MITRE ATT&CK® and ATT&CK® are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Bare Metal Cyber is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

This is an original Bare Metal Cyber educational profile reviewed against Enterprise ATT&CK catalog v19.2. The official M1022 page controls the current object name, status, version, relationships, source citations, and changes. MITRE identifier, name, version, creation date, modification date, and official URL are preserved as source metadata; the explanatory and implementation guidance is original.

Certification relevance

This subject appears in or supports the following certification bodies of knowledge:

Authoritative sources

• MITRE ATT&CK® M1022 — Restrict File and Directory Permissions
• MITRE ATT&CK® Enterprise Mitigations
• MITRE ATT&CK® Data & Tools
• MITRE ATT&CK® Legal and Branding Guidance