Definition
Deploying a network resource for the purposes of deceiving an adversary.
How it works
Decoy network resources are deployed to web application servers, network file shares, or other network based sharing services.
A "honeypot" may serve a variety of decoy network resources.
Considerations
- Developing a deployment and placement strategy for the decoy network resource.
- Personnel responsible for creation of decoy networks should consider the potential for resource exhaustion through denial of service attacks.
Examples
- Honeypots are typically used to mimic a known system with fake vulnerabilities. This may attract attackers to the honeypot.
- Decoy accounts are also used to scan for attempted logins. The decoy accounts can provide security analysts with the attacker's potential intents and strategies.
- Tarpits are used to monitor unallocated IP space for unauthorized network activity.
Implementation perspective
Decoy Network Resource should be treated as a technical defensive capability rather than a product checkbox. In practice, teams should define the protected scope, the conditions under which the technique acts, and the observable evidence that demonstrates the intended behavior. For this technique, likely engineering context includes Network Resource.
Use the technique to present controlled information, services, or artifacts that shape adversary behavior and create observable interaction.
Questions to ask
- What behavior is the deceptive element intended to attract, delay, reveal, or redirect?
- How is the deceptive element made plausible without creating unacceptable operational risk?
- Which interactions are monitored, and who investigates them?
- How is the deceptive environment isolated from production systems and sensitive data?
Evidence and validation
- Design records describing the deception objective and placement
- Isolation and containment test results
- Monitoring and alert-routing configuration
- Interaction records and documented investigative outcomes
Common failure patterns
- The deceptive element is obvious, stale, or inconsistent with the surrounding environment.
- Interactions are collected but not reviewed or connected to response processes.
- The decoy introduces a new pathway to production data or systems.
This implementation perspective is original Bare Metal Cyber educational content. It does not replace the official D3FEND definition or establish that a specific product implements the technique.
Technique hierarchy
Top-level family
Parent techniques
Direct child techniques
None listed at this level.
Artifacts and ontology entities
These relationships describe how D3FEND connects a defensive technique to artifacts or other ontology entities. They describe graph semantics, not a product certification.
Explicit technique relationships
Show inferred artifact relationship paths (1)
Offensive-technique relationships
These relationships are generated from D3FEND graph paths and are explicitly experimental. They should be treated as hypotheses for defensive analysis—not as proof that the technique prevents, detects, or removes an offensive behavior.
ATT&CK Enterprise (8)
Authoritative sources
- Open this technique on the official D3FEND website ↗
- Open the official ontology resources ↗
- Automatically generating network resource groups and assigning customized decoy policies thereto ↗Illusive Networks Ltd · Shlomo Touboul; Hanan Levin; Stephane Roubach; Assaf Mischari; Itai Ben David; Itay Avraham; Adi Ozer; Chen Kazaz; Ofer Israeli; Olga Vingurt; Liad Gareh; Israel Grimberg; Cobby Cohen; Sharon Sultan; Matan Kubovsky · PatentReference
- Deception-Based Responses to Security Attacks ↗Crowdstrike Inc · Adam S. Meyers; Dmitri Alperovitch; George Robert Kurtz; David F. Diehl; Sven Krasser · PatentReference
- Dynamic selection and generation of a virtual clone for detonation of suspicious content within a honey network ↗Palo Alto Networks Inc · Taylor Ettema; Huagang Xie · PatentReference
- System and method for identifying the presence of malware using mini-traps set at network endpoints ↗Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Inc · Doron Kolton; Rami Mizrahi; Omer Zohar; Benny Ben-Rabi; Alex Barbalat; Shlomi Gabai · PatentReference
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