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MITRE D3FEND™ Learning Center

D3-FIM — File Integrity Monitoring

Detecting any suspicious changes to files in a computer system.

99Enterprise inferred
8ICS inferred
1Parent technique
1Related artifact

Detect · D3FEND ontology 1.6.0 · Active

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Official D3FEND definition

Definition

Detecting any suspicious changes to files in a computer system.

Official D3FEND knowledge-base content

How it Works

There are a number of tools in Windows and Unix that can monitor specific files in a system and generate alerts if any artifacts have been created, modified, or removed. They accomplish this by comparing the current artifacts to a previous snapshot.

Unix - Unix systems have a file integrity checker tool called tripwire. Tripwire first initializes a database that serves as a basis for comparison and can then scan the system to compare the state of the current file system against the initial baseline database. Additionally, users can define policies that specify potential violations.

Windows - In Microsoft Azure, file integrity monitoring can be enabled which can track file and registry key creation, removals, and modifications of specific files.

Considerations

Files can change constantly due to the non-static nature of a computer system. File Integrity Monitoring works best when pointed at a narrow scope of critical files to limit the number of unnecessary files that may be modified over the course of normal use. The accuracy and precision of defined policies also affect the efficacy of this technique.

Bare Metal Cyber interpretation

Implementation perspective

File Integrity Monitoring should be treated as a technical defensive capability rather than a product checkbox. In practice, teams should define the protected scope, the conditions under which the technique acts, and the observable evidence that demonstrates the intended behavior. For this technique, likely engineering context includes File.

Use the technique to identify suspicious, unauthorized, or abnormal activity through observable evidence and repeatable analysis.

Questions to ask

  • Which events, states, or artifacts must be observed for the analysis to work?
  • What analytic logic, threshold, comparison, or signature turns observations into a finding?
  • How are expected false positives, blind spots, and environmental variations documented?
  • Who receives the result, and what action is expected when the technique produces a finding?

Evidence and validation

  • Telemetry and data-source configuration records
  • Analytic logic, thresholds, signatures, and version history
  • Test cases demonstrating expected positive and negative results
  • Alert, triage, escalation, and tuning records

Common failure patterns

  • Required telemetry is missing, delayed, or transformed in a way that invalidates the analysis.
  • The technique produces alerts without an accountable triage and response process.
  • Detection coverage is claimed from product deployment without testing the relevant analytic behavior.

This implementation perspective is original Bare Metal Cyber educational content. It does not replace the official D3FEND definition or establish that a specific product implements the technique.

Ontology hierarchy

Technique hierarchy

Parent techniques

Direct child techniques

None listed at this level.

D3FEND graph relationships

Artifacts and ontology entities

These relationships describe how D3FEND connects a defensive technique to artifacts or other ontology entities. They describe graph semantics, not a product certification.

Explicit technique relationships

analyzesFile
Show inferred artifact relationship paths (1)
File Integrity MonitoringanalyzesFile
Inferred and experimental

Offensive-technique relationships

These relationships are generated from D3FEND graph paths and are explicitly experimental. They should be treated as hypotheses for defensive analysis—not as proof that the technique prevents, detects, or removes an offensive behavior.

ATT&CK Enterprise (99)
T1003.007Proc FilesystemCredential AccessT1003.008/etc/passwd and /etc/shadowCredential AccessT1005Data from Local SystemCollectionT1014RootkitStealthT1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryDiscoveryT1018Remote System DiscoveryDiscoveryT1027.001Binary PaddingStealthT1027.002Software PackingStealthT1027.004Compile After DeliveryStealthT1033System Owner/User DiscoveryDiscoveryT1036.001Invalid Code SignatureStealthT1036.003Rename Legitimate UtilitiesStealthT1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationStealthT1036.006Space after FilenameStealthT1037.001Logon Script (Windows)Persistence, Privilege EscalationT1037.002Login HookPersistence, Privilege EscalationT1037.003Network Logon ScriptPersistence, Privilege EscalationT1037.004RC ScriptsPersistence, Privilege EscalationT1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelExfiltrationT1048.002Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 ProtocolExfiltration
T1053.004LaunchdExecution, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
T1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionPrivilege Escalation, StealthT1055.002Portable Executable InjectionPrivilege Escalation, StealthT1055.003Thread Execution HijackingPrivilege Escalation, StealthT1055.009Proc MemoryPrivilege Escalation, StealthT1055.014VDSO HijackingPrivilege Escalation, StealthT1059Command and Scripting InterpreterExecution
T1070.002Clear Linux or Mac System LogsStealth
T1070.004File DeletionStealthT1071Application Layer ProtocolCommand and ControlT1071.001Web ProtocolsCommand and ControlT1072Software Deployment ToolsExecution, Lateral MovementT1074.001Local Data StagingCollectionT1083File and Directory DiscoveryDiscoveryT1114.001Local Email CollectionCollectionT1119Automated CollectionCollectionT1127.001MSBuildExecution, StealthT1137.001Office Template MacrosPersistenceT1137.003Outlook FormsPersistenceT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationStealthT1187Forced AuthenticationCredential AccessT1204.002Malicious FileExecutionT1218.005MshtaStealthT1218.011Rundll32StealthT1220XSL Script ProcessingStealthT1486Data Encrypted for ImpactImpactT1505.003Web ShellPersistenceT1534Internal SpearphishingLateral MovementT1543.001Launch AgentPersistence, Privilege EscalationT1543.002Systemd ServicePersistence, Privilege EscalationT1543.004Launch DaemonPersistence, Privilege EscalationT1546.002ScreensaverPersistence, Privilege EscalationT1546.004Unix Shell Configuration ModificationPersistence, Privilege EscalationT1546.005TrapPersistence, Privilege EscalationT1546.006LC_LOAD_DYLIB AdditionPersistence, Privilege EscalationT1546.008Accessibility FeaturesPersistence, Privilege EscalationT1546.009AppCert DLLsPersistence, Privilege EscalationT1546.010AppInit DLLsPersistence, Privilege EscalationT1546.013PowerShell ProfilePersistence, Privilege EscalationT1546.014EmondPersistence, Privilege Escalation

Showing the first 60 of 99 source-derived relationships. Open the official D3FEND technique for the current graph view.

ATT&CK for ICS (8)
T0851RootkitEvasion, Inhibit Response Function
T0853ScriptingExecution
T0865Spearphishing AttachmentInitial Access
T0871Execution through APIExecution
T0888Remote System Information DiscoveryDiscovery
T0893Data from Local SystemCollection
T0894System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvasion
T0895Autorun ImageExecution
Source record

Authoritative sources