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MITRE D3FEND™ Learning Center

D3-HDDL — Hierarchical Domain Denylisting

Blocking the resolution of any subdomain of a specified domain name.

2Enterprise inferred
1Parent technique
1Related artifact
1Source reference

Isolate · D3FEND ontology 1.6.0 · Active

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Official D3FEND definition

Definition

Blocking the resolution of any subdomain of a specified domain name.

Official D3FEND knowledge-base content

How it works

This technique is used to block DNS queries from related domains and subdomains that are unauthorized.

Hierarchical domain blacklisting considers the blacklisting of second level domains and additional sub-domains and specific hosts for a given query value. A denylist is maintained that contains DNS names and corresponding subdomains, including wildcards, that should be blocked for a given lookup.

Considerations

  • The denylist of domain names will have to be maintained and will need to be kept up to date
  • Other domains that resolve to the domain of interest for blocking (CNAME, etc).
  • Denylists should have identified maintenance cycles to ensure lists are not stale.
Bare Metal Cyber interpretation

Implementation perspective

Hierarchical Domain Denylisting should be treated as a technical defensive capability rather than a product checkbox. In practice, teams should define the protected scope, the conditions under which the technique acts, and the observable evidence that demonstrates the intended behavior. For this technique, likely engineering context includes DNS Network Traffic.

Use the technique to create a logical or physical boundary that limits access, execution, communication, or movement.

Questions to ask

  • What is being isolated, from whom or what, and under which conditions?
  • Which flows or operations remain explicitly allowed across the boundary?
  • What happens when the isolation mechanism fails or loses policy context?
  • How is the boundary tested for alternate paths, bypasses, and unintended dependencies?

Evidence and validation

  • Architecture and data-flow diagrams showing the isolation boundary
  • Policy, rule, or configuration exports from enforcing components
  • Tests of allowed, denied, and failure-state behavior
  • Monitoring evidence for boundary violations and policy changes

Common failure patterns

  • The intended boundary has undocumented alternate paths or inherited trust relationships.
  • Rules accumulate without ownership, review, or removal of obsolete exceptions.
  • Isolation is assumed from network location while application, identity, or management paths remain open.

This implementation perspective is original Bare Metal Cyber educational content. It does not replace the official D3FEND definition or establish that a specific product implements the technique.

Ontology hierarchy

Technique hierarchy

Top-level family

Direct child techniques

None listed at this level.

D3FEND graph relationships

Artifacts and ontology entities

These relationships describe how D3FEND connects a defensive technique to artifacts or other ontology entities. They describe graph semantics, not a product certification.

Show inferred artifact relationship paths (1)
DNS DenylistingblocksDNS Network Traffic
Inferred and experimental

Offensive-technique relationships

These relationships are generated from D3FEND graph paths and are explicitly experimental. They should be treated as hypotheses for defensive analysis—not as proof that the technique prevents, detects, or removes an offensive behavior.

ATT&CK Enterprise (2)
Source record

Authoritative sources