D3-NTPM — Network Traffic Policy Mapping

Official D3FEND definition

Definition

Network traffic policy mapping identifies and models the allowed pathways of data at the network, transport, and/or application levels.

Bare Metal Cyber interpretation

Implementation perspective

Network Traffic Policy Mapping should be treated as a technical defensive capability rather than a product checkbox. In practice, teams should define the protected scope, the conditions under which the technique acts, and the observable evidence that demonstrates the intended behavior. For this technique, likely engineering context includes Access Control Configuration.

Use the technique to improve the shared model of systems, activities, dependencies, threats, or risk before making defensive decisions.

Questions to ask

What system, activity, relationship, or risk is being modeled, and where is the scope boundary?
Which authoritative data sources populate the model, and how is their quality assessed?
How often is the model refreshed after architectural, operational, or threat changes?
Which decisions, analyses, or engineering actions are expected to use the model?

Evidence and validation

Documented model scope, assumptions, and ownership
Source inventories, data-quality checks, and refresh records
Version history showing material changes to the model
Examples of decisions or analyses that used the model

Common failure patterns

The model is treated as a one-time diagram rather than a maintained decision aid.
Unverified or stale source data is accepted without recording uncertainty.
The model is comprehensive in appearance but disconnected from engineering or operational decisions.

This implementation perspective is original Bare Metal Cyber educational content. It does not replace the official D3FEND definition or establish that a specific product implements the technique.

Ontology hierarchy

Technique hierarchy

Top-level family

D3-NM Network Mapping

Parent techniques

D3-NM Network Mapping

Direct child techniques

None listed at this level.

D3FEND graph relationships

Artifacts and ontology entities

These relationships describe how D3FEND connects a defensive technique to artifacts or other ontology entities. They describe graph semantics, not a product certification.

Explicit technique relationships

mapsAccess Control Configuration

queriesNetwork Agent

Show inferred artifact relationship paths (1)

Network Traffic Policy MappingmapsAccess Control Configuration

Inferred and experimental

Offensive-technique relationships

These relationships are generated from D3FEND graph paths and are explicitly experimental. They should be treated as hypotheses for defensive analysis—not as proof that the technique prevents, detects, or removes an offensive behavior.

ATT&CK Enterprise (8)

T1134.005SID-History InjectionPrivilege Escalation, Stealth T1222File and Directory Permissions ModificationDefense Impairment T1484Domain or Tenant Policy ModificationDefense Impairment, Privilege Escalation T1548.001Setuid and SetgidPrivilege Escalation T1548.005Temporary Elevated Cloud AccessPrivilege Escalation T1552.006Group Policy PreferencesCredential Access T1556.009Conditional Access PoliciesCredential Access, Defense Impairment, Persistence T1615Group Policy DiscoveryDiscovery

Source record

Authoritative sources

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