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MITRE D3FEND™ Learning Center

D3-PSM — Proximity Sensor Monitoring

Monitoring events from proximity sensors that indicate a credential or tagged asset is within the sensor’s read range or a defined zone. Common enabling technologies include RFID, Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE), and Ultra-Wideband (UWB).

1Parent technique
1Related artifact
4Source references

Detect · D3FEND ontology 1.6.0 · Active

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Official D3FEND definition

Definition

Monitoring events from proximity sensors that indicate a credential or tagged asset is within the sensor’s read range or a defined zone. Common enabling technologies include RFID, Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE), and Ultra-Wideband (UWB).

Official D3FEND knowledge-base content

How it works

Proximity readers and sensors detect credentials or tagged assets within their read field, then report presence and, when applicable, authenticate to a controller for access decisions. Systems may use RSSI, dwell time, or time-of-flight to enforce zones and policies such as anti-passback. Secure, authenticated communication between readers and controllers helps prevent cloning and replay attacks.

Considerations

  • Place readers and align antennas to achieve consistent read ranges; account for materials like metal and liquids that can detune signals.
  • Use cryptographic credentials with mutual authentication and encrypted, supervised reader links to mitigate cloning and relay attacks.
  • Protect privacy by minimizing collected data, limiting retention, and restricting access to proximity logs.
  • Calibrate detection thresholds and zone boundaries; re-test after layout changes or equipment moves.
  • Monitor reader and tag health, including battery status for BLE and UWB tags and supervision signals for wired and wireless devices.
Bare Metal Cyber interpretation

Implementation perspective

Proximity Sensor Monitoring should be treated as a technical defensive capability rather than a product checkbox. In practice, teams should define the protected scope, the conditions under which the technique acts, and the observable evidence that demonstrates the intended behavior. For this technique, likely engineering context includes the relevant system, activity, and evidence sources.

Use the technique to identify suspicious, unauthorized, or abnormal activity through observable evidence and repeatable analysis.

Questions to ask

  • Which events, states, or artifacts must be observed for the analysis to work?
  • What analytic logic, threshold, comparison, or signature turns observations into a finding?
  • How are expected false positives, blind spots, and environmental variations documented?
  • Who receives the result, and what action is expected when the technique produces a finding?

Evidence and validation

  • Telemetry and data-source configuration records
  • Analytic logic, thresholds, signatures, and version history
  • Test cases demonstrating expected positive and negative results
  • Alert, triage, escalation, and tuning records

Common failure patterns

  • Required telemetry is missing, delayed, or transformed in a way that invalidates the analysis.
  • The technique produces alerts without an accountable triage and response process.
  • Detection coverage is claimed from product deployment without testing the relevant analytic behavior.

This implementation perspective is original Bare Metal Cyber educational content. It does not replace the official D3FEND definition or establish that a specific product implements the technique.

Ontology hierarchy

Technique hierarchy

Direct child techniques

None listed at this level.

D3FEND graph relationships

Artifacts and ontology entities

These relationships describe how D3FEND connects a defensive technique to artifacts or other ontology entities. They describe graph semantics, not a product certification.

Explicit technique relationships

monitorsProximity Sensor
Source record

Authoritative sources

Bare Metal Cyber is an independent educational publisher and is not affiliated with or endorsed by The MITRE Corporation. MITRE D3FEND™ and the D3FEND logo are trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK® and ATT&CK® are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Use of D3FEND source material is subject to the official Terms of Use.