Definition
Monitoring geolocation data of user logon attempts and comparing it to a baseline user behavior profile to identify anomalies in logon location.
How it works
Geolocation data for each user logon attempt is collected and used to create a baseline user behavior profile. Current geolocation logon data is then compared against the user behavior profile. Logon activity that deviates from normal patterns and can help in identifying situations that may be indicative of a remote attacker using stolen credentials. For example:
- logons from locations that are different from where a user usually logs in
- logons from a location in which an enterprise has no users located
- logon that is not physically possible given the elapsed time since a logon from another location.
Considerations
- Potential for false positives from logon anomalies that are not associated with malicious activity.
- Attackers may not differentiate their logon behavior enough to trigger an alert.
Implementation perspective
User Geolocation Logon Pattern Analysis should be treated as a technical defensive capability rather than a product checkbox. In practice, teams should define the protected scope, the conditions under which the technique acts, and the observable evidence that demonstrates the intended behavior. For this technique, likely engineering context includes Network Traffic.
Use the technique to identify suspicious, unauthorized, or abnormal activity through observable evidence and repeatable analysis.
Questions to ask
- Which events, states, or artifacts must be observed for the analysis to work?
- What analytic logic, threshold, comparison, or signature turns observations into a finding?
- How are expected false positives, blind spots, and environmental variations documented?
- Who receives the result, and what action is expected when the technique produces a finding?
Evidence and validation
- Telemetry and data-source configuration records
- Analytic logic, thresholds, signatures, and version history
- Test cases demonstrating expected positive and negative results
- Alert, triage, escalation, and tuning records
Common failure patterns
- Required telemetry is missing, delayed, or transformed in a way that invalidates the analysis.
- The technique produces alerts without an accountable triage and response process.
- Detection coverage is claimed from product deployment without testing the relevant analytic behavior.
This implementation perspective is original Bare Metal Cyber educational content. It does not replace the official D3FEND definition or establish that a specific product implements the technique.
Technique hierarchy
Top-level family
Parent techniques
Direct child techniques
None listed at this level.
Artifacts and ontology entities
These relationships describe how D3FEND connects a defensive technique to artifacts or other ontology entities. They describe graph semantics, not a product certification.
Explicit technique relationships
Show inferred artifact relationship paths (1)
ATT&CK Enterprise mitigation relationships
These links come from the D3FEND ontology’s ATT&CK mitigation mapping. They help users navigate between the knowledge bases and do not guarantee mitigation effectiveness.
Offensive-technique relationships
These relationships are generated from D3FEND graph paths and are explicitly experimental. They should be treated as hypotheses for defensive analysis—not as proof that the technique prevents, detects, or removes an offensive behavior.
ATT&CK Enterprise (72)
Showing the first 60 of 72 source-derived relationships. Open the official D3FEND technique for the current graph view.
ATT&CK for ICS (18)
Authoritative sources
- Open this technique on the official D3FEND website ↗
- Open the official ontology resources ↗
- Method and Apparatus for Network Fraud Detection and Remediation Through Analytics ↗Idaptive LLC · Yanlin Wang; Weizhi Li · PatentReference
- System, method, and computer program product for detecting and assessing security risks in a network ↗Exabeam Inc · Sylvain Gil; Domingo Mihovilovic; Nir Polak; Magnus Stensmo; Sing Yip · PatentReference
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