Roles, Responsibilities, and Authorities (GV.RR-02) — NIST CSF 2.0 Subcategory

Official CSF 2.0 outcome

GV.RR-02: Roles, responsibilities, and authorities related to cybersecurity risk management are established, communicated, understood, and enforced.

NIST places this Subcategory within GV.RR — Roles, Responsibilities, and Authorities and the GV — Govern Function. The statement defines an outcome; it does not prescribe one technology, control set, or maturity level.

What this outcome asks the organization to achieve

Roles, Responsibilities, and Authorities should be understood as an observable organizational condition, not merely an activity. The organization should be able to explain the scope, owner, decision criteria, operating process, and evidence that demonstrate the outcome.

Within Roles, Responsibilities, and Authorities, the outcome contributes to leadership accountability, decision authority, role clarity, resources, and workforce integration. Achievement may require policy, process, people, technology, supplier coordination, and assurance working together.

The appropriate implementation depends on mission, business impact, threat exposure, legal and contractual duties, architecture, and risk appetite. A small organization and a large enterprise can pursue the same outcome through different means.

Implementation considerations

Use the following questions and priorities to turn the outcome into a controlled, measurable capability. They are original Bare Metal Cyber guidance and should be tailored to the environment.

• Define the exact organizational scope in which “Roles, Responsibilities, and Authorities” must be achieved.
• Assign an accountable outcome owner and identify the teams that operate, support, or independently assess the capability.
• Translate the outcome into measurable requirements using the organization’s risk strategy, architecture, obligations, and operating context.
• Assign accountable risk owners, control owners, operators, and independent reviewers.
• Document decision rights, escalation authority, and accepted segregation of duties.
• Document exceptions, compensating measures, expiration dates, and reassessment triggers.
• Test the outcome using normal operations, a negative or failure condition, and a material change scenario.

Evidence to retain

Evidence should be strong enough for an operator to troubleshoot the capability, a risk owner to make a decision, and an independent reviewer to verify the assessment. Prefer current operational evidence over policy statements alone.

• RACI or responsibility matrices
• Charters, job descriptions, and delegated authority records
• Budget and staffing decisions tied to risk priorities
• Evidence of ownership, approval, exceptions, and corrective actions
• A current measurement or test showing whether the outcome is achieved in scope

Using this outcome in an Organizational Profile

In a Current Profile, record whether GV.RR-02 is achieved for the selected scope, the evidence used, important limitations, and any accepted residual risk. Avoid a simple yes-or-no answer when coverage or effectiveness varies across assets, suppliers, locations, or business services.

In a Target Profile, describe the target condition, priority, accountable owner, dependencies, resources, and the evidence that will demonstrate achievement. The gap between Current and Target becomes a managed improvement action rather than a vague aspiration.

• Scope and business or mission context
• Current achievement statement and supporting evidence
• Target achievement statement and success criteria
• Gap, priority, owner, dependencies, and target date
• Exceptions, residual risk, and reassessment triggers

Common failure modes

The following failure patterns are especially relevant to this Category. They should be tested rather than assumed absent.

• Everyone is responsible for cybersecurity, so no one is accountable for specific outcomes.
• Control owners lack the authority or resources to correct known weaknesses.
• Escalation paths are unclear during time-sensitive incidents.
• Cybersecurity duties are absent from workforce and performance processes.
• The organization marks the outcome complete without defining the assessed scope.
• Evidence demonstrates that an activity occurred but not that the intended outcome is sustained.

Relationship to the wider CSF

GV.RR-02 depends on and supports outcomes across the other CSF Functions. Governance establishes direction and accountability; Identify clarifies context and risk; Protect applies safeguards; Detect provides visibility; Respond manages incidents; and Recover restores operations.

Use the parent Category and Function profiles to understand the broader objective, then examine adjacent Subcategories for dependencies and sequencing. The CSF does not require the published order to be the implementation order.

Source, scope, and attribution

The Subcategory identifier and official outcome are reproduced from Appendix A of NIST CSWP 29, The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0. The page title after the identifier, explanatory guidance, implementation considerations, evidence suggestions, and failure modes are original Bare Metal Cyber educational material.

NIST’s online Reference Tool is the appropriate place to obtain current Implementation Examples and Informative References, which may change more frequently than the Core taxonomy.

Certification relevance

This subject appears in or supports the following certification bodies of knowledge:

Authoritative sources

• NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0 — NIST CSWP 29
• NIST Cybersecurity Framework Resource Center
• NIST CSF 2.0 Reference Tool
• NIST CSF 2.0 Organizational Profiles