NIST SP 800-172 Enhanced CUI Protection Center
Study this CUI requirement family as a connected set of implementation decisions, evidence expectations, and assessment procedures.
CUI requirement family
Use this family as a planning boundary, but assess every applicable requirement against the real CUI system boundary, inherited services, organization-defined parameters, and operational evidence.
Family catalog
Withdrawn records remain available and link to the requirements where their intent was incorporated or addressed.
Increasing the diversity of information technologies within organizational systems reduces the impact of exploitations or compromises of specific technologies. Such diversity protects against common mode failures, including those failures induced by supply chain attacks. Diversity in information technologies also reduces the likelihood that the means adversaries use to compromise one system component will be effectiv
Randomness introduces increased levels of uncertainty for adversaries regarding the actions that organizations take to defend their systems against attacks. Such actions may impede the ability of adversaries to correctly target organizational systems that support critical missions or business functions. Uncertainty may cause adversaries to hesitate before initiating or continuing attacks. Misdirection techniques that
Concealment and misdirection techniques can significantly reduce the targeting capabilities of adversaries (i.e., window of opportunity and available attack surface) to initiate and complete attacks. For example, virtualization techniques provide organizations with the ability to disguise systems, potentially reducing the likelihood of successful attacks without the cost of having multiple platforms. The increased us
Organizations can isolate system components that perform different mission or business functions. Isolating system components with boundary protection mechanisms provides the capability for increased protection of individual system components and to more effectively control information flows between those components. The degree of isolation varies depending on the mechanisms selected. Boundary protection mechanisms i
Adversaries target critical missions and business functions and the systems that support those missions and business functions while also trying to minimize the exposure of their existence and tradecraft. The static, homogeneous, and deterministic nature of organizational systems targeted by adversaries make such systems more susceptible to attacks with less adversary cost and effort to be successful. Changing proces
Platforms are the hardware, software, and firmware components used to execute the organization’s software applications. Platforms include operating systems, the underlying computer architectures, or both. Platform-independent applications are applications with the capability to execute on multiple platforms. Such applications promote portability and reconstitution on different platforms. The portability of applicatio
While frequent changes to operating systems and applications can pose significant configuration management challenges, the changes can result in an increased work factor for adversaries to conduct successful attacks. Changing virtual operating systems or applications, as opposed to changing actual operating systems or applications, provides virtual changes that impede attacker success while reducing configuration man
Decoys (i.e., honeypots, honeynets, or deception nets) are established to attract adversaries and deflect attacks away from the operational systems that support organizational missions and business functions. The use of decoys requires some supporting isolation measures to ensure that any deflected malicious code does not infect organizational systems. This requirement does not enhance a specific requirement in SP 80
Physically separate subnetworks with managed interfaces are useful for isolating computer network defenses from critical operational processing networks to prevent adversaries from discovering the analysis and forensics techniques employed by organizations. This requirement enhances SP 800-171 requirement 03.13.01.
The decomposition of systems into subnetworks (i.e., subnets) helps to provide the appropriate level of protection for network connections to different security domains. This requirement enhances SP 800-171 requirement 03.13.01.
The deployment of system components with minimal functionality reduces the need to secure every endpoint and may reduce the exposure of information, systems, and services to attacks. Reduced or minimal functionality includes diskless nodes and thin client technologies. This requirement does not enhance a specific requirement in SP 800-171 but can be used to strengthen the protection of CUI associated with critical pr
Denial-of-service events may occur due to a variety of internal and external causes, such as an attack by an adversary or a lack of planning to support organizational needs with respect to capacity and bandwidth. Such attacks can occur across a wide range of network protocols (e.g., IPv4, IPv6). A variety of technologies are available to limit or eliminate the origination and effects of denial-of-service events. For
Connection ports include Universal Serial Bus (USB), Thunderbolt, and Firewire (IEEE 1394). Input/output (I/O) devices include optical drives (e.g., compact disc and digital versatile disc drives), printers, and network attached storage devices. Disabling or removing such connection ports and I/O devices helps prevent the exfiltration of information from systems and the introduction of malicious code from those ports
Detonation chambers (also known as dynamic execution environments) allow organizations to open email attachments, execute untrusted or suspicious applications, and execute URL requests in the safety of an isolated environment or a virtualized sandbox. Protected and isolated execution environments provide a means of determining whether the associated attachments or applications contain malicious code. While related to
Separating critical system components and functions from other noncritical system components and functions through separate subnetworks may be necessary to reduce susceptibility to a catastrophic or debilitating breach or compromise that results in system failure. For example, physically separating the command-and-control function from the in-flight entertainment function through separate subnetworks in a commercial
System partitioning is part of a defense-in-depth protection strategy. Organizations determine the degree of physical separation of system components. Physical separation options include physically distinct components in separate racks in the same room, critical components in separate rooms, and geographical separation of critical components. Managed interfaces restrict or prohibit network access and information flow
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