Security requirement
Test backup information [Organization-defined: organization-defined frequency] to verify media reliability and information integrity.
Discussion
Organizations need assurance that backup information can be reliably retrieved. Reliability pertains to the systems and system components in which the backup information is stored, the operations used to retrieve the information, and the integrity of the information being retrieved. Independent and specialized tests can be used for each of these aspects of reliability. For example, decrypting and transporting (or transmitting) a random sample of backup files from the alternate storage or backup site and comparing the information to the same information at the primary processing site can provide such assurance. This requirement enhances SP 800-171 requirement 03.08.09.
Tailoring decisions required
Resolve these values through the governing organization’s approved tailoring and risk-management process before declaring the requirement implemented.
Protection strategies supported
These classifications are carried from the official SP 800-172 OSCAL record and help explain the enhanced requirement’s defensive purpose.
Implementation perspective
Treat Testing System Backups for Reliability and Integrity as an enhanced CUI protection outcome for elevated threat conditions that must be reflected in the system boundary, documented implementation, operational behavior, and assessment evidence. Pay particular attention to CUI media accountability, access, marking, storage, transport, sanitization, and disposal.
- Confirm the federal agency selected this enhanced requirement for the critical program or high-value asset and identify the CUI system components, services, users, and external connections in scope.
- Resolve every organization-defined parameter through an approved governance and tailoring process.
- Map each clause of the requirement to an accountable owner, implementation mechanism, and evidence source.
- Verify that inherited and shared implementations are supported by current provider evidence and responsibility boundaries.
- Collect evidence during normal operation and review changes, exceptions, and deficiencies on a risk-based cadence.
Questions to ask
- Which critical-program or high-value-asset CUI, data flows, users, and services are protected by this enhanced requirement?
- Which portions are implemented locally, inherited, shared, or not applicable, and what evidence supports that determination?
- Do the system security plan, deployed configuration, operating process, and assessment evidence tell the same story?
- What change, incident, or threshold should trigger reassessment?
Evidence and validation
- media inventories and chain-of-custody records
- sanitization certificates
- transport and storage procedures
- removable-media control logs
Common failure patterns
- cloud snapshots and virtual media excluded
- sanitization method not matched to media type
- untracked removable media
- disposal vendors accepted without verification
Assessment objectives and methods
Assessment objectives (2)
backup information is tested [Organization-defined: frequency] to verify media reliability.
backup information is tested [Organization-defined: frequency] to verify information integrity.
Examine
- Contingency planning policy
- procedures addressing system backup
- contingency plan
- system backup test results
- contingency plan test documentation
- contingency plan test results
- system security plan
- other relevant documents or records
Interview
- Personnel with system backup responsibilities
- personnel with information security responsibilities
Test
- Processes for conducting system backups
- mechanisms supporting and/or implementing system backups
Source NIST SP 800-53 controls
These controls are referenced by the official SP 800-172 Rev. 3 OSCAL record. Open the corresponding control pages for complete control text, enhancements, D3FEND mappings, and related learning.
Authoritative sources
- NIST SP 800-172 Revision 3 official publication ↗
- NIST SP 800-172A Revision 3 official publication ↗
- NIST OSCAL Content release used for this import ↗
Bare Metal Cyber is an independent educational publisher and is not affiliated with or endorsed by NIST. The official publications, the responsible federal agency, and the governing contract or agreement determine applicability, tailoring, assessment depth, and required implementation.