Security requirement
Discover, collect, and distribute to [Organization-defined: sources], indicators of compromise provided by [Organization-defined: personnel or roles] .
Discussion
Indicators of compromise (IOCs) are forensic artifacts from intrusions that are identified on organizational systems at the host or network level. IOCs provide valuable information on systems that have been compromised. IOCs can include the creation of registry key values. IOCs for network traffic include universal resource locator (URL) or protocol elements that indicate malicious code command and control servers. The rapid distribution and adoption of IOCs can improve information security by reducing the time that systems and organizations are vulnerable to the same exploit or attack. Threat indicators, signatures, tactics, techniques, procedures, and other IOCs may be available via government and non-government cooperatives, including the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST), the Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Center (CERT/CC), the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT), and the Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Cybersecurity Information Sharing Program. This requirement enhances SP 800-171 requirement 03.14.06.
Tailoring decisions required
Resolve these values through the governing organization’s approved tailoring and risk-management process before declaring the requirement implemented.
Protection strategies supported
These classifications are carried from the official SP 800-172 OSCAL record and help explain the enhanced requirement’s defensive purpose.
Implementation perspective
Treat Indicators of Compromise as an enhanced CUI protection outcome for elevated threat conditions that must be reflected in the system boundary, documented implementation, operational behavior, and assessment evidence. Pay particular attention to threat, vulnerability, likelihood, impact, criticality, and risk-response decisions for the CUI environment.
- Confirm the federal agency selected this enhanced requirement for the critical program or high-value asset and identify the CUI system components, services, users, and external connections in scope.
- Resolve every organization-defined parameter through an approved governance and tailoring process.
- Map each clause of the requirement to an accountable owner, implementation mechanism, and evidence source.
- Verify that inherited and shared implementations are supported by current provider evidence and responsibility boundaries.
- Collect evidence during normal operation and review changes, exceptions, and deficiencies on a risk-based cadence.
Questions to ask
- Which critical-program or high-value-asset CUI, data flows, users, and services are protected by this enhanced requirement?
- Which portions are implemented locally, inherited, shared, or not applicable, and what evidence supports that determination?
- Do the system security plan, deployed configuration, operating process, and assessment evidence tell the same story?
- What change, incident, or threshold should trigger reassessment?
Evidence and validation
- risk assessments and threat models
- vulnerability findings and prioritization records
- supply-chain risk assessments
- risk response and acceptance decisions
Common failure patterns
- risk registers detached from technical evidence
- vulnerability severity treated as business impact
- assessments not updated after material change
- accepted risks without owners or expiration
Assessment objectives and methods
Assessment objectives (3)
indicators of compromise provided by [Organization-defined: sources] are discovered.
indicators of compromise provided by [Organization-defined: sources] are collected.
indicators of compromise provided by [Organization-defined: sources] are distributed to [Organization-defined: personnel or roles].
Examine
- System and information integrity policy
- system and information integrity procedures
- procedures addressing system monitoring
- system design documentation
- system monitoring tools and techniques documentation
- system configuration settings and associated documentation
- system monitoring logs or records
- system audit records
- system security plan
- other relevant documents or records
Interview
- System/network administrators
- personnel with information security responsibilities
- system developers
- personnel installing, configuring, and/or maintaining the system
- personnel responsible for monitoring system hosts
Test
- Processes for system monitoring
- processes for the discovery, collection, distribution, and use of indicators of compromise
- mechanisms supporting and/or implementing a system monitoring capability
- mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the discovery, collection, distribution, and use of indicators of compromise
Source NIST SP 800-53 controls
These controls are referenced by the official SP 800-172 Rev. 3 OSCAL record. Open the corresponding control pages for complete control text, enhancements, D3FEND mappings, and related learning.
Authoritative sources
- NIST SP 800-172 Revision 3 official publication ↗
- NIST SP 800-172A Revision 3 official publication ↗
- NIST OSCAL Content release used for this import ↗
Bare Metal Cyber is an independent educational publisher and is not affiliated with or endorsed by NIST. The official publications, the responsible federal agency, and the governing contract or agreement determine applicability, tailoring, assessment depth, and required implementation.