Security requirement
Determine information about the system that is discoverable and take [Organization-defined: corrective actions].
Discussion
Discoverable information includes information that adversaries could obtain without compromising or breaching the system, such as by collecting information that the system is exposing or by conducting extensive web searches. Corrective actions include notifying organizational personnel, removing designated information, or changing the system to make the designated information less relevant or attractive to adversaries. This requirement excludes intentionally discoverable information that may be part of a decoy capability (e.g., honeypots, honeynets, or deception nets) implemented by the organization. This requirement enhances SP 800-171 requirement 03.11.02.
Tailoring decisions required
Resolve these values through the governing organization’s approved tailoring and risk-management process before declaring the requirement implemented.
Protection strategies supported
These classifications are carried from the official SP 800-172 OSCAL record and help explain the enhanced requirement’s defensive purpose.
Implementation perspective
Treat Discoverable Information as an enhanced CUI protection outcome for elevated threat conditions that must be reflected in the system boundary, documented implementation, operational behavior, and assessment evidence. Pay particular attention to threat, vulnerability, likelihood, impact, criticality, and risk-response decisions for the CUI environment.
- Confirm the federal agency selected this enhanced requirement for the critical program or high-value asset and identify the CUI system components, services, users, and external connections in scope.
- Resolve every organization-defined parameter through an approved governance and tailoring process.
- Map each clause of the requirement to an accountable owner, implementation mechanism, and evidence source.
- Verify that inherited and shared implementations are supported by current provider evidence and responsibility boundaries.
- Collect evidence during normal operation and review changes, exceptions, and deficiencies on a risk-based cadence.
Questions to ask
- Which critical-program or high-value-asset CUI, data flows, users, and services are protected by this enhanced requirement?
- Which portions are implemented locally, inherited, shared, or not applicable, and what evidence supports that determination?
- Do the system security plan, deployed configuration, operating process, and assessment evidence tell the same story?
- What change, incident, or threshold should trigger reassessment?
Evidence and validation
- risk assessments and threat models
- vulnerability findings and prioritization records
- supply-chain risk assessments
- risk response and acceptance decisions
Common failure patterns
- risk registers detached from technical evidence
- vulnerability severity treated as business impact
- assessments not updated after material change
- accepted risks without owners or expiration
Assessment objectives and methods
Assessment objectives (2)
discoverable information about the system is identified.
[Organization-defined: corrective actions] are taken when information about the system is confirmed as discoverable.
Examine
- Procedures addressing vulnerability scanning
- assessment report
- penetration test results
- vulnerability scanning results
- risk assessment report
- records of corrective actions taken on discoverable information
- incident response records
- audit records
- system security plan
- other relevant documents or records
Interview
- Personnel with vulnerability scanning and/or penetration testing responsibilities
- personnel with vulnerability scan analysis responsibilities
- personnel responsible for risk response
- personnel responsible for incident management and response
- personnel with information security responsibilities
Test
- Processes for vulnerability scanning
- processes for risk response
- processes for incident management and response
- mechanisms and/or tools supporting and/or implementing vulnerability scanning
- mechanisms supporting and/or implementing risk response
- mechanisms supporting and/or implementing incident management and response
Source NIST SP 800-53 controls
These controls are referenced by the official SP 800-172 Rev. 3 OSCAL record. Open the corresponding control pages for complete control text, enhancements, D3FEND mappings, and related learning.
Authoritative sources
- NIST SP 800-172 Revision 3 official publication ↗
- NIST SP 800-172A Revision 3 official publication ↗
- NIST OSCAL Content release used for this import ↗
Bare Metal Cyber is an independent educational publisher and is not affiliated with or endorsed by NIST. The official publications, the responsible federal agency, and the governing contract or agreement determine applicability, tailoring, assessment depth, and required implementation.