Security requirement
Employ automated mechanisms to maximize the effectiveness of sharing threat intelligence information.
Discussion
To maximize the effectiveness of monitoring and sharing threat intelligence information, it is important to know what threat observables and indicators the sensors need to be searching for. By using well-established frameworks, services, and automated tools, organizations improve their ability to rapidly share and feed the relevant threat detection signatures into monitoring tools. This requirement does not enhance a specific requirement in SP 800-171 but can be used to strengthen the protection of CUI associated with critical programs or high value assets.
Protection strategies supported
These classifications are carried from the official SP 800-172 OSCAL record and help explain the enhanced requirement’s defensive purpose.
Implementation perspective
Treat Automated Means for Sharing Threat Intelligence as an enhanced CUI protection outcome for elevated threat conditions that must be reflected in the system boundary, documented implementation, operational behavior, and assessment evidence. Pay particular attention to threat, vulnerability, likelihood, impact, criticality, and risk-response decisions for the CUI environment.
- Confirm the federal agency selected this enhanced requirement for the critical program or high-value asset and identify the CUI system components, services, users, and external connections in scope.
- Resolve every organization-defined parameter through an approved governance and tailoring process.
- Map each clause of the requirement to an accountable owner, implementation mechanism, and evidence source.
- Verify that inherited and shared implementations are supported by current provider evidence and responsibility boundaries.
- Collect evidence during normal operation and review changes, exceptions, and deficiencies on a risk-based cadence.
Questions to ask
- Which critical-program or high-value-asset CUI, data flows, users, and services are protected by this enhanced requirement?
- Which portions are implemented locally, inherited, shared, or not applicable, and what evidence supports that determination?
- Do the system security plan, deployed configuration, operating process, and assessment evidence tell the same story?
- What change, incident, or threshold should trigger reassessment?
Evidence and validation
- risk assessments and threat models
- vulnerability findings and prioritization records
- supply-chain risk assessments
- risk response and acceptance decisions
Common failure patterns
- risk registers detached from technical evidence
- vulnerability severity treated as business impact
- assessments not updated after material change
- accepted risks without owners or expiration
Assessment objectives and methods
Assessment objectives (1)
automated mechanisms are employed to maximize the effectiveness of sharing threat intelligence information.
Examine
- Information security program plan
- threat awareness program policy
- threat awareness program procedures
- risk assessment results related to threat awareness
- documentation about the cross-organization information-sharing capability
- other relevant documents or records
Interview
- Personnel with information security program planning and plan implementation responsibilities
- personnel responsible for the threat awareness program
- personnel responsible for the cross-organization information-sharing capability
- personnel with information security responsibilities
- external personnel with whom threat awareness information is shared by the organization
Test
- Processes for implementing the threat awareness program
- processes for implementing the cross-organization information-sharing capability
- automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the threat awareness program
- automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the cross-organization information-sharing capability
Source NIST SP 800-53 controls
These controls are referenced by the official SP 800-172 Rev. 3 OSCAL record. Open the corresponding control pages for complete control text, enhancements, D3FEND mappings, and related learning.
Authoritative sources
- NIST SP 800-172 Revision 3 official publication ↗
- NIST SP 800-172A Revision 3 official publication ↗
- NIST OSCAL Content release used for this import ↗
Bare Metal Cyber is an independent educational publisher and is not affiliated with or endorsed by NIST. The official publications, the responsible federal agency, and the governing contract or agreement determine applicability, tailoring, assessment depth, and required implementation.