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NIST SP 800-172 Enhanced CUI Protection Center

03.17.02E — Inspection of Systems or Components

Read the official CUI requirement and assessment content, then use the separately labeled Bare Metal Cyber perspective to connect it to implementation, evidence, and sustained operation.

4Parameters
1Source controls
1Assessment objectives
3Assessment methods

03.17 — Supply Chain Risk Management · NIST SP 800-172 Revision 3

Active
Official NIST requirement content

Security requirement

Inspect the following systems or system components [Organization-defined: systems or system components] to detect tampering: [Organization-defined: SELECTED PARAMETER VALUE(S)].

Official NIST discussion

Discussion

Inspecting systems or systems components for evidence of tampering addresses physical and logical tampering and is applied to systems and system components that are removed from organization-controlled areas. Indications of a need for inspection include changes in packaging, specifications, factory location, or entity in which the part is purchased, and when individuals return from travel to high-risk locations. This requirement is sourced to a control tailored out of the SP 800-53B .13 moderate baseline in SP 800-171.

Official organization-defined parameters

Tailoring decisions required

Resolve these values through the governing organization’s approved tailoring and risk-management process before declaring the requirement implemented.

systems or system componentsorganization-defined systems or system componentssystems or system components that require inspection are defined.
SELECTED PARAMETER VALUE(S)
frequencyorganization-defined frequencythe frequency at which to inspect systems or system components is defined (if selected).
indications of the need for inspectionorganization-defined indications of need for inspectionindications of the need for an inspection of systems or system components are defined (if selected).
Official protection strategy classifications

Protection strategies supported

These classifications are carried from the official SP 800-172 OSCAL record and help explain the enhanced requirement’s defensive purpose.

PS-DLODamage-Limiting Operations
Bare Metal Cyber interpretation

Implementation perspective

Treat Inspection of Systems or Components as an enhanced CUI protection outcome for elevated threat conditions that must be reflected in the system boundary, documented implementation, operational behavior, and assessment evidence. Pay particular attention to supply-chain governance, provenance, supplier risk, component authenticity, and dependency resilience.

  1. Confirm the federal agency selected this enhanced requirement for the critical program or high-value asset and identify the CUI system components, services, users, and external connections in scope.
  2. Resolve every organization-defined parameter through an approved governance and tailoring process.
  3. Map each clause of the requirement to an accountable owner, implementation mechanism, and evidence source.
  4. Verify that inherited and shared implementations are supported by current provider evidence and responsibility boundaries.
  5. Collect evidence during normal operation and review changes, exceptions, and deficiencies on a risk-based cadence.

Questions to ask

  • Which critical-program or high-value-asset CUI, data flows, users, and services are protected by this enhanced requirement?
  • Which portions are implemented locally, inherited, shared, or not applicable, and what evidence supports that determination?
  • Do the system security plan, deployed configuration, operating process, and assessment evidence tell the same story?
  • What change, incident, or threshold should trigger reassessment?

Evidence and validation

  • supplier inventories and criticality ratings
  • contract security clauses
  • provenance and authenticity records
  • supplier monitoring and incident records

Common failure patterns

  • sub-tier dependencies ignored
  • contracts lacking evidence and notification obligations
  • open-source and service dependencies omitted
  • supplier risk reviewed only during procurement
Official NIST SP 800-172A content

Assessment objectives and methods

Assessment objectives (1)

  1. [Organization-defined: systems or system components] are inspected [Organization-defined: SELECTED PARAMETER VALUE(S)] to detect tampering.

Examine

  • Supply chain risk management policy and procedures
  • supply chain risk management plan
  • system and services acquisition policy
  • records of random inspections
  • inspection reports or results
  • assessment reports or results
  • acquisition documentation
  • acquisition contracts for the system, system component, or system service
  • inter-organizational agreements and procedures
  • system security plan
  • service-level agreements
  • other relevant documents or records

Interview

  • Personnel with system and services acquisition responsibilities
  • personnel with information security responsibilities
  • personnel with supply chain risk management responsibilities

Test

  • Processes for establishing inter-organizational agreements and procedures with supply chain entities
  • processes to inspect for tampering
Official source-control relationships

Source NIST SP 800-53 controls

These controls are referenced by the official SP 800-172 Rev. 3 OSCAL record. Open the corresponding control pages for complete control text, enhancements, D3FEND mappings, and related learning.

Source controlSR-10Open SP 800-53 control →
Source record

Authoritative sources

Bare Metal Cyber is an independent educational publisher and is not affiliated with or endorsed by NIST. The official publications, the responsible federal agency, and the governing contract or agreement determine applicability, tailoring, assessment depth, and required implementation.