Security requirement
Document, monitor, and maintain valid provenance of the following systems, system components, and associated CUI: [Organization-defined: systems, system components, and associated CUI].
Discussion
Every system and system component has a point of origin and may be changed throughout its existence. Provenance is the chronology of the origin, development, ownership, location, and changes to a system or system component and associated data. It may also include personnel and processes used to interact with or make modifications to the system, component, or associated data. Organizations have methods to document, monitor, and maintain valid provenance baselines for systems, system components, and related data. These actions help track, assess, and document any changes to the provenance, including changes in supply chain elements or configuration, and help ensure non-repudiation of provenance information and the provenance change records. This requirement does not enhance a specific requirement in SP 800-171 but can be used to strengthen the protection of CUI associated with critical programs or high value assets.
Tailoring decisions required
Resolve these values through the governing organization’s approved tailoring and risk-management process before declaring the requirement implemented.
Protection strategies supported
These classifications are carried from the official SP 800-172 OSCAL record and help explain the enhanced requirement’s defensive purpose.
Implementation perspective
Treat Provenance as an enhanced CUI protection outcome for elevated threat conditions that must be reflected in the system boundary, documented implementation, operational behavior, and assessment evidence. Pay particular attention to supply-chain governance, provenance, supplier risk, component authenticity, and dependency resilience.
- Confirm the federal agency selected this enhanced requirement for the critical program or high-value asset and identify the CUI system components, services, users, and external connections in scope.
- Resolve every organization-defined parameter through an approved governance and tailoring process.
- Map each clause of the requirement to an accountable owner, implementation mechanism, and evidence source.
- Verify that inherited and shared implementations are supported by current provider evidence and responsibility boundaries.
- Collect evidence during normal operation and review changes, exceptions, and deficiencies on a risk-based cadence.
Questions to ask
- Which critical-program or high-value-asset CUI, data flows, users, and services are protected by this enhanced requirement?
- Which portions are implemented locally, inherited, shared, or not applicable, and what evidence supports that determination?
- Do the system security plan, deployed configuration, operating process, and assessment evidence tell the same story?
- What change, incident, or threshold should trigger reassessment?
Evidence and validation
- supplier inventories and criticality ratings
- contract security clauses
- provenance and authenticity records
- supplier monitoring and incident records
Common failure patterns
- sub-tier dependencies ignored
- contracts lacking evidence and notification obligations
- open-source and service dependencies omitted
- supplier risk reviewed only during procurement
Assessment objectives and methods
Assessment objectives (3)
valid provenance is documented for [Organization-defined: systems, system components, and associated CUI].
valid provenance is monitored for [Organization-defined: systems, system components, and associated CUI].
valid provenance is maintained for [Organization-defined: systems, system components, and associated CUI].
Examine
- Supply chain risk management policy
- supply chain risk management procedures
- supply chain risk management plan
- documentation of critical systems, critical system components, and associated data
- documentation showing the history of ownership, custody, and location of and changes to critical systems or critical system components
- system architecture
- inter-organizational agreements and procedures
- contracts
- system security plan
- other relevant documents or records
Interview
- Organizational personnel with acquisition responsibilities
- organizational personnel with information security responsibilities
- organizational personnel with supply chain risk management responsibilities
Test
- Organizational processes for identifying the provenance of critical systems and critical system components
- mechanisms used to document, monitor, or maintain provenance
Source NIST SP 800-53 controls
These controls are referenced by the official SP 800-172 Rev. 3 OSCAL record. Open the corresponding control pages for complete control text, enhancements, D3FEND mappings, and related learning.
Authoritative sources
- NIST SP 800-172 Revision 3 official publication ↗
- NIST SP 800-172A Revision 3 official publication ↗
- NIST OSCAL Content release used for this import ↗
Bare Metal Cyber is an independent educational publisher and is not affiliated with or endorsed by NIST. The official publications, the responsible federal agency, and the governing contract or agreement determine applicability, tailoring, assessment depth, and required implementation.