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NIST SP 800-53 Learning Center

AU-15 — Alternate Audit Logging Capability

Read the official control and assessment content, then use the separately labeled Bare Metal Cyber perspective to connect the requirement to implementation, evidence, and sustained operation.

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AU — Audit and Accountability · NIST SP 800-53 Release 5.2.0

Withdrawn
Official NIST control content

Control statement

This control is marked withdrawn in the official OSCAL catalog. Use the related-control references to trace where the control intent was incorporated or superseded.

Original Bare Metal Cyber perspective

From control text to operational evidence

Use Alternate Audit Logging Capability as a testable risk decision. Translate the official statement into accountable people, repeatable processes, configured technology, and evidence that demonstrates the outcome over time. In this family, pay particular attention to audit event design, trustworthy collection, retention, review, and investigation support.

Implementation workflow

  • Define the control boundary, responsible owner, inherited portions, and systems or processes in scope.
  • Resolve each organization-defined parameter before declaring the control implemented.
  • Document how the implementation satisfies every clause of the official control statement.
  • Collect evidence as a normal byproduct of operation rather than only before an assessment.
  • Review exceptions, changes, and monitoring results on a risk-based cadence.

Evidence examples

  • logging standards and event-selection decisions
  • sample audit records and retention settings
  • time-synchronization evidence
  • alert and review records

Common failure patterns

  • collecting logs without defined use cases
  • critical events missing from the audit trail
  • retention shorter than investigative needs
  • logs accessible to the same administrators being monitored

Questions practitioners should ask

  • What risk decision is this control intended to support in this system?
  • Which parts are implemented locally, inherited, shared, or not applicable—and what evidence supports that decision?
  • Do the documented narrative, deployed configuration, operating process, and collected evidence agree?
  • What event or threshold requires the implementation to be reviewed or changed?
MITRE D3FEND semantic mapping

Related defensive techniques

D3FEND maps this base control or one of its enhancements to the following defensive techniques. The ontology relation label is preserved and does not by itself prove implementation or effectiveness.

MITRE D3FEND™ and the D3FEND logo are trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Bare Metal Cyber is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

Source record

Authoritative sources