Control statement
Uniquely identify and authenticate [Organization-defined: system services and applications] before establishing communications with devices, users, or other services or applications.
Discussion
Services that may require identification and authentication include web applications using digital certificates or services or applications that query a database. Identification and authentication methods for system services and applications include information or code signing, provenance graphs, and electronic signatures that indicate the sources of services. Decisions regarding the validity of identification and authentication claims can be made by services separate from the services acting on those decisions. This can occur in distributed system architectures. In such situations, the identification and authentication decisions (instead of actual identifiers and authentication data) are provided to the services that need to act on those decisions.
Organization-defined parameters
These values must be resolved through the organization’s tailoring and governance process. Bracketed parameter references in the control text identify where a decision is required.
From control text to operational evidence
Use Service Identification and Authentication as a testable risk decision. Translate the official statement into accountable people, repeatable processes, configured technology, and evidence that demonstrates the outcome over time. In this family, pay particular attention to identity proofing, authentication strength, credential lifecycle, and trusted identity assertions.
Implementation workflow
- Define the control boundary, responsible owner, inherited portions, and systems or processes in scope.
- Resolve each organization-defined parameter before declaring the control implemented.
- Document how the implementation satisfies every clause of the official control statement.
- Collect evidence as a normal byproduct of operation rather than only before an assessment.
- Review exceptions, changes, and monitoring results on a risk-based cadence.
Evidence examples
- identity-proofing records
- authenticator issuance and revocation logs
- MFA and federation configuration
- credential inventory and rotation evidence
Common failure patterns
- strong authentication applied only to interactive users
- service credentials without ownership or rotation
- weak recovery paths that bypass MFA
- federated trust not reviewed after partner changes
Questions practitioners should ask
- What risk decision is this control intended to support in this system?
- Which parts are implemented locally, inherited, shared, or not applicable—and what evidence supports that decision?
- Do the documented narrative, deployed configuration, operating process, and collected evidence agree?
- What event or threshold requires the implementation to be reviewed or changed?
Assessment objectives and methods
Show the assessment objective
[Organization-defined: system services and applications] are uniquely identified and authenticated before establishing communications with devices, users, or other services or applications.
Examine
- Identification and authentication policy
- procedures addressing service identification and authentication
- system security plan
- system design documentation
- security safeguards used to identify and authenticate system services
- system configuration settings and associated documentation
- system audit records
- other relevant documents or records
Interview
- Organizational personnel with system operations responsibilities
- organizational personnel with information security responsibilities
- system/network administrators
- system developers
- organizational personnel with identification and authentication responsibilities
Test
- Security safeguards implementing service identification and authentication capabilities
Related controls
These relationships come from the official OSCAL catalog. They indicate useful dependencies or context, not automatic inheritance or equivalence.
Control enhancements
Enhancements add specificity, strength, or scope to the base control. Baseline badges show explicit selections in the official SP 800-53B OSCAL profiles.
IA-9(1) — Information Exchange
This enhancement is marked withdrawn in the official OSCAL catalog. Related-control metadata below may identify where its intent was incorporated.
IA-9(2) — Transmission of Decisions
This enhancement is marked withdrawn in the official OSCAL catalog. Related-control metadata below may identify where its intent was incorporated.
Authoritative sources
Bare Metal Cyber is an independent educational publisher and is not affiliated with or endorsed by NIST. Official control requirements and interpretations remain with NIST and the responsible authorizing organization.