Control statement
- a.Establish and maintain a cyber threat hunting capability to:
- 1.Search for indicators of compromise in organizational systems; and
- 2.Detect, track, and disrupt threats that evade existing controls; and
- b.Employ the threat hunting capability [Organization-defined: frequency].
Discussion
Threat hunting is an active means of cyber defense in contrast to traditional protection measures, such as firewalls, intrusion detection and prevention systems, quarantining malicious code in sandboxes, and Security Information and Event Management technologies and systems. Cyber threat hunting involves proactively searching organizational systems, networks, and infrastructure for advanced threats. The objective is to track and disrupt cyber adversaries as early as possible in the attack sequence and to measurably improve the speed and accuracy of organizational responses. Indications of compromise include unusual network traffic, unusual file changes, and the presence of malicious code. Threat hunting teams leverage existing threat intelligence and may create new threat intelligence, which is shared with peer organizations, Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations (ISAO), Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISAC), and relevant government departments and agencies.
Organization-defined parameters
These values must be resolved through the organization’s tailoring and governance process. Bracketed parameter references in the control text identify where a decision is required.
From control text to operational evidence
Use Threat Hunting as a testable risk decision. Translate the official statement into accountable people, repeatable processes, configured technology, and evidence that demonstrates the outcome over time. In this family, pay particular attention to risk framing, threat and vulnerability analysis, impact, criticality, and response decisions.
Implementation workflow
- Define the control boundary, responsible owner, inherited portions, and systems or processes in scope.
- Resolve each organization-defined parameter before declaring the control implemented.
- Document how the implementation satisfies every clause of the official control statement.
- Collect evidence as a normal byproduct of operation rather than only before an assessment.
- Review exceptions, changes, and monitoring results on a risk-based cadence.
Evidence examples
- risk assessments and threat models
- vulnerability findings and prioritization records
- supply-chain risk assessments
- risk response and acceptance decisions
Common failure patterns
- risk registers detached from technical evidence
- vulnerability severity treated as business impact
- assessments not updated after material change
- accepted risks have no owner or expiration
Questions practitioners should ask
- What risk decision is this control intended to support in this system?
- Which parts are implemented locally, inherited, shared, or not applicable—and what evidence supports that decision?
- Do the documented narrative, deployed configuration, operating process, and collected evidence agree?
- What event or threshold requires the implementation to be reviewed or changed?
Assessment objectives and methods
Show the assessment objective
- RA-10a.
- RA-10a.01a cyber threat capability is established and maintained to search for indicators of compromise in organizational systems;
- RA-10a.02a cyber threat capability is established and maintained to detect, track, and disrupt threats that evade existing controls;
- RA-10b.the threat hunting capability is employed [Organization-defined: frequency].
Examine
- Risk assessment policy
- assessment reports
- audit records/event logs
- threat hunting capability
- system security plan
- other relevant documents or records
Interview
- Organizational personnel with threat hunting responsibilities
- system/network administrators
- organizational personnel with security responsibilities
Test
- Organizational processes for assessments and audits
- mechanisms/tools supporting and/or implementing threat hunting capabilities
Related controls
These relationships come from the official OSCAL catalog. They indicate useful dependencies or context, not automatic inheritance or equivalence.
Authoritative sources
Bare Metal Cyber is an independent educational publisher and is not affiliated with or endorsed by NIST. Official control requirements and interpretations remain with NIST and the responsible authorizing organization.