Control statement
Employ [Organization-defined: sa-23_odp.01] on [Organization-defined: systems or system components] supporting mission essential services or functions to increase the trustworthiness in those systems or components.
Discussion
It is often necessary for a system or system component that supports mission-essential services or functions to be enhanced to maximize the trustworthiness of the resource. Sometimes this enhancement is done at the design level. In other instances, it is done post-design, either through modifications of the system in question or by augmenting the system with additional components. For example, supplemental authentication or non-repudiation functions may be added to the system to enhance the identity of critical resources to other resources that depend on the organization-defined resources.
Organization-defined parameters
These values must be resolved through the organization’s tailoring and governance process. Bracketed parameter references in the control text identify where a decision is required.
From control text to operational evidence
Use Specialization as a testable risk decision. Translate the official statement into accountable people, repeatable processes, configured technology, and evidence that demonstrates the outcome over time. In this family, pay particular attention to secure acquisition, engineering, development lifecycle, supplier expectations, and system integrity by design.
Implementation workflow
- Define the control boundary, responsible owner, inherited portions, and systems or processes in scope.
- Resolve each organization-defined parameter before declaring the control implemented.
- Document how the implementation satisfies every clause of the official control statement.
- Collect evidence as a normal byproduct of operation rather than only before an assessment.
- Review exceptions, changes, and monitoring results on a risk-based cadence.
Evidence examples
- security requirements in contracts and specifications
- architecture and design review records
- development lifecycle evidence
- supplier assessment and acceptance records
Common failure patterns
- security requirements added after procurement
- supplier claims accepted without evidence
- development exceptions become permanent
- security architecture not tied to testable requirements
Questions practitioners should ask
- What risk decision is this control intended to support in this system?
- Which parts are implemented locally, inherited, shared, or not applicable—and what evidence supports that decision?
- Do the documented narrative, deployed configuration, operating process, and collected evidence agree?
- What event or threshold requires the implementation to be reviewed or changed?
Assessment objectives and methods
Show the assessment objective
[Organization-defined: sa-23_odp.01] is employed on [Organization-defined: systems or system components] supporting essential services or functions to increase the trustworthiness in those systems or components.
Examine
- System and services acquisition policy
- procedures addressing design modification, augmentation, or reconfiguration of systems or system components
- documented evidence of design modification, augmentation, or reconfiguration
- system security plan
- supply chain risk management plan
- other relevant documents or records
Interview
- Organizational personnel with system and service acquisition responsibilities
- organizational personnel with information security responsibilities
- organizational personnel with the responsibility for security architecture
- organizational personnel responsible for configuration management
Test
- Organizational processes for the modification of design, augmentation, or reconfiguration of systems or system components
- mechanisms supporting and/or implementing design modification, augmentation, or reconfiguration of systems or system components
Related controls
These relationships come from the official OSCAL catalog. They indicate useful dependencies or context, not automatic inheritance or equivalence.
Authoritative sources
Bare Metal Cyber is an independent educational publisher and is not affiliated with or endorsed by NIST. Official control requirements and interpretations remain with NIST and the responsible authorizing organization.