Control statement
- a.Obtain or develop administrator documentation for the system, system component, or system service that describes:
- 1.Secure configuration, installation, and operation of the system, component, or service;
- 2.Effective use and maintenance of security and privacy functions and mechanisms; and
- 3.Known vulnerabilities regarding configuration and use of administrative or privileged functions;
- b.Obtain or develop user documentation for the system, system component, or system service that describes:
- 1.User-accessible security and privacy functions and mechanisms and how to effectively use those functions and mechanisms;
- 2.Methods for user interaction, which enables individuals to use the system, component, or service in a more secure manner and protect individual privacy; and
- 3.User responsibilities in maintaining the security of the system, component, or service and privacy of individuals;
- c.Document attempts to obtain system, system component, or system service documentation when such documentation is either unavailable or nonexistent and take [Organization-defined: actions] in response; and
- d.Distribute documentation to [Organization-defined: personnel or roles].
Discussion
System artifacts and documentation created by the developer helps organizational personnel understand the implementation and operation of controls. Organizations consider establishing specific measures to determine the quality and completeness of the content provided. System documentation may be used to delineate roles, responsibilities and expectations of the developer and organization, support the management of supply chain risk, incident response, flaw remediation, and other functions. Personnel or roles that require documentation include system owners, system security officers, and system administrators. Attempts to obtain documentation include contacting manufacturers or suppliers and conducting web-based searches. The inability to obtain documentation may occur due to the age of the system or component or the lack of support from developers and contractors. When documentation cannot be obtained, organizations may need to recreate the documentation if it is essential to the implementation or operation of the controls. The protection provided for the documentation is commensurate with the security category or classification of the system. Documentation that addresses system vulnerabilities may require an increased level of protection. Secure operation of the system includes initially starting the system and resuming secure system operation after a lapse in system operation. An example of least privilege in software development is minimizing the functions that operate with elevated privileges (e.g., limiting the tools and functionality that operate in kernel mode)
Organization-defined parameters
These values must be resolved through the organization’s tailoring and governance process. Bracketed parameter references in the control text identify where a decision is required.
From control text to operational evidence
Use System Documentation as a testable risk decision. Translate the official statement into accountable people, repeatable processes, configured technology, and evidence that demonstrates the outcome over time. In this family, pay particular attention to secure acquisition, engineering, development lifecycle, supplier expectations, and system integrity by design.
Implementation workflow
- Define the control boundary, responsible owner, inherited portions, and systems or processes in scope.
- Resolve each organization-defined parameter before declaring the control implemented.
- Document how the implementation satisfies every clause of the official control statement.
- Collect evidence as a normal byproduct of operation rather than only before an assessment.
- Review exceptions, changes, and monitoring results on a risk-based cadence.
Evidence examples
- security requirements in contracts and specifications
- architecture and design review records
- development lifecycle evidence
- supplier assessment and acceptance records
Common failure patterns
- security requirements added after procurement
- supplier claims accepted without evidence
- development exceptions become permanent
- security architecture not tied to testable requirements
Questions practitioners should ask
- What risk decision is this control intended to support in this system?
- Which parts are implemented locally, inherited, shared, or not applicable—and what evidence supports that decision?
- Do the documented narrative, deployed configuration, operating process, and collected evidence agree?
- What event or threshold requires the implementation to be reviewed or changed?
Assessment objectives and methods
Show the assessment objective
- SA-05a.
- SA-05a.01
- SA-05a.01[01]administrator documentation for the system, system component, or system service that describes the secure configuration of the system, component, or service is obtained or developed;
- SA-05a.01[02]administrator documentation for the system, system component, or system service that describes the secure installation of the system, component, or service is obtained or developed;
- SA-05a.01[03]administrator documentation for the system, system component, or system service that describes the secure operation of the system, component, or service is obtained or developed;
- SA-05a.02
- SA-05a.02[01]administrator documentation for the system, system component, or system service that describes the effective use of security functions and mechanisms is obtained or developed;
- SA-05a.02[02]administrator documentation for the system, system component, or system service that describes the effective maintenance of security functions and mechanisms is obtained or developed;
- SA-05a.02[03]administrator documentation for the system, system component, or system service that describes the effective use of privacy functions and mechanisms is obtained or developed;
- SA-05a.02[04]administrator documentation for the system, system component, or system service that describes the effective maintenance of privacy functions and mechanisms is obtained or developed;
- SA-05a.03
- SA-05a.03[01]administrator documentation for the system, system component, or system service that describes known vulnerabilities regarding the configuration of administrative or privileged functions is obtained or developed;
- SA-05a.03[02]administrator documentation for the system, system component, or system service that describes known vulnerabilities regarding the use of administrative or privileged functions is obtained or developed;
- SA-05a.01
- SA-05b.
- SA-05b.01
- SA-05b.01[01]user documentation for the system, system component, or system service that describes user-accessible security functions and mechanisms is obtained or developed;
- SA-05b.01[02]user documentation for the system, system component, or system service that describes how to effectively use those (user-accessible security) functions and mechanisms is obtained or developed;
- SA-05b.01[03]user documentation for the system, system component, or system service that describes user-accessible privacy functions and mechanisms is obtained or developed;
- SA-05b.01[04]user documentation for the system, system component, or system service that describes how to effectively use those (user-accessible privacy) functions and mechanisms is obtained or developed;
- SA-05b.02
- SA-05b.02[01]user documentation for the system, system component, or system service that describes methods for user interaction, which enable individuals to use the system, component, or service in a more secure manner is obtained or developed;
- SA-05b.02[02]user documentation for the system, system component, or system service that describes methods for user interaction, which enable individuals to use the system, component, or service to protect individual privacy is obtained or developed;
- SA-05b.03
- SA-05b.03[01]user documentation for the system, system component, or system service that describes user responsibilities for maintaining the security of the system, component, or service is obtained or developed;
- SA-05b.03[02]user documentation for the system, system component, or system service that describes user responsibilities for maintaining the privacy of individuals is obtained or developed;
- SA-05b.01
- SA-05c.
- SA-05c.[01]attempts to obtain system, system component, or system service documentation when such documentation is either unavailable or nonexistent is documented;
- SA-05c.[02]after attempts to obtain system, system component, or system service documentation when such documentation is either unavailable or nonexistent, [Organization-defined: actions] are taken in response;
- SA-05d.documentation is distributed to [Organization-defined: personnel or roles].
Examine
- System and services acquisition policy
- system and services acquisition procedures
- procedures addressing system documentation
- system documentation, including administrator and user guides
- system design documentation
- records documenting attempts to obtain unavailable or nonexistent system documentation
- list of actions to be taken in response to documented attempts to obtain system, system component, or system service documentation
- risk management strategy documentation
- system security plan
- privacy plan
- privacy impact assessment
- privacy risk assessment documentation
- other relevant documents or records
Interview
- Organizational personnel with acquisition/contracting responsibilities
- organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities
- system administrators
- organizational personnel responsible for operating, using, and/or maintaining the system
- system developers
Test
- Organizational processes for obtaining, protecting, and distributing system administrator and user documentation
Related controls
These relationships come from the official OSCAL catalog. They indicate useful dependencies or context, not automatic inheritance or equivalence.
Control enhancements
Enhancements add specificity, strength, or scope to the base control. Baseline badges show explicit selections in the official SP 800-53B OSCAL profiles.
SA-5(1) — Functional Properties of Security Controls
This enhancement is marked withdrawn in the official OSCAL catalog. Related-control metadata below may identify where its intent was incorporated.
SA-5(2) — Security-relevant External System Interfaces
This enhancement is marked withdrawn in the official OSCAL catalog. Related-control metadata below may identify where its intent was incorporated.
SA-5(3) — High-level Design
This enhancement is marked withdrawn in the official OSCAL catalog. Related-control metadata below may identify where its intent was incorporated.
SA-5(4) — Low-level Design
This enhancement is marked withdrawn in the official OSCAL catalog. Related-control metadata below may identify where its intent was incorporated.
SA-5(5) — Source Code
This enhancement is marked withdrawn in the official OSCAL catalog. Related-control metadata below may identify where its intent was incorporated.
Authoritative sources
Bare Metal Cyber is an independent educational publisher and is not affiliated with or endorsed by NIST. Official control requirements and interpretations remain with NIST and the responsible authorizing organization.