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NIST SP 800-53 Learning Center

SA-6 — Software Usage Restrictions

Read the official control and assessment content, then use the separately labeled Bare Metal Cyber perspective to connect the requirement to implementation, evidence, and sustained operation.

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SA — System and Services Acquisition · NIST SP 800-53 Release 5.2.0

Withdrawn
Official NIST control content

Control statement

This control is marked withdrawn in the official OSCAL catalog. Use the related-control references to trace where the control intent was incorporated or superseded.

Original Bare Metal Cyber perspective

From control text to operational evidence

Use Software Usage Restrictions as a testable risk decision. Translate the official statement into accountable people, repeatable processes, configured technology, and evidence that demonstrates the outcome over time. In this family, pay particular attention to secure acquisition, engineering, development lifecycle, supplier expectations, and system integrity by design.

Implementation workflow

  • Define the control boundary, responsible owner, inherited portions, and systems or processes in scope.
  • Resolve each organization-defined parameter before declaring the control implemented.
  • Document how the implementation satisfies every clause of the official control statement.
  • Collect evidence as a normal byproduct of operation rather than only before an assessment.
  • Review exceptions, changes, and monitoring results on a risk-based cadence.

Evidence examples

  • security requirements in contracts and specifications
  • architecture and design review records
  • development lifecycle evidence
  • supplier assessment and acceptance records

Common failure patterns

  • security requirements added after procurement
  • supplier claims accepted without evidence
  • development exceptions become permanent
  • security architecture not tied to testable requirements

Questions practitioners should ask

  • What risk decision is this control intended to support in this system?
  • Which parts are implemented locally, inherited, shared, or not applicable—and what evidence supports that decision?
  • Do the documented narrative, deployed configuration, operating process, and collected evidence agree?
  • What event or threshold requires the implementation to be reviewed or changed?
Source record

Authoritative sources