Control statement
Include components within organizational systems specifically designed to be the target of malicious attacks for detecting, deflecting, and analyzing such attacks.
Discussion
Decoys (i.e., honeypots, honeynets, or deception nets) are established to attract adversaries and deflect attacks away from the operational systems that support organizational mission and business functions. Use of decoys requires some supporting isolation measures to ensure that any deflected malicious code does not infect organizational systems. Depending on the specific usage of the decoy, consultation with the Office of the General Counsel before deployment may be needed.
From control text to operational evidence
Use Decoys as a testable risk decision. Translate the official statement into accountable people, repeatable processes, configured technology, and evidence that demonstrates the outcome over time. In this family, pay particular attention to secure architecture, boundary protection, communications protection, cryptography, and system isolation.
Implementation workflow
- Define the control boundary, responsible owner, inherited portions, and systems or processes in scope.
- Resolve each organization-defined parameter before declaring the control implemented.
- Document how the implementation satisfies every clause of the official control statement.
- Collect evidence as a normal byproduct of operation rather than only before an assessment.
- Review exceptions, changes, and monitoring results on a risk-based cadence.
Evidence examples
- network and trust-boundary diagrams
- firewall and gateway configurations
- cryptographic configuration and key records
- segmentation and isolation test results
Common failure patterns
- diagrams omit cloud and third-party paths
- encryption enabled without key governance
- flat trust zones allow unnecessary lateral movement
- boundary rules accumulate without owner review
Questions practitioners should ask
- What risk decision is this control intended to support in this system?
- Which parts are implemented locally, inherited, shared, or not applicable—and what evidence supports that decision?
- Do the documented narrative, deployed configuration, operating process, and collected evidence agree?
- What event or threshold requires the implementation to be reviewed or changed?
Assessment objectives and methods
Show the assessment objective
- SC-26[01]components within organizational systems specifically designed to be the target of malicious attacks are included to detect such attacks;
- SC-26[02]components within organizational systems specifically designed to be the target of malicious attacks are included to deflect such attacks;
- SC-26[03]components within organizational systems specifically designed to be the target of malicious attacks are included to analyze such attacks.
Examine
- System and communications protection policy
- procedures addressing the use of decoys
- system design documentation
- system configuration settings and associated documentation
- system audit records
- system security plan
- other relevant documents or records
Interview
- System/network administrators
- organizational personnel with information security responsibilities
- system developer
Test
- Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing decoys
Related controls
These relationships come from the official OSCAL catalog. They indicate useful dependencies or context, not automatic inheritance or equivalence.
Control enhancements
Enhancements add specificity, strength, or scope to the base control. Baseline badges show explicit selections in the official SP 800-53B OSCAL profiles.
SC-26(1) — Detection of Malicious Code
This enhancement is marked withdrawn in the official OSCAL catalog. Related-control metadata below may identify where its intent was incorporated.
Authoritative sources
Bare Metal Cyber is an independent educational publisher and is not affiliated with or endorsed by NIST. Official control requirements and interpretations remain with NIST and the responsible authorizing organization.