Control statement
Relocate [Organization-defined: sensors and monitoring capabilities] to [Organization-defined: locations] under the following conditions or circumstances: [Organization-defined: conditions or circumstances].
Discussion
Adversaries may take various paths and use different approaches as they move laterally through an organization (including its systems) to reach their target or as they attempt to exfiltrate information from the organization. The organization often only has a limited set of monitoring and detection capabilities, and they may be focused on the critical or likely infiltration or exfiltration paths. By using communications paths that the organization typically does not monitor, the adversary can increase its chances of achieving its desired goals. By relocating its sensors or monitoring capabilities to new locations, the organization can impede the adversary’s ability to achieve its goals. The relocation of the sensors or monitoring capabilities might be done based on threat information that the organization has acquired or randomly to confuse the adversary and make its lateral transition through the system or organization more challenging.
Organization-defined parameters
These values must be resolved through the organization’s tailoring and governance process. Bracketed parameter references in the control text identify where a decision is required.
From control text to operational evidence
Use Sensor Relocation as a testable risk decision. Translate the official statement into accountable people, repeatable processes, configured technology, and evidence that demonstrates the outcome over time. In this family, pay particular attention to secure architecture, boundary protection, communications protection, cryptography, and system isolation.
Implementation workflow
- Define the control boundary, responsible owner, inherited portions, and systems or processes in scope.
- Resolve each organization-defined parameter before declaring the control implemented.
- Document how the implementation satisfies every clause of the official control statement.
- Collect evidence as a normal byproduct of operation rather than only before an assessment.
- Review exceptions, changes, and monitoring results on a risk-based cadence.
Evidence examples
- network and trust-boundary diagrams
- firewall and gateway configurations
- cryptographic configuration and key records
- segmentation and isolation test results
Common failure patterns
- diagrams omit cloud and third-party paths
- encryption enabled without key governance
- flat trust zones allow unnecessary lateral movement
- boundary rules accumulate without owner review
Questions practitioners should ask
- What risk decision is this control intended to support in this system?
- Which parts are implemented locally, inherited, shared, or not applicable—and what evidence supports that decision?
- Do the documented narrative, deployed configuration, operating process, and collected evidence agree?
- What event or threshold requires the implementation to be reviewed or changed?
Assessment objectives and methods
Show the assessment objective
[Organization-defined: sensors and monitoring capabilities] are relocated to [Organization-defined: locations] under [Organization-defined: conditions or circumstances].
Examine
- System and communications protection policy
- procedures addressing sensor and monitoring capability relocation
- list of sensors/monitoring capabilities to be relocated
- change control records
- configuration management records
- system design documentation
- system configuration settings and associated documentation
- system audit records
- system security plan
- other relevant documents or records
Interview
- System/network administrators
- organizational personnel with information security responsibilities
- organizational personnel installing, configuring, and/or maintaining the system
Test
- Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing sensor relocation
Related controls
These relationships come from the official OSCAL catalog. They indicate useful dependencies or context, not automatic inheritance or equivalence.
Control enhancements
Enhancements add specificity, strength, or scope to the base control. Baseline badges show explicit selections in the official SP 800-53B OSCAL profiles.
SC-48(1) — Dynamic Relocation of Sensors or Monitoring Capabilities
Dynamically relocate [Organization-defined: sensors and monitoring capabilities] to [Organization-defined: locations] under the following conditions or circumstances: [Organization-defined: conditions or circumstances].
Official discussion
None.
Organization-defined parameters (3)
Assessment objectives and methods
[Organization-defined: sensors and monitoring capabilities] are dynamically relocated to [Organization-defined: locations] under [Organization-defined: conditions or circumstances].
Examine
- System and communications protection policy
- procedures addressing sensor and monitoring capability relocation
- list of sensors/monitoring capabilities to be relocated
- change control records
- configuration management records
- system design documentation
- system configuration settings and associated documentation
- system audit records
- system security plan
- other relevant documents or records
Interview
- System/network administrators
- organizational personnel with information security responsibilities
- organizational personnel installing, configuring, and/or maintaining the system
Test
- SELECT FROM: Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing sensor relocation
Authoritative sources
Bare Metal Cyber is an independent educational publisher and is not affiliated with or endorsed by NIST. Official control requirements and interpretations remain with NIST and the responsible authorizing organization.