Control statement
Dispose of [Organization-defined: data, documentation, tools, or system components] using the following techniques and methods: [Organization-defined: techniques and methods].
Discussion
Data, documentation, tools, or system components can be disposed of at any time during the system development life cycle (not only in the disposal or retirement phase of the life cycle). For example, disposal can occur during research and development, design, prototyping, or operations/maintenance and include methods such as disk cleaning, removal of cryptographic keys, partial reuse of components. Opportunities for compromise during disposal affect physical and logical data, including system documentation in paper-based or digital files; shipping and delivery documentation; memory sticks with software code; or complete routers or servers that include permanent media, which contain sensitive or proprietary information. Additionally, proper disposal of system components helps to prevent such components from entering the gray market.
Organization-defined parameters
These values must be resolved through the organization’s tailoring and governance process. Bracketed parameter references in the control text identify where a decision is required.
From control text to operational evidence
Use Component Disposal as a testable risk decision. Translate the official statement into accountable people, repeatable processes, configured technology, and evidence that demonstrates the outcome over time. In this family, pay particular attention to cybersecurity supply-chain governance, provenance, supplier risk, component authenticity, and dependency resilience.
Implementation workflow
- Define the control boundary, responsible owner, inherited portions, and systems or processes in scope.
- Resolve each organization-defined parameter before declaring the control implemented.
- Document how the implementation satisfies every clause of the official control statement.
- Collect evidence as a normal byproduct of operation rather than only before an assessment.
- Review exceptions, changes, and monitoring results on a risk-based cadence.
Evidence examples
- supplier inventories and criticality ratings
- contract security clauses
- provenance and authenticity records
- supplier monitoring and incident records
Common failure patterns
- tier-one vendors assessed while sub-tier dependencies are ignored
- contracts lack evidence and notification obligations
- open-source and service dependencies omitted
- supplier risk reviews occur only at onboarding
Questions practitioners should ask
- What risk decision is this control intended to support in this system?
- Which parts are implemented locally, inherited, shared, or not applicable—and what evidence supports that decision?
- Do the documented narrative, deployed configuration, operating process, and collected evidence agree?
- What event or threshold requires the implementation to be reviewed or changed?
Assessment objectives and methods
Show the assessment objective
[Organization-defined: data, documentation, tools, or system components] are disposed of using [Organization-defined: techniques and methods].
Examine
- Supply chain risk management policy and procedures
- supply chain risk management plan
- disposal procedures addressing supply chain protection
- media disposal policy
- media protection policy
- disposal records for system components
- documentation of the system components identified for disposal
- documentation of the disposal techniques and methods employed for system components
- system security plan
- other relevant documents or records
Interview
- Organizational personnel with system component disposal responsibilities
- organizational personnel with information security responsibilities
- organizational personnel with supply chain protection responsibilities
Test
- Organizational techniques and methods for system component disposal
- mechanisms supporting and/or implementing system component disposal
Related controls
These relationships come from the official OSCAL catalog. They indicate useful dependencies or context, not automatic inheritance or equivalence.
Authoritative sources
Bare Metal Cyber is an independent educational publisher and is not affiliated with or endorsed by NIST. Official control requirements and interpretations remain with NIST and the responsible authorizing organization.