Definition
Preventing one process from writing to the memory space of another process through hardware based address manager implementations.
How it works
Process isolation, in this context, is address space separation controlled by a security function that limits the communication between processes so that one process cannot directly modify the executing code of another process. For example with virtual address space:
Hardware process isolation is commonly implemented through Direct Memory Access (DMA) which collaborates with a Memory Management Unit (MMU), or Input-Output Memory Management Unit (IOMMU). These hardware controls are deployed directly on processors to aid hosts or enclaves in process isolation.
- Process A address space is different from process B address space, which prevents process A from writing to process B
- DMA - Direct memory access allows memory access to occur independently of the program currently run by the microprocessor. DMA allows for I/O devices to directly read from and write to memory, or it can be used to efficiently copy blocks of memory. During DMA transfers, the microprocessor can execute an unrelated program.
- MMU - A memory management unit acts as an access control and is responsible for performing the translation of virtual memory addresses to physical memory addresses. The MMU allocates each process its own virtual memory space.
- IOMMU - An input-output memory management unit is used to allocate each I/O device its own virtual address space to the underlying physical addresses. IOMMU allows devices that do not support long memory addresses to address the entire memory space.
Considerations
- Private hosts may be vulnerable to DMA attack if they have a PCI or PCI Express port that connects attached devices directly to physical address space.
Implementations:
- Intel Virtualization Technology for Directed I/O (Intel VT-d)
- Firecracker
Implementation perspective
Hardware-based Process Isolation should be treated as a technical defensive capability rather than a product checkbox. In practice, teams should define the protected scope, the conditions under which the technique acts, and the observable evidence that demonstrates the intended behavior. For this technique, likely engineering context includes Create Process, Process.
Use the technique to create a logical or physical boundary that limits access, execution, communication, or movement.
Questions to ask
- What is being isolated, from whom or what, and under which conditions?
- Which flows or operations remain explicitly allowed across the boundary?
- What happens when the isolation mechanism fails or loses policy context?
- How is the boundary tested for alternate paths, bypasses, and unintended dependencies?
Evidence and validation
- Architecture and data-flow diagrams showing the isolation boundary
- Policy, rule, or configuration exports from enforcing components
- Tests of allowed, denied, and failure-state behavior
- Monitoring evidence for boundary violations and policy changes
Common failure patterns
- The intended boundary has undocumented alternate paths or inherited trust relationships.
- Rules accumulate without ownership, review, or removal of obsolete exceptions.
- Isolation is assumed from network location while application, identity, or management paths remain open.
This implementation perspective is original Bare Metal Cyber educational content. It does not replace the official D3FEND definition or establish that a specific product implements the technique.
Technique hierarchy
Top-level family
Parent techniques
Direct child techniques
None listed at this level.
Artifacts and ontology entities
These relationships describe how D3FEND connects a defensive technique to artifacts or other ontology entities. They describe graph semantics, not a product certification.
Explicit technique relationships
Show inferred artifact relationship paths (2)
NIST SP 800-53 relationships
The relation label is preserved from the D3FEND ontology. It is not converted into a claim that the control automatically implements or validates this technique.
ATT&CK Enterprise mitigation relationships
These links come from the D3FEND ontology’s ATT&CK mitigation mapping. They help users navigate between the knowledge bases and do not guarantee mitigation effectiveness.
D3FEND note: "Sandboxing" is often used to describe a detection environment which includes some forms of analysis (see D3-DA.)" Many forms of isolation (e.g., quarantining) are more static in nature and simply limit software's access to system resources.
Offensive-technique relationships
These relationships are generated from D3FEND graph paths and are explicitly experimental. They should be treated as hypotheses for defensive analysis—not as proof that the technique prevents, detects, or removes an offensive behavior.
ATT&CK Enterprise (36)
ATT&CK for ICS (12)
Authoritative sources
- Open this technique on the official D3FEND website ↗
- Open the official ontology resources ↗
- Approaches for securing an internet endpoint using fine-grained operating system virtualization ↗Bromium, Inc. · Gaurav Banga, Ian Pratt, Kiran Bondalapati, Vikram Kapoor · PatentReference
- Isolation of applications within a virtual machine ↗Bromium, Inc. · Gaurav Banga, Sergei Vorobiev, Deepak Khajuria, Vikram Kapoor, Ian Pratt, Simon Crosby, Adrian Taylor · PatentReference
- Virtualized process isolation ↗Advanced Micro Devices Inc · David A. Kaplan · PatentReference
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