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MITRE D3FEND™ Learning Center

D3-OAM — Operational Activity Mapping

Operational activity mapping identifies activities of the organization and the organization's suborganizations, groups, roles, and individuals that carry out the activities and then establishes the dependencies of the activities on the systems and people that perform those activities.

24Enterprise inferred
2ICS inferred
4Direct children
2Related artifacts

Model · D3FEND ontology 1.6.0 · Active

Open official technique ↗
Official D3FEND definition

Definition

Operational activity mapping identifies activities of the organization and the organization's suborganizations, groups, roles, and individuals that carry out the activities and then establishes the dependencies of the activities on the systems and people that perform those activities.

Bare Metal Cyber interpretation

Implementation perspective

Operational Activity Mapping should be treated as a technical defensive capability rather than a product checkbox. In practice, teams should define the protected scope, the conditions under which the technique acts, and the observable evidence that demonstrates the intended behavior. For this technique, likely engineering context includes Access Control Configuration, User Account.

Use the technique to improve the shared model of systems, activities, dependencies, threats, or risk before making defensive decisions.

Questions to ask

  • What system, activity, relationship, or risk is being modeled, and where is the scope boundary?
  • Which authoritative data sources populate the model, and how is their quality assessed?
  • How often is the model refreshed after architectural, operational, or threat changes?
  • Which decisions, analyses, or engineering actions are expected to use the model?

Evidence and validation

  • Documented model scope, assumptions, and ownership
  • Source inventories, data-quality checks, and refresh records
  • Version history showing material changes to the model
  • Examples of decisions or analyses that used the model

Common failure patterns

  • The model is treated as a one-time diagram rather than a maintained decision aid.
  • Unverified or stale source data is accepted without recording uncertainty.
  • The model is comprehensive in appearance but disconnected from engineering or operational decisions.

This implementation perspective is original Bare Metal Cyber educational content. It does not replace the official D3FEND definition or establish that a specific product implements the technique.

Ontology hierarchy

Technique hierarchy

Parent techniques

None listed at this level.

D3FEND graph relationships

Artifacts and ontology entities

These relationships describe how D3FEND connects a defensive technique to artifacts or other ontology entities. They describe graph semantics, not a product certification.

Show inferred artifact relationship paths (2)
Access ModelingmapsAccess Control Configuration
Access ModelingmapsUser Account
Inferred and experimental

Offensive-technique relationships

These relationships are generated from D3FEND graph paths and are explicitly experimental. They should be treated as hypotheses for defensive analysis—not as proof that the technique prevents, detects, or removes an offensive behavior.

ATT&CK Enterprise (24)
T1078Valid AccountsInitial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, StealthT1078.001Default AccountsInitial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, StealthT1078.002Domain AccountsInitial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, StealthT1078.003Local AccountsInitial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, StealthT1078.004Cloud AccountsInitial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, StealthT1087.001Local AccountDiscoveryT1087.002Domain AccountDiscoveryT1087.004Cloud AccountDiscoveryT1098Account ManipulationPersistence, Privilege EscalationT1098.002Additional Email Delegate PermissionsPersistence, Privilege EscalationT1098.003Additional Cloud RolesPersistence, Privilege EscalationT1134.005SID-History InjectionPrivilege Escalation, StealthT1136Create AccountPersistenceT1136.001Local AccountPersistenceT1136.002Domain AccountPersistenceT1136.003Cloud AccountPersistenceT1222File and Directory Permissions ModificationDefense ImpairmentT1484Domain or Tenant Policy ModificationDefense Impairment, Privilege EscalationT1531Account Access RemovalImpactT1548.001Setuid and SetgidPrivilege EscalationT1548.005Temporary Elevated Cloud AccessPrivilege EscalationT1552.006Group Policy PreferencesCredential AccessT1556.009Conditional Access PoliciesCredential Access, Defense Impairment, PersistenceT1615Group Policy DiscoveryDiscovery
ATT&CK for ICS (2)
T0812Default CredentialsLateral Movement
T0859Valid AccountsLateral Movement, Persistence
Source record

Authoritative sources

Bare Metal Cyber is an independent educational publisher and is not affiliated with or endorsed by The MITRE Corporation. MITRE D3FEND™ and the D3FEND logo are trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK® and ATT&CK® are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Use of D3FEND source material is subject to the official Terms of Use.