Security requirement
- a.Restrict privileged accounts on the system to [Organization-defined: personnel or roles]..
- b.Require that users (or roles) with privileged accounts use non-privileged accounts when accessing non-security functions or non-security information.
Discussion
Privileged accounts refer to accounts that are granted elevated privileges to access resources (including security functions or security-relevant information) that are otherwise restricted for non-privileged accounts. These accounts are typically described as system administrator or super user accounts. For example, a privileged account is often required in order to perform privileged functions such as executing commands that could modify system behavior. Restricting privileged accounts to specific personnel or roles ensures that only those authorized users can access and manipulate security functions or security-relevant information. Requiring the use of non-privileged accounts when such access is not needed can limit unauthorized access to and manipulation of security functions or security-relevant information.
Tailoring decisions required
Resolve these values through the governing organization’s approved tailoring and risk-management process before declaring the requirement implemented.
Implementation perspective
Treat Least Privilege – Privileged Accounts as a CUI protection outcome that must be reflected in the system boundary, documented implementation, operational behavior, and assessment evidence. Pay particular attention to approved identities, least privilege, remote access, information flow, and the full account lifecycle.
- Confirm the requirement is in scope for the CUI system components, services, users, and external connections being assessed.
- Resolve every organization-defined parameter through an approved governance and tailoring process.
- Map each clause of the requirement to an accountable owner, implementation mechanism, and evidence source.
- Verify that inherited and shared implementations are supported by current provider evidence and responsibility boundaries.
- Collect evidence during normal operation and review changes, exceptions, and deficiencies on a risk-based cadence.
Questions to ask
- Which CUI assets, data flows, users, and services are protected by this requirement?
- Which portions are implemented locally, inherited, shared, or not applicable, and what evidence supports that determination?
- Do the system security plan, deployed configuration, operating process, and assessment evidence tell the same story?
- What change, incident, or threshold should trigger reassessment?
Evidence and validation
- access authorization and approval records
- account inventories and entitlement exports
- access review results
- authentication and authorization logs
Common failure patterns
- CUI access that exceeds mission need
- shared or orphaned accounts
- remote access paths outside the approved boundary
- access reviews that cannot be reconciled to deployed permissions
Assessment objectives and methods
Assessment objectives (2)
- a.
privileged accounts on the system are restricted to [Organization-defined: personnel or roles].
- b.
users (or roles) with privileged accounts are required to use non-privileged accounts when accessing non-security functions or non-security information.
Examine
- access control policy and procedures
- procedures for least privilege
- list of system-generated privileged accounts
- list of system administration personnel
- system audit records
- system configuration settings
- system security plan
- list of system-generated security functions or security-relevant information assigned to system accounts or roles
- other relevant documents or records
Interview
- personnel with responsibilities for defining least privileges
- personnel with information security responsibilities
- system administrators
Test
- mechanisms for implementing least privilege functions
Source NIST SP 800-53 controls
These controls are referenced by the official SP 800-171 Rev. 3 OSCAL record. Open the corresponding control pages for complete control text, enhancements, D3FEND mappings, and related learning.
Authoritative sources
- NIST SP 800-171 Revision 3 official publication ↗
- NIST SP 800-171A Revision 3 official publication ↗
- NIST OSCAL Content release used for this import ↗
Bare Metal Cyber is an independent educational publisher and is not affiliated with or endorsed by NIST. The official publications, the responsible federal agency, and the governing contract or agreement determine applicability, tailoring, assessment depth, and required implementation.