Security requirement
- a.Alert organizational personnel or roles within [Organization-defined: time period] in the event of an audit logging process failure.
- b.Take the following additional actions: [Organization-defined: additional actions].
Discussion
Audit logging process failures include software and hardware errors, failures in audit log capturing mechanisms, and reaching or exceeding audit log storage capacity. Response actions include overwriting the oldest audit records, shutting down the system, and stopping the generation of audit records. Organizations may choose to define additional actions for audit logging process failures based on the type of failure, the location of the failure, the severity of the failure, or a combination of such factors. When the audit logging process failure is related to storage, the response is carried out for the audit log storage repository (i.e., the distinct system component where the audit logs are stored), the system on which the audit logs reside, the total audit log storage capacity of the organization (i.e., all audit log storage repositories combined), or all three. Organizations may decide to take no additional actions after alerting designated roles or personnel.
Tailoring decisions required
Resolve these values through the governing organization’s approved tailoring and risk-management process before declaring the requirement implemented.
Implementation perspective
Treat Response to Audit Logging Process Failures as a CUI protection outcome that must be reflected in the system boundary, documented implementation, operational behavior, and assessment evidence. Pay particular attention to event selection, trustworthy logging, review, retention, and support for CUI investigations.
- Confirm the requirement is in scope for the CUI system components, services, users, and external connections being assessed.
- Resolve every organization-defined parameter through an approved governance and tailoring process.
- Map each clause of the requirement to an accountable owner, implementation mechanism, and evidence source.
- Verify that inherited and shared implementations are supported by current provider evidence and responsibility boundaries.
- Collect evidence during normal operation and review changes, exceptions, and deficiencies on a risk-based cadence.
Questions to ask
- Which CUI assets, data flows, users, and services are protected by this requirement?
- Which portions are implemented locally, inherited, shared, or not applicable, and what evidence supports that determination?
- Do the system security plan, deployed configuration, operating process, and assessment evidence tell the same story?
- What change, incident, or threshold should trigger reassessment?
Evidence and validation
- logging standards and event-selection decisions
- sample audit records and retention settings
- time synchronization evidence
- alert review and investigation records
Common failure patterns
- collecting logs without defined use cases
- critical CUI events absent from the audit trail
- retention shorter than investigative needs
- logs modifiable by the same administrators being monitored
Assessment objectives and methods
Assessment objectives (2)
- a.
organizational personnel or roles are alerted in the event of an audit logging process failure within [Organization-defined: time period].
- b.
the following additional actions are taken: [Organization-defined: additional actions].
Examine
- audit and accountability policy and procedures
- procedures for responding to audit processing failures
- system design documentation
- system configuration settings
- list of personnel to be notified in case of an audit processing failure
- system audit records
- system security plan
- other relevant documents or records
Interview
- personnel with audit and accountability responsibilities
- personnel with information security responsibilities
- system developers
- system administrators
Test
- mechanisms for implementing system response to audit processing failures
Source NIST SP 800-53 controls
These controls are referenced by the official SP 800-171 Rev. 3 OSCAL record. Open the corresponding control pages for complete control text, enhancements, D3FEND mappings, and related learning.
Authoritative sources
- NIST SP 800-171 Revision 3 official publication ↗
- NIST SP 800-171A Revision 3 official publication ↗
- NIST OSCAL Content release used for this import ↗
Bare Metal Cyber is an independent educational publisher and is not affiliated with or endorsed by NIST. The official publications, the responsible federal agency, and the governing contract or agreement determine applicability, tailoring, assessment depth, and required implementation.