Security requirement
Uniquely identify and authenticate [Organization-defined: devices or types of devices] before establishing a system connection.
Discussion
Devices that require unique device-to-device identification and authentication are defined by type, device, or a combination of type and device. Organization-defined device types include devices that are not owned by the organization. Systems use shared known information (e.g., Media Access Control .MAC, Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol .TCP/IP addresses) for device identification or organizational authentication solutions (e.g., Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers .IEEE 802.1x and Extensible Authentication Protocol .EAP, RADIUS server with EAP-Transport Layer Security .TLS authentication, Kerberos) to identify and authenticate devices on local and wide area networks. Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and certificate revocation checking for the certificates exchanged can be included as part of device authentication.
Tailoring decisions required
Resolve these values through the governing organization’s approved tailoring and risk-management process before declaring the requirement implemented.
Implementation perspective
Treat Device Identification and Authentication as a CUI protection outcome that must be reflected in the system boundary, documented implementation, operational behavior, and assessment evidence. Pay particular attention to identity proofing, authentication strength, authenticator lifecycle, and resistance to credential compromise.
- Confirm the requirement is in scope for the CUI system components, services, users, and external connections being assessed.
- Resolve every organization-defined parameter through an approved governance and tailoring process.
- Map each clause of the requirement to an accountable owner, implementation mechanism, and evidence source.
- Verify that inherited and shared implementations are supported by current provider evidence and responsibility boundaries.
- Collect evidence during normal operation and review changes, exceptions, and deficiencies on a risk-based cadence.
Questions to ask
- Which CUI assets, data flows, users, and services are protected by this requirement?
- Which portions are implemented locally, inherited, shared, or not applicable, and what evidence supports that determination?
- Do the system security plan, deployed configuration, operating process, and assessment evidence tell the same story?
- What change, incident, or threshold should trigger reassessment?
Evidence and validation
- identity proofing records
- authenticator issuance and revocation logs
- MFA and federation configuration
- credential inventories and rotation evidence
Common failure patterns
- MFA applied only to interactive users
- service credentials without ownership or rotation
- weak recovery paths that bypass strong authentication
- federated trust not reviewed after partner changes
Assessment objectives and methods
Assessment objectives (2)
- SR-03.5.2.
[Organization-defined: devices or types of devices] are authenticated before establishing a system connection.
- SR-03.5.2.
[Organization-defined: devices or types of devices] are uniquely identified before establishing a system connection.
Examine
- identification and authentication policy and procedures
- procedures for device identification and authentication
- system design documentation
- list of devices requiring unique identification and authentication
- device connection reports
- system configuration settings
- system security plan
- other relevant documents or records
Interview
- personnel with responsibilities for device identification and authentication
- personnel with information security responsibilities
- system developers
- system administrators
Test
- mechanisms for supporting or implementing device identification and authentication capabilities
Source NIST SP 800-53 controls
These controls are referenced by the official SP 800-171 Rev. 3 OSCAL record. Open the corresponding control pages for complete control text, enhancements, D3FEND mappings, and related learning.
Authoritative sources
- NIST SP 800-171 Revision 3 official publication ↗
- NIST SP 800-171A Revision 3 official publication ↗
- NIST OSCAL Content release used for this import ↗
Bare Metal Cyber is an independent educational publisher and is not affiliated with or endorsed by NIST. The official publications, the responsible federal agency, and the governing contract or agreement determine applicability, tailoring, assessment depth, and required implementation.