Security requirement
Employ [Organization-defined: SELECTED PARAMETER VALUE(S)] on [Organization-defined: systems or system components] supporting mission-essential services or functions to increase the trustworthiness in those systems or components.
Discussion
Systems or system components that support mission-essential services or functions can be enhanced or strengthened to maximize the trustworthiness of the resource. Sometimes, this enhancement or strengthening is done at the design level. In other instances, it is done post-design, either through modifications of the system in question or by augmenting the system with additional components. For example, supplemental authentication or non-repudiation functions may be added to the system to enhance critical resources that depend on organization-defined resources. This requirement does not enhance a specific requirement in SP 800-171 but can be used to strengthen the protection of CUI associated with critical programs or high value assets.
Tailoring decisions required
Resolve these values through the governing organization’s approved tailoring and risk-management process before declaring the requirement implemented.
Protection strategies supported
These classifications are carried from the official SP 800-172 OSCAL record and help explain the enhanced requirement’s defensive purpose.
Implementation perspective
Treat Specialization as an enhanced CUI protection outcome for elevated threat conditions that must be reflected in the system boundary, documented implementation, operational behavior, and assessment evidence. Pay particular attention to security requirements in acquisition, secure development, supplier expectations, and acceptance evidence.
- Confirm the federal agency selected this enhanced requirement for the critical program or high-value asset and identify the CUI system components, services, users, and external connections in scope.
- Resolve every organization-defined parameter through an approved governance and tailoring process.
- Map each clause of the requirement to an accountable owner, implementation mechanism, and evidence source.
- Verify that inherited and shared implementations are supported by current provider evidence and responsibility boundaries.
- Collect evidence during normal operation and review changes, exceptions, and deficiencies on a risk-based cadence.
Questions to ask
- Which critical-program or high-value-asset CUI, data flows, users, and services are protected by this enhanced requirement?
- Which portions are implemented locally, inherited, shared, or not applicable, and what evidence supports that determination?
- Do the system security plan, deployed configuration, operating process, and assessment evidence tell the same story?
- What change, incident, or threshold should trigger reassessment?
Evidence and validation
- security requirements in contracts and specifications
- architecture and design review records
- development lifecycle evidence
- supplier assessment and acceptance records
Common failure patterns
- security requirements added after procurement
- supplier claims accepted without evidence
- development exceptions becoming permanent
- security architecture not tied to testable requirements
Assessment objectives and methods
Assessment objectives (1)
[Organization-defined: SELECTED PARAMETER VALUE(S)] is/are employed to [Organization-defined: systems or system components] supporting mission-essential services or functions to increase the trustworthiness in those systems or components.
Examine
- System and services acquisition policy
- procedures addressing design modification, augmentation, or reconfiguration of systems or system components
- documented evidence of design modification, augmentation, or reconfiguration
- system security plan
- supply chain risk management plan
- other relevant documents or records
Interview
- Personnel with system and service acquisition responsibilities
- personnel with information security responsibilities
- personnel with security architecture responsibilities
- personnel with configuration management responsibilities
Test
- Processes for the modification, design, augmentation, or reconfiguration of systems or system components
- mechanisms supporting and/or implementing design modification, augmentation, or reconfiguration of systems or system components
Source NIST SP 800-53 controls
These controls are referenced by the official SP 800-172 Rev. 3 OSCAL record. Open the corresponding control pages for complete control text, enhancements, D3FEND mappings, and related learning.
Authoritative sources
- NIST SP 800-172 Revision 3 official publication ↗
- NIST SP 800-172A Revision 3 official publication ↗
- NIST OSCAL Content release used for this import ↗
Bare Metal Cyber is an independent educational publisher and is not affiliated with or endorsed by NIST. The official publications, the responsible federal agency, and the governing contract or agreement determine applicability, tailoring, assessment depth, and required implementation.