Control statement
Prevent the installation of [Organization-defined: organization-defined software and firmware components] without verification that the component has been digitally signed using a certificate that is recognized and approved by the organization.
Discussion
Software and firmware components prevented from installation unless signed with recognized and approved certificates include software and firmware version updates, patches, service packs, device drivers, and basic input/output system updates. Organizations can identify applicable software and firmware components by type, by specific items, or a combination of both. Digital signatures and organizational verification of such signatures is a method of code authentication.
Organization-defined parameters
These values must be resolved through the organization’s tailoring and governance process. Bracketed parameter references in the control text identify where a decision is required.
From control text to operational evidence
Use Signed Components as a testable risk decision. Translate the official statement into accountable people, repeatable processes, configured technology, and evidence that demonstrates the outcome over time. In this family, pay particular attention to secure baselines, controlled change, configuration visibility, and drift management.
Implementation workflow
- Define the control boundary, responsible owner, inherited portions, and systems or processes in scope.
- Resolve each organization-defined parameter before declaring the control implemented.
- Document how the implementation satisfies every clause of the official control statement.
- Collect evidence as a normal byproduct of operation rather than only before an assessment.
- Review exceptions, changes, and monitoring results on a risk-based cadence.
Evidence examples
- approved baseline configurations
- change tickets and approvals
- configuration scans and drift reports
- software and hardware inventories
Common failure patterns
- baselines documented but not enforced
- emergency changes never reconciled
- asset inventories that omit cloud or ephemeral resources
- security-impact analysis performed after deployment
Questions practitioners should ask
- What risk decision is this control intended to support in this system?
- Which parts are implemented locally, inherited, shared, or not applicable—and what evidence supports that decision?
- Do the documented narrative, deployed configuration, operating process, and collected evidence agree?
- What event or threshold requires the implementation to be reviewed or changed?
Assessment objectives and methods
Show the assessment objective
- CM-14[01]the installation of [Organization-defined: software components] is prevented unless it is verified that the software has been digitally signed using a certificate recognized and approved by the organization;
- CM-14[02]the installation of [Organization-defined: firmware components] is prevented unless it is verified that the firmware has been digitally signed using a certificate recognized and approved by the organization.
Examine
- Configuration management policy
- procedures addressing digitally signed certificates for software and firmware components
- configuration management plan
- system security plan
- system design documentation
- change control records
- system component inventory
- system security plan
- other relevant documents or records
Interview
- Organizational personnel with responsibilities for verifying digitally signed certificates for software and firmware component installation
- organizational personnel with information security responsibilities
- system/network administrators
- system developers
Test
- Organizational processes governing information location
- mechanisms enforcing policies and methods for governing information location
- automated tools supporting or implementing digitally signatures for software and firmware components
- automated tools supporting or implementing verification of digital signatures for software and firmware component installation
Related controls
These relationships come from the official OSCAL catalog. They indicate useful dependencies or context, not automatic inheritance or equivalence.
Related defensive techniques
D3FEND maps this base control or one of its enhancements to the following defensive techniques. The ontology relation label is preserved and does not by itself prove implementation or effectiveness.
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Authoritative sources
Bare Metal Cyber is an independent educational publisher and is not affiliated with or endorsed by NIST. Official control requirements and interpretations remain with NIST and the responsible authorizing organization.