Control statement
- a.Provide the capability of shutting off power to [Organization-defined: system or individual system components] in emergency situations;
- b.Place emergency shutoff switches or devices in [Organization-defined: location] to facilitate access for authorized personnel; and
- c.Protect emergency power shutoff capability from unauthorized activation.
Discussion
Emergency power shutoff primarily applies to organizational facilities that contain concentrations of system resources, including data centers, mainframe computer rooms, server rooms, and areas with computer-controlled machinery.
Organization-defined parameters
These values must be resolved through the organization’s tailoring and governance process. Bracketed parameter references in the control text identify where a decision is required.
From control text to operational evidence
Use Emergency Shutoff as a testable risk decision. Translate the official statement into accountable people, repeatable processes, configured technology, and evidence that demonstrates the outcome over time. In this family, pay particular attention to physical access, facility protection, environmental safeguards, and visitor accountability.
Implementation workflow
- Define the control boundary, responsible owner, inherited portions, and systems or processes in scope.
- Resolve each organization-defined parameter before declaring the control implemented.
- Document how the implementation satisfies every clause of the official control statement.
- Collect evidence as a normal byproduct of operation rather than only before an assessment.
- Review exceptions, changes, and monitoring results on a risk-based cadence.
Evidence examples
- badge and visitor logs
- physical access reviews
- facility diagrams and sensor records
- environmental and power test results
Common failure patterns
- logical security assumptions invalidated by physical access
- tailgating and visitor exceptions normalized
- critical infrastructure not included in access reviews
- environmental alarms not integrated into response
Questions practitioners should ask
- What risk decision is this control intended to support in this system?
- Which parts are implemented locally, inherited, shared, or not applicable—and what evidence supports that decision?
- Do the documented narrative, deployed configuration, operating process, and collected evidence agree?
- What event or threshold requires the implementation to be reviewed or changed?
Assessment objectives and methods
Show the assessment objective
- PE-10a.the capability to shut off power to [Organization-defined: system or individual system components] in emergency situations is provided;
- PE-10b.emergency shutoff switches or devices are placed in [Organization-defined: location] to facilitate access for authorized personnel;
- PE-10c.the emergency power shutoff capability is protected from unauthorized activation.
Examine
- Physical and environmental protection policy
- procedures addressing power source emergency shutoff
- emergency shutoff controls or switches
- locations housing emergency shutoff switches and devices
- security safeguards protecting the emergency power shutoff capability from unauthorized activation
- system security plan
- other relevant documents or records
Interview
- Organizational personnel with the responsibility for the emergency power shutoff capability (both implementing and using the capability)
- organizational personnel with information security responsibilities
Test
- Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing emergency power shutoff
Related controls
These relationships come from the official OSCAL catalog. They indicate useful dependencies or context, not automatic inheritance or equivalence.
Control enhancements
Enhancements add specificity, strength, or scope to the base control. Baseline badges show explicit selections in the official SP 800-53B OSCAL profiles.
PE-10(1) — Accidental and Unauthorized Activation
This enhancement is marked withdrawn in the official OSCAL catalog. Related-control metadata below may identify where its intent was incorporated.
Authoritative sources
Bare Metal Cyber is an independent educational publisher and is not affiliated with or endorsed by NIST. Official control requirements and interpretations remain with NIST and the responsible authorizing organization.