Control statement
Implement an insider threat program that includes a cross-discipline insider threat incident handling team.
Discussion
Organizations that handle classified information are required, under Executive Order 13587 [EO 13587](#0af071a6-cf8e-48ee-8c82-fe91efa20f94) and the National Insider Threat Policy [ODNI NITP](#06d74ea9-2178-449c-a9c5-b2980f804ac8) , to establish insider threat programs. The same standards and guidelines that apply to insider threat programs in classified environments can also be employed effectively to improve the security of controlled unclassified and other information in non-national security systems. Insider threat programs include controls to detect and prevent malicious insider activity through the centralized integration and analysis of both technical and nontechnical information to identify potential insider threat concerns. A senior official is designated by the department or agency head as the responsible individual to implement and provide oversight for the program. In addition to the centralized integration and analysis capability, insider threat programs require organizations to prepare department or agency insider threat policies and implementation plans, conduct host-based user monitoring of individual employee activities on government-owned classified computers, provide insider threat awareness training to employees, receive access to information from offices in the department or agency for insider threat analysis, and conduct self-assessments of department or agency insider threat posture. Insider threat programs can leverage the existence of incident handling teams that organizations may already have in place, such as computer security incident response teams. Human resources records are especially important in this effort, as there is compelling evidence to show that some types of insider crimes are often preceded by nontechnical behaviors in the workplace, including ongoing patterns of disgruntled behavior and conflicts with coworkers and other colleagues. These precursors can guide organizational officials in more focused, targeted monitoring efforts. However, the use of human resource records could raise significant concerns for privacy. The participation of a legal team, including consultation with the senior agency official for privacy, ensures that monitoring activities are performed in accordance with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines.
From control text to operational evidence
Use Insider Threat Program as a testable risk decision. Translate the official statement into accountable people, repeatable processes, configured technology, and evidence that demonstrates the outcome over time. In this family, pay particular attention to enterprise program governance, accountability, resources, metrics, and organization-wide risk decisions.
Implementation workflow
- Define the control boundary, responsible owner, inherited portions, and systems or processes in scope.
- Resolve each organization-defined parameter before declaring the control implemented.
- Document how the implementation satisfies every clause of the official control statement.
- Collect evidence as a normal byproduct of operation rather than only before an assessment.
- Review exceptions, changes, and monitoring results on a risk-based cadence.
Evidence examples
- program charters and policies
- governance meeting records
- risk and performance metrics
- resource and responsibility assignments
Common failure patterns
- program metrics count activity instead of outcomes
- system-level risks never reach enterprise governance
- responsibilities assigned without authority or resources
- privacy and security managed in separate silos
Questions practitioners should ask
- What risk decision is this control intended to support in this system?
- Which parts are implemented locally, inherited, shared, or not applicable—and what evidence supports that decision?
- Do the documented narrative, deployed configuration, operating process, and collected evidence agree?
- What event or threshold requires the implementation to be reviewed or changed?
Assessment objectives and methods
Show the assessment objective
an insider threat program that includes a cross-discipline insider threat incident handling team is implemented.
Interview
- Organizational personnel with information security and privacy program planning and plan implementation responsibilities
- organizational personnel responsible for the insider threat program
- members of the cross-discipline insider threat incident handling team
- legal counsel
- organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities
Test
- Organizational processes for implementing the insider threat program and the cross-discipline insider threat incident handling team
- mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the insider threat program and the cross-discipline insider threat incident handling team
Related controls
These relationships come from the official OSCAL catalog. They indicate useful dependencies or context, not automatic inheritance or equivalence.
Authoritative sources
Bare Metal Cyber is an independent educational publisher and is not affiliated with or endorsed by NIST. Official control requirements and interpretations remain with NIST and the responsible authorizing organization.