Control statement
Embed data or capabilities in the following systems or system components to determine if organizational data has been exfiltrated or improperly removed from the organization: [Organization-defined: systems or system components].
Discussion
Many cyber-attacks target organizational information, or information that the organization holds on behalf of other entities (e.g., personally identifiable information), and exfiltrate that data. In addition, insider attacks and erroneous user procedures can remove information from the system that is in violation of the organizational policies. Tainting approaches can range from passive to active. A passive tainting approach can be as simple as adding false email names and addresses to an internal database. If the organization receives email at one of the false email addresses, it knows that the database has been compromised. Moreover, the organization knows that the email was sent by an unauthorized entity, so any packets it includes potentially contain malicious code, and that the unauthorized entity may have potentially obtained a copy of the database. Another tainting approach can include embedding false data or steganographic data in files to enable the data to be found via open-source analysis. Finally, an active tainting approach can include embedding software in the data that is able to "call home," thereby alerting the organization to its "capture," and possibly its location, and the path by which it was exfiltrated or removed.
Organization-defined parameters
These values must be resolved through the organization’s tailoring and governance process. Bracketed parameter references in the control text identify where a decision is required.
From control text to operational evidence
Use Tainting as a testable risk decision. Translate the official statement into accountable people, repeatable processes, configured technology, and evidence that demonstrates the outcome over time. In this family, pay particular attention to flaw remediation, malicious-code protection, monitoring, integrity, and trustworthy information handling.
Implementation workflow
- Define the control boundary, responsible owner, inherited portions, and systems or processes in scope.
- Resolve each organization-defined parameter before declaring the control implemented.
- Document how the implementation satisfies every clause of the official control statement.
- Collect evidence as a normal byproduct of operation rather than only before an assessment.
- Review exceptions, changes, and monitoring results on a risk-based cadence.
Evidence examples
- patch and remediation records
- malware protection configuration
- monitoring alerts and response records
- integrity validation and exception reports
Common failure patterns
- patch compliance hides unsupported assets
- alerts generated without response ownership
- exceptions never expire
- integrity monitoring excludes critical configurations
Questions practitioners should ask
- What risk decision is this control intended to support in this system?
- Which parts are implemented locally, inherited, shared, or not applicable—and what evidence supports that decision?
- Do the documented narrative, deployed configuration, operating process, and collected evidence agree?
- What event or threshold requires the implementation to be reviewed or changed?
Assessment objectives and methods
Show the assessment objective
data or capabilities are embedded in [Organization-defined: systems or system components] to determine if organizational data has been exfiltrated or improperly removed from the organization.
Examine
- System and information integrity policy
- system and information integrity procedures
- personally identifiable information processing policy
- procedures addressing software and information integrity
- system design documentation
- system configuration settings and associated documentation
- policy and procedures addressing the systems security engineering technique of deception
- system security plan
- privacy plan
- other relevant documents or records
Interview
- Organizational personnel responsible for detecting tainted data
- organizational personnel with systems security engineering responsibilities
- organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities
Test
- Automated mechanisms for post-breach detection
- decoys, traps, lures, and methods for deceiving adversaries
- detection and notification mechanisms
Related controls
These relationships come from the official OSCAL catalog. They indicate useful dependencies or context, not automatic inheritance or equivalence.
Authoritative sources
Bare Metal Cyber is an independent educational publisher and is not affiliated with or endorsed by NIST. Official control requirements and interpretations remain with NIST and the responsible authorizing organization.