Control statement
Based on [Organization-defined: circumstances]:
- a.Fragment the following information: [Organization-defined: information] ; and
- b.Distribute the fragmented information across the following systems or system components: [Organization-defined: systems or system components].
Discussion
One objective of the advanced persistent threat is to exfiltrate valuable information. Once exfiltrated, there is generally no way for the organization to recover the lost information. Therefore, organizations may consider dividing the information into disparate elements and distributing those elements across multiple systems or system components and locations. Such actions will increase the adversary’s work factor to capture and exfiltrate the desired information and, in so doing, increase the probability of detection. The fragmentation of information impacts the organization’s ability to access the information in a timely manner. The extent of the fragmentation is dictated by the impact or classification level (and value) of the information, threat intelligence information received, and whether data tainting is used (i.e., data tainting-derived information about the exfiltration of some information could result in the fragmentation of the remaining information).
Organization-defined parameters
These values must be resolved through the organization’s tailoring and governance process. Bracketed parameter references in the control text identify where a decision is required.
From control text to operational evidence
Use Information Fragmentation as a testable risk decision. Translate the official statement into accountable people, repeatable processes, configured technology, and evidence that demonstrates the outcome over time. In this family, pay particular attention to flaw remediation, malicious-code protection, monitoring, integrity, and trustworthy information handling.
Implementation workflow
- Define the control boundary, responsible owner, inherited portions, and systems or processes in scope.
- Resolve each organization-defined parameter before declaring the control implemented.
- Document how the implementation satisfies every clause of the official control statement.
- Collect evidence as a normal byproduct of operation rather than only before an assessment.
- Review exceptions, changes, and monitoring results on a risk-based cadence.
Evidence examples
- patch and remediation records
- malware protection configuration
- monitoring alerts and response records
- integrity validation and exception reports
Common failure patterns
- patch compliance hides unsupported assets
- alerts generated without response ownership
- exceptions never expire
- integrity monitoring excludes critical configurations
Questions practitioners should ask
- What risk decision is this control intended to support in this system?
- Which parts are implemented locally, inherited, shared, or not applicable—and what evidence supports that decision?
- Do the documented narrative, deployed configuration, operating process, and collected evidence agree?
- What event or threshold requires the implementation to be reviewed or changed?
Assessment objectives and methods
Show the assessment objective
- SI-23a.under [Organization-defined: circumstances], [Organization-defined: information] is fragmented;
- SI-23b.under [Organization-defined: circumstances] , the fragmented information is distributed across [Organization-defined: systems or system components].
Examine
- System and information integrity policy
- system and information integrity procedures
- personally identifiable information processing policy
- procedures addressing software and information integrity
- system design documentation
- system configuration settings and associated documentation
- procedures to identify information for fragmentation and distribution across systems/system components
- list of distributed and fragmented information
- list of circumstances requiring information fragmentation
- enterprise architecture
- system security architecture
- system security plan
- privacy plan
- other relevant documents or records
Interview
- Organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities
- organizational personnel with systems security engineering responsibilities
- system developers
- security architects
Test
- Organizational processes to identify information for fragmentation and distribution across systems/system components
- automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing information fragmentation and distribution across systems/system components
Authoritative sources
Bare Metal Cyber is an independent educational publisher and is not affiliated with or endorsed by NIST. Official control requirements and interpretations remain with NIST and the responsible authorizing organization.