Control statement
Implement a tamper protection program for the system, system component, or system service.
Discussion
Anti-tamper technologies, tools, and techniques provide a level of protection for systems, system components, and services against many threats, including reverse engineering, modification, and substitution. Strong identification combined with tamper resistance and/or tamper detection is essential to protecting systems and components during distribution and when in use.
From control text to operational evidence
Use Tamper Resistance and Detection as a testable risk decision. Translate the official statement into accountable people, repeatable processes, configured technology, and evidence that demonstrates the outcome over time. In this family, pay particular attention to cybersecurity supply-chain governance, provenance, supplier risk, component authenticity, and dependency resilience.
Implementation workflow
- Define the control boundary, responsible owner, inherited portions, and systems or processes in scope.
- Resolve each organization-defined parameter before declaring the control implemented.
- Document how the implementation satisfies every clause of the official control statement.
- Collect evidence as a normal byproduct of operation rather than only before an assessment.
- Review exceptions, changes, and monitoring results on a risk-based cadence.
Evidence examples
- supplier inventories and criticality ratings
- contract security clauses
- provenance and authenticity records
- supplier monitoring and incident records
Common failure patterns
- tier-one vendors assessed while sub-tier dependencies are ignored
- contracts lack evidence and notification obligations
- open-source and service dependencies omitted
- supplier risk reviews occur only at onboarding
Questions practitioners should ask
- What risk decision is this control intended to support in this system?
- Which parts are implemented locally, inherited, shared, or not applicable—and what evidence supports that decision?
- Do the documented narrative, deployed configuration, operating process, and collected evidence agree?
- What event or threshold requires the implementation to be reviewed or changed?
Assessment objectives and methods
Show the assessment objective
a tamper protection program is implemented for the system, system component, or system service.
Examine
- Supply chain risk management policy and procedures
- supply chain risk management plan
- system and services acquisition policy
- procedures addressing supply chain protection
- procedures addressing tamper resistance and detection
- tamper protection program documentation
- tamper protection tools and techniques documentation
- tamper resistance and detection tools and techniques documentation
- acquisition documentation
- service level agreements
- acquisition contracts for the system, system component, or system service
- system security plan
- other relevant documents or records
Interview
- Organizational personnel with tamper protection program responsibilities
- organizational personnel with information security responsibilities
- organizational personnel with supply chain risk management responsibilities
Test
- Organizational processes for the implementation of the tamper protection program
- mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the tamper protection program
Related controls
These relationships come from the official OSCAL catalog. They indicate useful dependencies or context, not automatic inheritance or equivalence.
Control enhancements
Enhancements add specificity, strength, or scope to the base control. Baseline badges show explicit selections in the official SP 800-53B OSCAL profiles.
SR-9(1) — Multiple Stages of System Development Life Cycle
Employ anti-tamper technologies, tools, and techniques throughout the system development life cycle.
Official discussion
The system development life cycle includes research and development, design, manufacturing, acquisition, delivery, integration, operations and maintenance, and disposal. Organizations use a combination of hardware and software techniques for tamper resistance and detection. Organizations use obfuscation and self-checking to make reverse engineering and modifications more difficult, time-consuming, and expensive for adversaries. The customization of systems and system components can make substitutions easier to detect and therefore limit damage.
Assessment objectives and methods
anti-tamper technologies, tools, and techniques are employed throughout the system development life cycle.
Examine
- Supply chain risk management policy and procedures
- supply chain risk management plan
- system and services acquisition policy
- procedures addressing tamper resistance and detection
- tamper protection program documentation
- tamper protection tools and techniques documentation
- tamper resistance and detection tools (technologies) and techniques documentation
- system development life cycle documentation
- procedures addressing supply chain protection
- system development life cycle procedures
- acquisition documentation
- service level agreements
- acquisition contracts for the system, system component, or system service
- inter-organizational agreements and procedures
- system security plan
- other relevant documents or records
Interview
- Organizational personnel with system and services acquisition responsibilities
- organizational personnel with information security responsibilities
- organizational personnel with supply chain risk management responsibilities
- organizational personnel with SDLC responsibilities
Test
- Organizational processes for employing anti-tamper technologies
- mechanisms supporting and/or implementing anti-tamper technologies
Related controls
Authoritative sources
Bare Metal Cyber is an independent educational publisher and is not affiliated with or endorsed by NIST. Official control requirements and interpretations remain with NIST and the responsible authorizing organization.