Definition
Analyzing a Container Image with respect to a set of policies.
How it works
Container images are standalone collections of the executable code and content that are used to populate a container environment. They are usually created by either building a container from scratch or by building on top of an existing image pulled from a repository.
Throughout the container build workflow, images should be scanned to identify:
Scanning should also provide the flexibility to disregard false positives for vulnerability detection where knowledgeable cybersecurity professionals have deemed alerts to be inaccurate.
One approach to implementing image scanning is to use an admission controller to block deployments if the image does not comply with the organization's security policies.
An admission controller is a Container Orchestration feature that can intercept and process requests to the Container Orchestration API prior to persistence of the object, but after the request is authenticated and authorized. A webhook can be implemented to scan any image before it is deployed in the orchestrator. This admission controller
- outdated libraries,
- known vulnerabilities,
- or misconfigurations, such as insecure ports or permissions.
Considerations
files to the Image.
- Image scanning is key to ensuring deployed containers are secure.
- Using trusted repositories to build containers is a critical part of the container build workflow.
- This technique does not necessarily prevent the build process to add insecure or unsecured
Implementation perspective
Container Image Analysis should be treated as a technical defensive capability rather than a product checkbox. In practice, teams should define the protected scope, the conditions under which the technique acts, and the observable evidence that demonstrates the intended behavior. For this technique, likely engineering context includes Container Image, Software.
Use the technique to improve the shared model of systems, activities, dependencies, threats, or risk before making defensive decisions.
Questions to ask
- What system, activity, relationship, or risk is being modeled, and where is the scope boundary?
- Which authoritative data sources populate the model, and how is their quality assessed?
- How often is the model refreshed after architectural, operational, or threat changes?
- Which decisions, analyses, or engineering actions are expected to use the model?
Evidence and validation
- Documented model scope, assumptions, and ownership
- Source inventories, data-quality checks, and refresh records
- Version history showing material changes to the model
- Examples of decisions or analyses that used the model
Common failure patterns
- The model is treated as a one-time diagram rather than a maintained decision aid.
- Unverified or stale source data is accepted without recording uncertainty.
- The model is comprehensive in appearance but disconnected from engineering or operational decisions.
This implementation perspective is original Bare Metal Cyber educational content. It does not replace the official D3FEND definition or establish that a specific product implements the technique.
Technique hierarchy
Top-level family
Parent techniques
Direct child techniques
None listed at this level.
Artifacts and ontology entities
These relationships describe how D3FEND connects a defensive technique to artifacts or other ontology entities. They describe graph semantics, not a product certification.
Explicit technique relationships
Show inferred artifact relationship paths (2)
Offensive-technique relationships
These relationships are generated from D3FEND graph paths and are explicitly experimental. They should be treated as hypotheses for defensive analysis—not as proof that the technique prevents, detects, or removes an offensive behavior.
ATT&CK Enterprise (27)
ATT&CK for ICS (9)
Authoritative sources
- Open this technique on the official D3FEND website ↗
- Open the official ontology resources ↗
- Kubernetes Hardening Guide ↗National Security Agency · InternetArticleReference
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