Knowledge is Power

Sitewide Search

Search Bare Metal Cyber

Search exact control and technique identifiers, Cyber Wiki articles, framework records, playbooks, books, podcasts, Academy courses, individual lessons, and BMC Cyber Challenge activities.

NIST SP 800-53 Learning Center

Turn the NIST control catalog into an implementation and evidence map.

Browse every control family, base control, and enhancement from the official Release 5.2.0 OSCAL catalog. Official NIST text is preserved and separated from Bare Metal Cyber implementation guidance.

20Control families
324Base controls
872Enhancements
1,196Searchable records

Catalog version 5.2.0 · OSCAL 1.2.2 · Baseline selections from SP 800-53B

LowModerateHighPrivacy

Twenty control families

Start with the risk area you are trying to govern.

Each family page narrows the catalog to a coherent security or privacy domain and connects official control language to implementation, evidence, and assessment thinking.

AC

Access Control

25 base controls · 122 enhancements

Open family →
AT

Awareness and Training

6 base controls · 11 enhancements

Open family →
AU

Audit and Accountability

16 base controls · 53 enhancements

Open family →
CA

Assessment, Authorization, and Monitoring

9 base controls · 23 enhancements

Open family →
CM

Configuration Management

14 base controls · 52 enhancements

Open family →
CP

Contingency Planning

13 base controls · 43 enhancements

Open family →
IA

Identification and Authentication

13 base controls · 61 enhancements

Open family →
IR

Incident Response

10 base controls · 32 enhancements

Open family →
MA

Maintenance

7 base controls · 23 enhancements

Open family →
MP

Media Protection

8 base controls · 22 enhancements

Open family →
PE

Physical and Environmental Protection

23 base controls · 36 enhancements

Open family →
PL

Planning

11 base controls · 6 enhancements

Open family →
PM

Program Management

32 base controls · 5 enhancements

Open family →
PS

Personnel Security

9 base controls · 9 enhancements

Open family →
PT

Personally Identifiable Information Processing and Transparency

8 base controls · 13 enhancements

Open family →
RA

Risk Assessment

10 base controls · 16 enhancements

Open family →
SA

System and Services Acquisition

24 base controls · 123 enhancements

Open family →
SC

System and Communications Protection

51 base controls · 111 enhancements

Open family →
SI

System and Information Integrity

23 base controls · 96 enhancements

Open family →
SR

Supply Chain Risk Management

12 base controls · 15 enhancements

Open family →

Complete catalog

Search controls and enhancements.

Filter by family, record type, and SP 800-53B baseline. Withdrawn records remain visible so supersession and historical references are not silently lost.

AC-1control

Policy and Procedures

Access control policy and procedures address the controls in the AC family that are implemented within systems and organizations. The risk management strategy is an important factor in establishing such policies and procedures. Policies and procedures contribute to security and privacy assurance. Therefore, it is important that security and privacy programs

AC-2control

Account Management

Examples of system account types include individual, shared, group, system, guest, anonymous, emergency, developer, temporary, and service. Identification of authorized system users and the specification of access privileges reflect the requirements in other controls in the security plan. Users requiring administrative privileges on system accounts receive a

AC-3control

Access Enforcement

Access control policies control access between active entities or subjects (i.e., users or processes acting on behalf of users) and passive entities or objects (i.e., devices, files, records, domains) in organizational systems. In addition to enforcing authorized access at the system level and recognizing that systems can host many applications and services

AC-4control

Information Flow Enforcement

Information flow control regulates where information can travel within a system and between systems (in contrast to who is allowed to access the information) and without regard to subsequent accesses to that information. Flow control restrictions include blocking external traffic that claims to be from within the organization, keeping export-controlled infor

AC-5control

Separation of Duties

Separation of duties addresses the potential for abuse of authorized privileges and helps to reduce the risk of malevolent activity without collusion. Separation of duties includes dividing mission or business functions and support functions among different individuals or roles, conducting system support functions with different individuals, and ensuring tha

AC-6control

Least Privilege

Organizations employ least privilege for specific duties and systems. The principle of least privilege is also applied to system processes, ensuring that the processes have access to systems and operate at privilege levels no higher than necessary to accomplish organizational missions or business functions. Organizations consider the creation of additional p

AC-7control

Unsuccessful Logon Attempts

The need to limit unsuccessful logon attempts and take subsequent action when the maximum number of attempts is exceeded applies regardless of whether the logon occurs via a local or network connection. Due to the potential for denial of service, automatic lockouts initiated by systems are usually temporary and automatically release after a predetermined, or

AC-8control

System Use Notification

System use notifications can be implemented using messages or warning banners displayed before individuals log in to systems. System use notifications are used only for access via logon interfaces with human users. Notifications are not required when human interfaces do not exist. Based on an assessment of risk, organizations consider whether or not a second

AC-9control

Previous Logon Notification

Previous logon notification is applicable to system access via human user interfaces and access to systems that occurs in other types of architectures. Information about the last successful logon allows the user to recognize if the date and time provided is not consistent with the user’s last access.

AC-10control

Concurrent Session Control

Organizations may define the maximum number of concurrent sessions for system accounts globally, by account type, by account, or any combination thereof. For example, organizations may limit the number of concurrent sessions for system administrators or other individuals working in particularly sensitive domains or mission-critical applications. Concurrent s

AC-11control

Device Lock

Device locks are temporary actions taken to prevent logical access to organizational systems when users stop work and move away from the immediate vicinity of those systems but do not want to log out because of the temporary nature of their absences. Device locks can be implemented at the operating system level or at the application level. A proximity lock m

AC-12control

Session Termination

Session termination addresses the termination of user-initiated logical sessions (in contrast to [SC-10](#sc-10) , which addresses the termination of network connections associated with communications sessions (i.e., network disconnect)). A logical session (for local, network, and remote access) is initiated whenever a user (or process acting on behalf of a

AC-14control

Permitted Actions Without Identification or Authentication

Specific user actions may be permitted without identification or authentication if organizations determine that identification and authentication are not required for the specified user actions. Organizations may allow a limited number of user actions without identification or authentication, including when individuals access public websites or other publicl

AC-16control

Security and Privacy Attributes

Information is represented internally within systems using abstractions known as data structures. Internal data structures can represent different types of entities, both active and passive. Active entities, also known as subjects, are typically associated with individuals, devices, or processes acting on behalf of individuals. Passive entities, also known a

AC-17control

Remote Access

Remote access is access to organizational systems (or processes acting on behalf of users) that communicate through external networks such as the Internet. Types of remote access include dial-up, broadband, and wireless. Organizations use encrypted virtual private networks (VPNs) to enhance confidentiality and integrity for remote connections. The use of enc

AC-18control

Wireless Access

Wireless technologies include microwave, packet radio (ultra-high frequency or very high frequency), 802.11x, and Bluetooth. Wireless networks use authentication protocols that provide authenticator protection and mutual authentication.

AC-19control

Access Control for Mobile Devices

A mobile device is a computing device that has a small form factor such that it can easily be carried by a single individual; is designed to operate without a physical connection; possesses local, non-removable or removable data storage; and includes a self-contained power source. Mobile device functionality may also include voice communication capabilities,

AC-20control

Use of External Systems

External systems are systems that are used by but not part of organizational systems, and for which the organization has no direct control over the implementation of required controls or the assessment of control effectiveness. External systems include personally owned systems, components, or devices; privately owned computing and communications devices in c

AC-2(1)enhancement

Automated System Account Management

Automated system account management includes using automated mechanisms to create, enable, modify, disable, and remove accounts; notify account managers when an account is created, enabled, modified, disabled, or removed, or when users are terminated or transferred; monitor system account usage; and report atypical system account usage. Automated mechanisms

AC-21control

Information Sharing

Information sharing applies to information that may be restricted in some manner based on some formal or administrative determination. Examples of such information include, contract-sensitive information, classified information related to special access programs or compartments, privileged information, proprietary information, and personally identifiable inf

AC-2(2)enhancement

Automated Temporary and Emergency Account Management

Management of temporary and emergency accounts includes the removal or disabling of such accounts automatically after a predefined time period rather than at the convenience of the system administrator. Automatic removal or disabling of accounts provides a more consistent implementation.

AC-22control

Publicly Accessible Content

In accordance with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidelines, the public is not authorized to have access to nonpublic information, including information protected under the [PRIVACT](#18e71fec-c6fd-475a-925a-5d8495cf8455) and proprietary information. Publicly accessible content addresses systems that are

AC-2(3)enhancement

Disable Accounts

Disabling expired, inactive, or otherwise anomalous accounts supports the concepts of least privilege and least functionality which reduce the attack surface of the system.

AC-23control

Data Mining Protection

Data mining is an analytical process that attempts to find correlations or patterns in large data sets for the purpose of data or knowledge discovery. Data storage objects include database records and database fields. Sensitive information can be extracted from data mining operations. When information is personally identifiable information, it may lead to un

AC-2(4)enhancement

Automated Audit Actions

Account management audit records are defined in accordance with [AU-02](#au-2) and reviewed, analyzed, and reported in accordance with [AU-06](#au-6).

AC-24control

Access Control Decisions

Access control decisions (also known as authorization decisions) occur when authorization information is applied to specific accesses. In contrast, access enforcement occurs when systems enforce access control decisions. While it is common to have access control decisions and access enforcement implemented by the same entity, it is not required, and it is no

AC-2(5)enhancement

Inactivity Logout

Inactivity logout is behavior- or policy-based and requires users to take physical action to log out when they are expecting inactivity longer than the defined period. Automatic enforcement of inactivity logout is addressed by [AC-11](#ac-11).

AC-25control

Reference Monitor

A reference monitor is a set of design requirements on a reference validation mechanism that, as a key component of an operating system, enforces an access control policy over all subjects and objects. A reference validation mechanism is always invoked, tamper-proof, and small enough to be subject to analysis and tests, the completeness of which can be assur

AC-2(6)enhancement

Dynamic Privilege Management

In contrast to access control approaches that employ static accounts and predefined user privileges, dynamic access control approaches rely on runtime access control decisions facilitated by dynamic privilege management, such as attribute-based access control. While user identities remain relatively constant over time, user privileges typically change more f

AC-2(7)enhancement

Privileged User Accounts

Privileged roles are organization-defined roles assigned to individuals that allow those individuals to perform certain security-relevant functions that ordinary users are not authorized to perform. Privileged roles include key management, account management, database administration, system and network administration, and web administration. A role-based acc

AC-2(8)enhancement

Dynamic Account Management

Approaches for dynamically creating, activating, managing, and deactivating system accounts rely on automatically provisioning the accounts at runtime for entities that were previously unknown. Organizations plan for the dynamic management, creation, activation, and deactivation of system accounts by establishing trust relationships, business rules, and mech

AC-3(2)enhancement

Dual Authorization

Dual authorization, also known as two-person control, reduces risk related to insider threats. Dual authorization mechanisms require the approval of two authorized individuals to execute. To reduce the risk of collusion, organizations consider rotating dual authorization duties. Organizations consider the risk associated with implementing dual authorization

AC-3(3)enhancement

Mandatory Access Control

Mandatory access control is a type of nondiscretionary access control. Mandatory access control policies constrain what actions subjects can take with information obtained from objects for which they have already been granted access. This prevents the subjects from passing the information to unauthorized subjects and objects. Mandatory access control policie

AC-3(4)enhancement

Discretionary Access Control

When discretionary access control policies are implemented, subjects are not constrained with regard to what actions they can take with information for which they have already been granted access. Thus, subjects that have been granted access to information are not prevented from passing the information to other subjects or objects (i.e., subjects have the di

AC-3(5)enhancement

Security-relevant Information

Security-relevant information is information within systems that can potentially impact the operation of security functions or the provision of security services in a manner that could result in failure to enforce system security and privacy policies or maintain the separation of code and data. Security-relevant information includes access control lists, fil

AC-3(7)enhancement

Role-based Access Control

Role-based access control (RBAC) is an access control policy that enforces access to objects and system functions based on the defined role (i.e., job function) of the subject. Organizations can create specific roles based on job functions and the authorizations (i.e., privileges) to perform needed operations on the systems associated with the organization-d

AC-3(8)enhancement

Revocation of Access Authorizations

Revocation of access rules may differ based on the types of access revoked. For example, if a subject (i.e., user or process acting on behalf of a user) is removed from a group, access may not be revoked until the next time the object is opened or the next time the subject attempts to access the object. Revocation based on changes to security labels may take

AC-3(9)enhancement

Controlled Release

Organizations can only directly protect information when it resides within the system. Additional controls may be needed to ensure that organizational information is adequately protected once it is transmitted outside of the system. In situations where the system is unable to determine the adequacy of the protections provided by external entities, as a mitig

AC-4(1)enhancement

Object Security and Privacy Attributes

Information flow enforcement mechanisms compare security and privacy attributes associated with information (i.e., data content and structure) and source and destination objects and respond appropriately when the enforcement mechanisms encounter information flows not explicitly allowed by information flow policies. For example, an information object labeled

AC-4(2)enhancement

Processing Domains

Protected processing domains within systems are processing spaces that have controlled interactions with other processing spaces, enabling control of information flows between these spaces and to/from information objects. A protected processing domain can be provided, for example, by implementing domain and type enforcement. In domain and type enforcement, s

AC-4(3)enhancement

Dynamic Information Flow Control

Organizational policies regarding dynamic information flow control include allowing or disallowing information flows based on changing conditions or mission or operational considerations. Changing conditions include changes in risk tolerance due to changes in the immediacy of mission or business needs, changes in the threat environment, and detection of pote

AC-4(4)enhancement

Flow Control of Encrypted Information

Flow control mechanisms include content checking, security policy filters, and data type identifiers. The term encryption is extended to cover encoded data not recognized by filtering mechanisms.

AC-4(5)enhancement

Embedded Data Types

Embedding data types within other data types may result in reduced flow control effectiveness. Data type embedding includes inserting files as objects within other files and using compressed or archived data types that may include multiple embedded data types. Limitations on data type embedding consider the levels of embedding and prohibit levels of data typ

AC-4(6)enhancement

Metadata

Metadata is information that describes the characteristics of data. Metadata can include structural metadata describing data structures or descriptive metadata describing data content. Enforcement of allowed information flows based on metadata enables simpler and more effective flow control. Organizations consider the trustworthiness of metadata regarding da

AC-4(7)enhancement

One-way Flow Mechanisms

One-way flow mechanisms may also be referred to as a unidirectional network, unidirectional security gateway, or data diode. One-way flow mechanisms can be used to prevent data from being exported from a higher impact or classified domain or system while permitting data from a lower impact or unclassified domain or system to be imported.

AC-4(8)enhancement

Security and Privacy Policy Filters

Organization-defined security or privacy policy filters can address data structures and content. For example, security or privacy policy filters for data structures can check for maximum file lengths, maximum field sizes, and data/file types (for structured and unstructured data). Security or privacy policy filters for data content can check for specific wor

AC-4(9)enhancement

Human Reviews

Organizations define security or privacy policy filters for all situations where automated flow control decisions are possible. When a fully automated flow control decision is not possible, then a human review may be employed in lieu of or as a complement to automated security or privacy policy filtering. Human reviews may also be employed as deemed necessar

AC-6(1)enhancement

Authorize Access to Security Functions

Security functions include establishing system accounts, configuring access authorizations (i.e., permissions, privileges), configuring settings for events to be audited, and establishing intrusion detection parameters. Security-relevant information includes filtering rules for routers or firewalls, configuration parameters for security services, cryptograph

AC-6(2)enhancement

Non-privileged Access for Nonsecurity Functions

Requiring the use of non-privileged accounts when accessing nonsecurity functions limits exposure when operating from within privileged accounts or roles. The inclusion of roles addresses situations where organizations implement access control policies, such as role-based access control, and where a change of role provides the same degree of assurance in the

AC-6(4)enhancement

Separate Processing Domains

Providing separate processing domains for finer-grained allocation of user privileges includes using virtualization techniques to permit additional user privileges within a virtual machine while restricting privileges to other virtual machines or to the underlying physical machine, implementing separate physical domains, and employing hardware or software do

AC-6(5)enhancement

Privileged Accounts

Privileged accounts, including super user accounts, are typically described as system administrator for various types of commercial off-the-shelf operating systems. Restricting privileged accounts to specific personnel or roles prevents day-to-day users from accessing privileged information or privileged functions. Organizations may differentiate in the appl

AC-6(6)enhancement

Privileged Access by Non-organizational Users

An organizational user is an employee or an individual considered by the organization to have the equivalent status of an employee. Organizational users include contractors, guest researchers, or individuals detailed from other organizations. A non-organizational user is a user who is not an organizational user. Policies and procedures for granting equivalen

AC-6(7)enhancement

Review of User Privileges

The need for certain assigned user privileges may change over time to reflect changes in organizational mission and business functions, environments of operation, technologies, or threats. A periodic review of assigned user privileges is necessary to determine if the rationale for assigning such privileges remains valid. If the need cannot be revalidated, or

AC-6(8)enhancement

Privilege Levels for Code Execution

In certain situations, software applications or programs need to execute with elevated privileges to perform required functions. However, depending on the software functionality and configuration, if the privileges required for execution are at a higher level than the privileges assigned to organizational users invoking such applications or programs, those u

AC-6(9)enhancement

Log Use of Privileged Functions

The misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by authorized users or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. Logging and analyzing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and, in d

AC-7(2)enhancement

Purge or Wipe Mobile Device

A mobile device is a computing device that has a small form factor such that it can be carried by a single individual; is designed to operate without a physical connection; possesses local, non-removable or removable data storage; and includes a self-contained power source. Purging or wiping the device applies only to mobile devices for which the organizatio

AC-7(3)enhancement

Biometric Attempt Limiting

Biometrics are probabilistic in nature. The ability to successfully authenticate can be impacted by many factors, including matching performance and presentation attack detection mechanisms. Organizations select the appropriate number of attempts for users based on organizationally-defined factors.

AC-7(4)enhancement

Use of Alternate Authentication Factor

The use of alternate authentication factors supports the objective of availability and allows a user who has inadvertently been locked out to use additional authentication factors to bypass the lockout.

AC-9(1)enhancement

Unsuccessful Logons

Information about the number of unsuccessful logon attempts since the last successful logon allows the user to recognize if the number of unsuccessful logon attempts is consistent with the user’s actual logon attempts.

AC-9(2)enhancement

Successful and Unsuccessful Logons

Information about the number of successful and unsuccessful logon attempts within a specified time period allows the user to recognize if the number and type of logon attempts are consistent with the user’s actual logon attempts.

AC-9(3)enhancement

Notification of Account Changes

Information about changes to security-related account characteristics within a specified time period allows users to recognize if changes were made without their knowledge.

AC-9(4)enhancement

Additional Logon Information

Organizations can specify additional information to be provided to users upon logon, including the location of the last logon. User location is defined as information that can be determined by systems, such as Internet Protocol (IP) addresses from which network logons occurred, notifications of local logons, or device identifiers.

AC-11(1)enhancement

Pattern-hiding Displays

The pattern-hiding display can include static or dynamic images, such as patterns used with screen savers, photographic images, solid colors, clock, battery life indicator, or a blank screen with the caveat that controlled unclassified information is not displayed.

AC-12(1)enhancement

User-initiated Logouts

Information resources to which users gain access via authentication include local workstations, databases, and password-protected websites or web-based services.

AC-12(2)enhancement

Termination Message

Logout messages for web access can be displayed after authenticated sessions have been terminated. However, for certain types of sessions, including file transfer protocol (FTP) sessions, systems typically send logout messages as final messages prior to terminating sessions.

AC-12(3)enhancement

Timeout Warning Message

To increase usability, notify users of pending session termination and prompt users to continue the session. The pending session termination time period is based on the parameters defined in the [AC-12](#ac-12) base control.

AC-16(1)enhancement

Dynamic Attribute Association

Dynamic association of attributes is appropriate whenever the security or privacy characteristics of information change over time. Attributes may change due to information aggregation issues (i.e., characteristics of individual data elements are different from the combined elements), changes in individual access authorizations (i.e., privileges), changes in

AC-16(2)enhancement

Attribute Value Changes by Authorized Individuals

The content or assigned values of attributes can directly affect the ability of individuals to access organizational information. Therefore, it is important for systems to be able to limit the ability to create or modify attributes to authorized individuals.

AC-16(3)enhancement

Maintenance of Attribute Associations by System

Maintaining the association and integrity of security and privacy attributes to subjects and objects with sufficient assurance helps to ensure that the attribute associations can be used as the basis of automated policy actions. The integrity of specific items, such as security configuration files, may be maintained through the use of an integrity monitoring

AC-16(4)enhancement

Association of Attributes by Authorized Individuals

Systems, in general, provide the capability for privileged users to assign security and privacy attributes to system-defined subjects (e.g., users) and objects (e.g., directories, files, and ports). Some systems provide additional capability for general users to assign security and privacy attributes to additional objects (e.g., files, emails). The associati

AC-16(5)enhancement

Attribute Displays on Objects to Be Output

System outputs include printed pages, screens, or equivalent items. System output devices include printers, notebook computers, video displays, smart phones, and tablets. To mitigate the risk of unauthorized exposure of information (e.g., shoulder surfing), the outputs display full attribute values when unmasked by the subscriber.

AC-16(6)enhancement

Maintenance of Attribute Association

Maintaining attribute association requires individual users (as opposed to the system) to maintain associations of defined security and privacy attributes with subjects and objects.

AC-16(7)enhancement

Consistent Attribute Interpretation

To enforce security and privacy policies across multiple system components in distributed systems, organizations provide a consistent interpretation of security and privacy attributes employed in access enforcement and flow enforcement decisions. Organizations can establish agreements and processes to help ensure that distributed system components implement

AC-16(8)enhancement

Association Techniques and Technologies

The association of security and privacy attributes to information within systems is important for conducting automated access enforcement and flow enforcement actions. The association of such attributes to information (i.e., binding) can be accomplished with technologies and techniques that provide different levels of assurance. For example, systems can cryp

AC-16(9)enhancement

Attribute Reassignment — Regrading Mechanisms

A regrading mechanism is a trusted process authorized to re-classify and re-label data in accordance with a defined policy exception. Validated regrading mechanisms are used by organizations to provide the requisite levels of assurance for attribute reassignment activities. The validation is facilitated by ensuring that regrading mechanisms are single purpos

AC-17(1)enhancement

Monitoring and Control

Monitoring and control of remote access methods allows organizations to detect attacks and help ensure compliance with remote access policies by auditing the connection activities of remote users on a variety of system components, including servers, notebook computers, workstations, smart phones, and tablets. Audit logging for remote access is enforced by [A

AC-17(2)enhancement

Protection of Confidentiality and Integrity Using Encryption

Virtual private networks can be used to protect the confidentiality and integrity of remote access sessions. Transport Layer Security (TLS) is an example of a cryptographic protocol that provides end-to-end communications security over networks and is used for Internet communications and online transactions.

AC-17(3)enhancement

Managed Access Control Points

Organizations consider the Trusted Internet Connections (TIC) initiative [DHS TIC](#4f42ee6e-86cc-403b-a51f-76c2b4f81b54) requirements for external network connections since limiting the number of access control points for remote access reduces attack surfaces.

AC-17(4)enhancement

Privileged Commands and Access

Remote access to systems represents a significant potential vulnerability that can be exploited by adversaries. As such, restricting the execution of privileged commands and access to security-relevant information via remote access reduces the exposure of the organization and the susceptibility to threats by adversaries to the remote access capability.

AC-17(6)enhancement

Protection of Mechanism Information

Remote access to organizational information by non-organizational entities can increase the risk of unauthorized use and disclosure about remote access mechanisms. The organization considers including remote access requirements in the information exchange agreements with other organizations, as applicable. Remote access requirements can also be included in r

AC-17(9)enhancement

Disconnect or Disable Access

The speed of system disconnect or disablement varies based on the criticality of missions or business functions and the need to eliminate immediate or future remote access to systems.

AC-18(1)enhancement

Authentication and Encryption

Wireless networking capabilities represent a significant potential vulnerability that can be exploited by adversaries. To protect systems with wireless access points, strong authentication of users and devices along with strong encryption can reduce susceptibility to threats by adversaries involving wireless technologies.

AC-18(3)enhancement

Disable Wireless Networking

Wireless networking capabilities that are embedded within system components represent a significant potential vulnerability that can be exploited by adversaries. Disabling wireless capabilities when not needed for essential organizational missions or functions can reduce susceptibility to threats by adversaries involving wireless technologies.

AC-18(4)enhancement

Restrict Configurations by Users

Organizational authorizations to allow selected users to configure wireless networking capabilities are enforced, in part, by the access enforcement mechanisms employed within organizational systems.

AC-18(5)enhancement

Antennas and Transmission Power Levels

Actions that may be taken to limit unauthorized use of wireless communications outside of organization-controlled boundaries include reducing the power of wireless transmissions so that the transmissions are less likely to emit a signal that can be captured outside of the physical perimeters of the organization, employing measures such as emissions security

AC-19(5)enhancement

Full Device or Container-based Encryption

Container-based encryption provides a more fine-grained approach to data and information encryption on mobile devices, including encrypting selected data structures such as files, records, or fields.

AC-20(1)enhancement

Limits on Authorized Use

Limiting authorized use recognizes circumstances where individuals using external systems may need to access organizational systems. Organizations need assurance that the external systems contain the necessary controls so as not to compromise, damage, or otherwise harm organizational systems. Verification that the required controls have been implemented can

AC-20(2)enhancement

Portable Storage Devices — Restricted Use

Limits on the use of organization-controlled portable storage devices in external systems include restrictions on how the devices may be used and under what conditions the devices may be used.

AC-20(3)enhancement

Non-organizationally Owned Systems — Restricted Use

Non-organizationally owned systems or system components include systems or system components owned by other organizations as well as personally owned devices. There are potential risks to using non-organizationally owned systems or components. In some cases, the risk is sufficiently high as to prohibit such use (see [AC-20 b.](#ac-20_smt.b) ). In other cases

AC-20(5)enhancement

Portable Storage Devices — Prohibited Use

Limits on the use of organization-controlled portable storage devices in external systems include a complete prohibition of the use of such devices. Prohibiting such use is enforced using technical methods and/or nontechnical (i.e., process-based) methods.

AC-2(11)enhancement

Usage Conditions

Specifying and enforcing usage conditions helps to enforce the principle of least privilege, increase user accountability, and enable effective account monitoring. Account monitoring includes alerts generated if the account is used in violation of organizational parameters. Organizations can describe specific conditions or circumstances under which system ac

AC-2(12)enhancement

Account Monitoring for Atypical Usage

Atypical usage includes accessing systems at certain times of the day or from locations that are not consistent with the normal usage patterns of individuals. Monitoring for atypical usage may reveal rogue behavior by individuals or an attack in progress. Account monitoring may inadvertently create privacy risks since data collected to identify atypical usag

AC-2(13)enhancement

Disable Accounts for High-risk Individuals

Users who pose a significant security and/or privacy risk include individuals for whom reliable evidence indicates either the intention to use authorized access to systems to cause harm or through whom adversaries will cause harm. Such harm includes adverse impacts to organizational operations, organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, or the

AC-24(1)enhancement

Transmit Access Authorization Information

Authorization processes and access control decisions may occur in separate parts of systems or in separate systems. In such instances, authorization information is transmitted securely (e.g., using cryptographic mechanisms) so that timely access control decisions can be enforced at the appropriate locations. To support the access control decisions, it may be

AC-24(2)enhancement

No User or Process Identity

In certain situations, it is important that access control decisions can be made without information regarding the identity of the users issuing the requests. These are generally instances where preserving individual privacy is of paramount importance. In other situations, user identification information is simply not needed for access control decisions, and

AC-3(10)enhancement

Audited Override of Access Control Mechanisms

In certain situations, such as when there is a threat to human life or an event that threatens the organization’s ability to carry out critical missions or business functions, an override capability for access control mechanisms may be needed. Override conditions are defined by organizations and used only in those limited circumstances. Audit events are defi

AC-3(11)enhancement

Restrict Access to Specific Information Types

Restricting access to specific information is intended to provide flexibility regarding access control of specific information types within a system. For example, role-based access could be employed to allow access to only a specific type of personally identifiable information within a database rather than allowing access to the database in its entirety. Oth

AC-3(12)enhancement

Assert and Enforce Application Access

Asserting and enforcing application access is intended to address applications that need to access existing system applications and functions, including user contacts, global positioning systems, cameras, keyboards, microphones, networks, phones, or other files.

AC-3(13)enhancement

Attribute-based Access Control

Attribute-based access control is an access control policy that restricts system access to authorized users based on specified organizational attributes (e.g., job function, identity), action attributes (e.g., read, write, delete), environmental attributes (e.g., time of day, location), and resource attributes (e.g., classification of a document). Organizati

AC-3(14)enhancement

Individual Access

Individual access affords individuals the ability to review personally identifiable information about them held within organizational records, regardless of format. Access helps individuals to develop an understanding about how their personally identifiable information is being processed. It can also help individuals ensure that their data is accurate. Acces

AC-3(15)enhancement

Discretionary and Mandatory Access Control

Simultaneously implementing a mandatory access control policy and a discretionary access control policy can provide additional protection against the unauthorized execution of code by users or processes acting on behalf of users. This helps prevent a single compromised user or process from compromising the entire system.

AC-4(10)enhancement

Enable and Disable Security or Privacy Policy Filters

For example, as allowed by the system authorization, administrators can enable security or privacy policy filters to accommodate approved data types. Administrators also have the capability to select the filters that are executed on a specific data flow based on the type of data that is being transferred, the source and destination security domains, and othe

AC-4(11)enhancement

Configuration of Security or Privacy Policy Filters

Documentation contains detailed information for configuring security or privacy policy filters. For example, administrators can configure security or privacy policy filters to include the list of inappropriate words that security or privacy policy mechanisms check in accordance with the definitions provided by organizations.

AC-4(12)enhancement

Data Type Identifiers

Data type identifiers include filenames, file types, file signatures or tokens, and multiple internal file signatures or tokens. Systems only allow transfer of data that is compliant with data type format specifications. Identification and validation of data types is based on defined specifications associated with each allowed data format. The filename and n

AC-4(13)enhancement

Decomposition into Policy-relevant Subcomponents

Decomposing information into policy-relevant subcomponents prior to information transfer facilitates policy decisions on source, destination, certificates, classification, attachments, and other security- or privacy-related component differentiators. Policy enforcement mechanisms apply filtering, inspection, and/or sanitization rules to the policy-relevant s

AC-4(14)enhancement

Security or Privacy Policy Filter Constraints

Data structure and content restrictions reduce the range of potential malicious or unsanctioned content in cross-domain transactions. Security or privacy policy filters that restrict data structures include restricting file sizes and field lengths. Data content policy filters include encoding formats for character sets, restricting character data fields to o

AC-4(15)enhancement

Detection of Unsanctioned Information

Unsanctioned information includes malicious code, information that is inappropriate for release from the source network, or executable code that could disrupt or harm the services or systems on the destination network.

AC-4(17)enhancement

Domain Authentication

Attribution is a critical component of a security and privacy concept of operations. The ability to identify source and destination points for information flowing within systems allows the forensic reconstruction of events and encourages policy compliance by attributing policy violations to specific organizations or individuals. Successful domain authenticat

AC-4(19)enhancement

Validation of Metadata

All information (including metadata and the data to which the metadata applies) is subject to filtering and inspection. Some organizations distinguish between metadata and data payloads (i.e., only the data to which the metadata is bound). Other organizations do not make such distinctions and consider metadata and the data to which the metadata applies to be

AC-4(20)enhancement

Approved Solutions

Organizations define approved solutions and configurations in cross-domain policies and guidance in accordance with the types of information flows across classification boundaries. The National Security Agency (NSA) National Cross Domain Strategy and Management Office provides a listing of approved cross-domain solutions. Contact [ncdsmo@nsa.gov](mailto:ncds

AC-4(21)enhancement

Physical or Logical Separation of Information Flows

Enforcing the separation of information flows associated with defined types of data can enhance protection by ensuring that information is not commingled while in transit and by enabling flow control by transmission paths that are not otherwise achievable. Types of separable information include inbound and outbound communications traffic, service requests an

AC-4(22)enhancement

Access Only

The system provides a capability for users to access each connected security domain without providing any mechanisms to allow users to transfer data or information between the different security domains. An example of an access-only solution is a terminal that provides a user access to information with different security classifications while assuredly keepi

AC-4(23)enhancement

Modify Non-releasable Information

Modifying non-releasable information can help prevent a data spill or attack when information is transferred across security domains. Modification actions include masking, permutation, alteration, removal, or redaction.

AC-4(24)enhancement

Internal Normalized Format

Converting data into normalized forms is one of most of effective mechanisms to stop malicious attacks and large classes of data exfiltration.

AC-4(25)enhancement

Data Sanitization

Data sanitization is the process of irreversibly removing or destroying data stored on a memory device (e.g., hard drives, flash memory/solid state drives, mobile devices, CDs, and DVDs) or in hard copy form.

AC-4(26)enhancement

Audit Filtering Actions

Content filtering is the process of inspecting information as it traverses a cross-domain solution and determines if the information meets a predefined policy. Content filtering actions and the results of filtering actions are recorded for individual messages to ensure that the correct filter actions were applied. Content filter reports are used to assist in

AC-4(27)enhancement

Redundant/Independent Filtering Mechanisms

Content filtering is the process of inspecting information as it traverses a cross-domain solution and determines if the information meets a predefined policy. Redundant and independent content filtering eliminates a single point of failure filtering system. Independence is defined as the implementation of a content filter that uses a different code base and

AC-4(28)enhancement

Linear Filter Pipelines

Content filtering is the process of inspecting information as it traverses a cross-domain solution and determines if the information meets a predefined policy. The use of linear content filter pipelines ensures that filter processes are non-bypassable and always invoked. In general, the use of parallel filtering architectures for content filtering of a singl

AC-4(29)enhancement

Filter Orchestration Engines

Content filtering is the process of inspecting information as it traverses a cross-domain solution and determines if the information meets a predefined security policy. An orchestration engine coordinates the sequencing of activities (manual and automated) in a content filtering process. Errors are defined as either anomalous actions or unexpected terminatio

AC-6(10)enhancement

Prohibit Non-privileged Users from Executing Privileged Functions

Privileged functions include disabling, circumventing, or altering implemented security or privacy controls, establishing system accounts, performing system integrity checks, and administering cryptographic key management activities. Non-privileged users are individuals who do not possess appropriate authorizations. Privileged functions that require protecti

AC-16(10)enhancement

Attribute Configuration by Authorized Individuals

The content or assigned values of security and privacy attributes can directly affect the ability of individuals to access organizational information. Thus, it is important for systems to be able to limit the ability to create or modify the type and value of attributes available for association with subjects and objects to authorized individuals only.

AC-17(10)enhancement

Authenticate Remote Commands

Authenticating remote commands protects against unauthorized commands and the replay of authorized commands. The ability to authenticate remote commands is important for remote systems for which loss, malfunction, misdirection, or exploitation would have immediate or serious consequences, such as injury, death, property damage, loss of high value assets, fai

AT-1control

Policy and Procedures

Awareness and training policy and procedures address the controls in the AT family that are implemented within systems and organizations. The risk management strategy is an important factor in establishing such policies and procedures. Policies and procedures contribute to security and privacy assurance. Therefore, it is important that security and privacy p

AT-2control

Literacy Training and Awareness

Organizations provide basic and advanced levels of literacy training to system users, including measures to test the knowledge level of users. Organizations determine the content of literacy training and awareness based on specific organizational requirements, the systems to which personnel have authorized access, and work environments (e.g., telework). The

AT-3control

Role-based Training

Organizations determine the content of training based on the assigned roles and responsibilities of individuals as well as the security and privacy requirements of organizations and the systems to which personnel have authorized access, including technical training specifically tailored for assigned duties. Roles that may require role-based training include

AT-4control

Training Records

Documentation for specialized training may be maintained by individual supervisors at the discretion of the organization. The National Archives and Records Administration provides guidance on records retention for federal agencies.

AT-6control

Training Feedback

Training feedback includes awareness training results and role-based training results. Training results, especially failures of personnel in critical roles, can be indicative of a potentially serious problem. Therefore, it is important that senior managers are made aware of such situations so that they can take appropriate response actions. Training feedback

AT-2(1)enhancement

Practical Exercises

Practical exercises include no-notice social engineering attempts to collect information, gain unauthorized access, or simulate the adverse impact of opening malicious email attachments or invoking, via spear phishing attacks, malicious web links.

AT-2(2)enhancement

Insider Threat

Potential indicators and possible precursors of insider threat can include behaviors such as inordinate, long-term job dissatisfaction; attempts to gain access to information not required for job performance; unexplained access to financial resources; bullying or harassment of fellow employees; workplace violence; and other serious violations of policies, pr

AT-2(3)enhancement

Social Engineering and Mining

Social engineering is an attempt to trick an individual into revealing information or taking an action that can be used to breach, compromise, or otherwise adversely impact a system. Social engineering includes phishing, pretexting, impersonation, baiting, quid pro quo, thread-jacking, social media exploitation, and tailgating. Social mining is an attempt to

AT-2(4)enhancement

Suspicious Communications and Anomalous System Behavior

A well-trained workforce provides another organizational control that can be employed as part of a defense-in-depth strategy to protect against malicious code coming into organizations via email or the web applications. Personnel are trained to look for indications of potentially suspicious email (e.g., receiving an unexpected email, receiving an email conta

AT-2(5)enhancement

Advanced Persistent Threat

An effective way to detect advanced persistent threats (APT) and to preclude successful attacks is to provide specific literacy training for individuals. Threat literacy training includes educating individuals on the various ways that APTs can infiltrate the organization (e.g., through websites, emails, advertisement pop-ups, articles, and social engineering

AT-2(6)enhancement

Cyber Threat Environment

Since threats continue to change over time, threat literacy training by the organization is dynamic. Moreover, threat literacy training is not performed in isolation from the system operations that support organizational mission and business functions.

AT-3(1)enhancement

Environmental Controls

Environmental controls include fire suppression and detection devices or systems, sprinkler systems, handheld fire extinguishers, fixed fire hoses, smoke detectors, temperature or humidity, heating, ventilation, air conditioning, and power within the facility.

AT-3(2)enhancement

Physical Security Controls

Physical security controls include physical access control devices, physical intrusion and detection alarms, operating procedures for facility security guards, and monitoring or surveillance equipment.

AT-3(3)enhancement

Practical Exercises

Practical exercises for security include training for software developers that addresses simulated attacks that exploit common software vulnerabilities or spear or whale phishing attacks targeted at senior leaders or executives. Practical exercises for privacy include modules with quizzes on identifying and processing personally identifiable information in v

AT-3(5)enhancement

Processing Personally Identifiable Information

Personally identifiable information processing and transparency controls include the organization’s authority to process personally identifiable information and personally identifiable information processing purposes. Role-based training for federal agencies addresses the types of information that may constitute personally identifiable information and the ri

AU-1control

Policy and Procedures

Audit and accountability policy and procedures address the controls in the AU family that are implemented within systems and organizations. The risk management strategy is an important factor in establishing such policies and procedures. Policies and procedures contribute to security and privacy assurance. Therefore, it is important that security and privacy

AU-2control

Event Logging

An event is an observable occurrence in a system. The types of events that require logging are those events that are significant and relevant to the security of systems and the privacy of individuals. Event logging also supports specific monitoring and auditing needs. Event types include password changes, failed logons or failed accesses related to systems,

AU-3control

Content of Audit Records

Audit record content that may be necessary to support the auditing function includes event descriptions (item a), time stamps (item b), source and destination addresses (item c), user or process identifiers (items d and f), success or fail indications (item e), and filenames involved (items a, c, e, and f) . Event outcomes include indicators of event success

AU-4control

Audit Log Storage Capacity

Organizations consider the types of audit logging to be performed and the audit log processing requirements when allocating audit log storage capacity. Allocating sufficient audit log storage capacity reduces the likelihood of such capacity being exceeded and resulting in the potential loss or reduction of audit logging capability.

AU-5control

Response to Audit Logging Process Failures

Audit logging process failures include software and hardware errors, failures in audit log capturing mechanisms, and reaching or exceeding audit log storage capacity. Organization-defined actions include overwriting oldest audit records, shutting down the system, and stopping the generation of audit records. Organizations may choose to define additional acti

AU-6control

Audit Record Review, Analysis, and Reporting

Audit record review, analysis, and reporting covers information security- and privacy-related logging performed by organizations, including logging that results from the monitoring of account usage, remote access, wireless connectivity, mobile device connection, configuration settings, system component inventory, use of maintenance tools and non-local mainte

AU-7control

Audit Record Reduction and Report Generation

Audit record reduction is a process that manipulates collected audit log information and organizes it into a summary format that is more meaningful to analysts. Audit record reduction and report generation capabilities do not always emanate from the same system or from the same organizational entities that conduct audit logging activities. The audit record r

AU-8control

Time Stamps

Time stamps generated by the system include date and time. Time is commonly expressed in Coordinated Universal Time (UTC), a modern continuation of Greenwich Mean Time (GMT), or local time with an offset from UTC. Granularity of time measurements refers to the degree of synchronization between system clocks and reference clocks (e.g., clocks synchronizing wi

AU-9control

Protection of Audit Information

Audit information includes all information needed to successfully audit system activity, such as audit records, audit log settings, audit reports, and personally identifiable information. Audit logging tools are those programs and devices used to conduct system audit and logging activities. Protection of audit information focuses on technical protection and

AU-10control

Non-repudiation

Types of individual actions covered by non-repudiation include creating information, sending and receiving messages, and approving information. Non-repudiation protects against claims by authors of not having authored certain documents, senders of not having transmitted messages, receivers of not having received messages, and signatories of not having signed

AU-11control

Audit Record Retention

Organizations retain audit records until it is determined that the records are no longer needed for administrative, legal, audit, or other operational purposes. This includes the retention and availability of audit records relative to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, subpoenas, and law enforcement actions. Organizations develop standard categories

AU-12control

Audit Record Generation

Audit records can be generated from many different system components. The event types specified in [AU-2d](#au-2_smt.d) are the event types for which audit logs are to be generated and are a subset of all event types for which the system can generate audit records.

AU-13control

Monitoring for Information Disclosure

Unauthorized disclosure of information is a form of data leakage. Open-source information includes social networking sites and code-sharing platforms and repositories. Examples of organizational information include personally identifiable information retained by the organization or proprietary information generated by the organization.

AU-14control

Session Audit

Session audits can include monitoring keystrokes, tracking websites visited, and recording information and/or file transfers. Session audit capability is implemented in addition to event logging and may involve implementation of specialized session capture technology. Organizations consider how session auditing can reveal information about individuals that m

AU-16control

Cross-organizational Audit Logging

When organizations use systems or services of external organizations, the audit logging capability necessitates a coordinated, cross-organization approach. For example, maintaining the identity of individuals who request specific services across organizational boundaries may often be difficult, and doing so may prove to have significant performance and priva

AU-3(1)enhancement

Additional Audit Information

The ability to add information generated in audit records is dependent on system functionality to configure the audit record content. Organizations may consider additional information in audit records including, but not limited to, access control or flow control rules invoked and individual identities of group account users. Organizations may also consider l

AU-4(1)enhancement

Transfer to Alternate Storage

Audit log transfer, also known as off-loading, is a common process in systems with limited audit log storage capacity and thus supports availability of the audit logs. The initial audit log storage is only used in a transitory fashion until the system can communicate with the secondary or alternate system allocated to audit log storage, at which point the au

AU-5(1)enhancement

Storage Capacity Warning

Organizations may have multiple audit log storage repositories distributed across multiple system components with each repository having different storage volume capacities.

AU-5(2)enhancement

Real-time Alerts

Alerts provide organizations with urgent messages. Real-time alerts provide these messages at information technology speed (i.e., the time from event detection to alert occurs in seconds or less).

AU-5(3)enhancement

Configurable Traffic Volume Thresholds

Organizations have the capability to reject or delay the processing of network communications traffic if audit logging information about such traffic is determined to exceed the storage capacity of the system audit logging function. The rejection or delay response is triggered by the established organizational traffic volume thresholds that can be adjusted b

AU-5(4)enhancement

Shutdown on Failure

Organizations determine the types of audit logging failures that can trigger automatic system shutdowns or degraded operations. Because of the importance of ensuring mission and business continuity, organizations may determine that the nature of the audit logging failure is not so severe that it warrants a complete shutdown of the system supporting the core

AU-5(5)enhancement

Alternate Audit Logging Capability

Since an alternate audit logging capability may be a short-term protection solution employed until the failure in the primary audit logging capability is corrected, organizations may determine that the alternate audit logging capability need only provide a subset of the primary audit logging functionality that is impacted by the failure.

AU-6(1)enhancement

Automated Process Integration

Organizational processes that benefit from integrated audit record review, analysis, and reporting include incident response, continuous monitoring, contingency planning, investigation and response to suspicious activities, and Inspector General audits.

AU-6(3)enhancement

Correlate Audit Record Repositories

Organization-wide situational awareness includes awareness across all three levels of risk management (i.e., organizational level, mission/business process level, and information system level) and supports cross-organization awareness.

AU-6(5)enhancement

Integrated Analysis of Audit Records

Integrated analysis of audit records does not require vulnerability scanning, the generation of performance data, or system monitoring. Rather, integrated analysis requires that the analysis of information generated by scanning, monitoring, or other data collection activities is integrated with the analysis of audit record information. Security Information a

AU-6(6)enhancement

Correlation with Physical Monitoring

The correlation of physical audit record information and the audit records from systems may assist organizations in identifying suspicious behavior or supporting evidence of such behavior. For example, the correlation of an individual’s identity for logical access to certain systems with the additional physical security information that the individual was pr

AU-6(7)enhancement

Permitted Actions

Organizations specify permitted actions for system processes, roles, and users associated with the review, analysis, and reporting of audit records through system account management activities. Specifying permitted actions on audit record information is a way to enforce the principle of least privilege. Permitted actions are enforced by the system and includ

AU-6(8)enhancement

Full Text Analysis of Privileged Commands

Full text analysis of privileged commands requires a distinct environment for the analysis of audit record information related to privileged users without compromising such information on the system where the users have elevated privileges, including the capability to execute privileged commands. Full text analysis refers to analysis that considers the full

AU-6(9)enhancement

Correlation with Information from Nontechnical Sources

Nontechnical sources include records that document organizational policy violations related to harassment incidents and the improper use of information assets. Such information can lead to a directed analytical effort to detect potential malicious insider activity. Organizations limit access to information that is available from nontechnical sources due to i

AU-7(1)enhancement

Automatic Processing

Events of interest can be identified by the content of audit records, including system resources involved, information objects accessed, identities of individuals, event types, event locations, event dates and times, Internet Protocol addresses involved, or event success or failure. Organizations may define event criteria to any degree of granularity require

AU-9(1)enhancement

Hardware Write-once Media

Writing audit trails to hardware-enforced, write-once media applies to the initial generation of audit trails (i.e., the collection of audit records that represents the information to be used for detection, analysis, and reporting purposes) and to the backup of those audit trails. Writing audit trails to hardware-enforced, write-once media does not apply to

AU-9(2)enhancement

Store on Separate Physical Systems or Components

Storing audit records in a repository separate from the audited system or system component helps to ensure that a compromise of the system being audited does not also result in a compromise of the audit records. Storing audit records on separate physical systems or components also preserves the confidentiality and integrity of audit records and facilitates t

AU-9(3)enhancement

Cryptographic Protection

Cryptographic mechanisms used for protecting the integrity of audit information include signed hash functions using asymmetric cryptography. This enables the distribution of the public key to verify the hash information while maintaining the confidentiality of the secret key used to generate the hash.

AU-9(4)enhancement

Access by Subset of Privileged Users

Individuals or roles with privileged access to a system and who are also the subject of an audit by that system may affect the reliability of the audit information by inhibiting audit activities or modifying audit records. Requiring privileged access to be further defined between audit-related privileges and other privileges limits the number of users or rol

AU-9(5)enhancement

Dual Authorization

Organizations may choose different selection options for different types of audit information. Dual authorization mechanisms (also known as two-person control) require the approval of two authorized individuals to execute audit functions. To reduce the risk of collusion, organizations consider rotating dual authorization duties to other individuals. Organiza

AU-9(6)enhancement

Read-only Access

Restricting privileged user or role authorizations to read-only helps to limit the potential damage to organizations that could be initiated by such users or roles, such as deleting audit records to cover up malicious activity.

AU-10(1)enhancement

Association of Identities

Binding identities to the information supports audit requirements that provide organizational personnel with the means to identify who produced specific information in the event of an information transfer. Organizations determine and approve the strength of attribute binding between the information producer and the information based on the security category

AU-10(2)enhancement

Validate Binding of Information Producer Identity

Validating the binding of the information producer identity to the information prevents the modification of information between production and review. The validation of bindings can be achieved by, for example, using cryptographic checksums. Organizations determine if validations are in response to user requests or generated automatically.

AU-10(3)enhancement

Chain of Custody

Chain of custody is a process that tracks the movement of evidence through its collection, safeguarding, and analysis life cycle by documenting each individual who handled the evidence, the date and time the evidence was collected or transferred, and the purpose for the transfer. If the reviewer is a human or if the review function is automated but separate

AU-10(4)enhancement

Validate Binding of Information Reviewer Identity

Validating the binding of the information reviewer identity to the information at transfer or release points prevents the unauthorized modification of information between review and the transfer or release. The validation of bindings can be achieved by using cryptographic checksums. Organizations determine if validations are in response to user requests or g

AU-11(1)enhancement

Long-term Retrieval Capability

Organizations need to access and read audit records requiring long-term storage (on the order of years). Measures employed to help facilitate the retrieval of audit records include converting records to newer formats, retaining equipment capable of reading the records, and retaining the necessary documentation to help personnel understand how to interpret th

AU-12(1)enhancement

System-wide and Time-correlated Audit Trail

Audit trails are time-correlated if the time stamps in the individual audit records can be reliably related to the time stamps in other audit records to achieve a time ordering of the records within organizational tolerances.

AU-12(2)enhancement

Standardized Formats

Audit records that follow common standards promote interoperability and information exchange between devices and systems. Promoting interoperability and information exchange facilitates the production of event information that can be readily analyzed and correlated. If logging mechanisms do not conform to standardized formats, systems may convert individual

AU-12(3)enhancement

Changes by Authorized Individuals

Permitting authorized individuals to make changes to system logging enables organizations to extend or limit logging as necessary to meet organizational requirements. Logging that is limited to conserve system resources may be extended (either temporarily or permanently) to address certain threat situations. In addition, logging may be limited to a specific

AU-12(4)enhancement

Query Parameter Audits of Personally Identifiable Information

Query parameters are explicit criteria that an individual or automated system submits to a system to retrieve data. Auditing of query parameters for datasets that contain personally identifiable information augments the capability of an organization to track and understand the access, usage, or sharing of personally identifiable information by authorized per

AU-13(1)enhancement

Use of Automated Tools

Automated mechanisms include commercial services that provide notifications and alerts to organizations and automated scripts to monitor new posts on websites.

AU-13(2)enhancement

Review of Monitored Sites

Reviewing the current list of open-source information sites being monitored on a regular basis helps to ensure that the selected sites remain relevant. The review also provides the opportunity to add new open-source information sites with the potential to provide evidence of unauthorized disclosure of organizational information. The list of sites monitored c

AU-13(3)enhancement

Unauthorized Replication of Information

The unauthorized use or replication of organizational information by external entities can cause adverse impacts on organizational operations and assets, including damage to reputation. Such activity can include the replication of an organizational website by an adversary or hostile threat actor who attempts to impersonate the web-hosting organization. Disco

AU-14(1)enhancement

System Start-up

The automatic initiation of session audits at startup helps to ensure that the information being captured on selected individuals is complete and not subject to compromise through tampering by malicious threat actors.

AU-16(1)enhancement

Identity Preservation

Identity preservation is applied when there is a need to be able to trace actions that are performed across organizational boundaries to a specific individual.

AU-16(2)enhancement

Sharing of Audit Information

Due to the distributed nature of the audit information, cross-organization sharing of audit information may be essential for effective analysis of the auditing being performed. For example, the audit records of one organization may not provide sufficient information to determine the appropriate or inappropriate use of organizational information resources by

AU-16(3)enhancement

Disassociability

Preserving identities in audit trails could have privacy ramifications, such as enabling the tracking and profiling of individuals, but may not be operationally necessary. These risks could be further amplified when transmitting information across organizational boundaries. Implementing privacy-enhancing cryptographic techniques can disassociate individuals

CA-1control

Policy and Procedures

Assessment, authorization, and monitoring policy and procedures address the controls in the CA family that are implemented within systems and organizations. The risk management strategy is an important factor in establishing such policies and procedures. Policies and procedures contribute to security and privacy assurance. Therefore, it is important that sec

CA-2control

Control Assessments

Organizations ensure that control assessors possess the required skills and technical expertise to develop effective assessment plans and to conduct assessments of system-specific, hybrid, common, and program management controls, as appropriate. The required skills include general knowledge of risk management concepts and approaches as well as comprehensive

CA-3control

Information Exchange

System information exchange requirements apply to information exchanges between two or more systems. System information exchanges include connections via leased lines or virtual private networks, connections to internet service providers, database sharing or exchanges of database transaction information, connections and exchanges with cloud services, exchang

CA-5control

Plan of Action and Milestones

Plans of action and milestones are useful for any type of organization to track planned remedial actions. Plans of action and milestones are required in authorization packages and subject to federal reporting requirements established by OMB.

CA-6control

Authorization

Authorizations are official management decisions by senior officials to authorize operation of systems, authorize the use of common controls for inheritance by organizational systems, and explicitly accept the risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation based on the implementation of agreed-upon controls. Au

CA-7control

Continuous Monitoring

Continuous monitoring at the system level facilitates ongoing awareness of the system security and privacy posture to support organizational risk management decisions. The terms "continuous" and "ongoing" imply that organizations assess and monitor their controls and risks at a frequency sufficient to support risk-based decisions. Different types of controls

CA-8control

Penetration Testing

Penetration testing is a specialized type of assessment conducted on systems or individual system components to identify vulnerabilities that could be exploited by adversaries. Penetration testing goes beyond automated vulnerability scanning and is conducted by agents and teams with demonstrable skills and experience that include technical expertise in netwo

CA-9control

Internal System Connections

Internal system connections are connections between organizational systems and separate constituent system components (i.e., connections between components that are part of the same system) including components used for system development. Intra-system connections include connections with mobile devices, notebook and desktop computers, tablets, printers, cop

CA-2(1)enhancement

Independent Assessors

Independent assessors or assessment teams are individuals or groups who conduct impartial assessments of systems. Impartiality means that assessors are free from any perceived or actual conflicts of interest regarding the development, operation, sustainment, or management of the systems under assessment or the determination of control effectiveness. To achie

CA-2(2)enhancement

Specialized Assessments

Organizations can conduct specialized assessments, including verification and validation, system monitoring, insider threat assessments, malicious user testing, and other forms of testing. These assessments can improve readiness by exercising organizational capabilities and indicating current levels of performance as a means of focusing actions to improve se

CA-2(3)enhancement

Leveraging Results from External Organizations

Organizations may rely on control assessments of organizational systems by other (external) organizations. Using such assessments and reusing existing assessment evidence can decrease the time and resources required for assessments by limiting the independent assessment activities that organizations need to perform. The factors that organizations consider in

CA-3(6)enhancement

Transfer Authorizations

To prevent unauthorized individuals and systems from making information transfers to protected systems, the protected system verifies—via independent means— whether the individual or system attempting to transfer information is authorized to do so. Verification of the authorization to transfer information also applies to control plane traffic (e.g., routing

CA-3(7)enhancement

Transitive Information Exchanges

Transitive or "downstream" information exchanges are information exchanges between the system or systems with which the organizational system exchanges information and other systems. For mission-essential systems, services, and applications, including high value assets, it is necessary to identify such information exchanges. The transparency of the controls

CA-5(1)enhancement

Automation Support for Accuracy and Currency

Using automated tools helps maintain the accuracy, currency, and availability of the plan of action and milestones and facilitates the coordination and sharing of security and privacy information throughout the organization. Such coordination and information sharing help to identify systemic weaknesses or deficiencies in organizational systems and ensure tha

CA-6(1)enhancement

Joint Authorization — Intra-organization

Assigning multiple authorizing officials from the same organization to serve as co-authorizing officials for the system increases the level of independence in the risk-based decision-making process. It also implements the concepts of separation of duties and dual authorization as applied to the system authorization process. The intra-organization joint autho

CA-6(2)enhancement

Joint Authorization — Inter-organization

Assigning multiple authorizing officials, at least one of whom comes from an external organization, to serve as co-authorizing officials for the system increases the level of independence in the risk-based decision-making process. It implements the concepts of separation of duties and dual authorization as applied to the system authorization process. Employi

CA-7(1)enhancement

Independent Assessment

Organizations maximize the value of control assessments by requiring that assessments be conducted by assessors with appropriate levels of independence. The level of required independence is based on organizational continuous monitoring strategies. Assessor independence provides a degree of impartiality to the monitoring process. To achieve such impartiality

CA-7(3)enhancement

Trend Analyses

Trend analyses include examining recent threat information that addresses the types of threat events that have occurred in the organization or the Federal Government, success rates of certain types of attacks, emerging vulnerabilities in technologies, evolving social engineering techniques, the effectiveness of configuration settings, results from multiple c

CA-7(4)enhancement

Risk Monitoring

Risk monitoring is informed by the established organizational risk tolerance. Effectiveness monitoring determines the ongoing effectiveness of the implemented risk response measures. Compliance monitoring verifies that required risk response measures are implemented. It also verifies that security and privacy requirements are satisfied. Change monitoring ide

CA-7(5)enhancement

Consistency Analysis

Security and privacy controls are often added incrementally to a system. As a result, policies for selecting and implementing controls may be inconsistent, and the controls could fail to work together in a consistent or coordinated manner. At a minimum, the lack of consistency and coordination could mean that there are unacceptable security and privacy gaps

CA-7(6)enhancement

Automation Support for Monitoring

Using automated tools for monitoring helps to maintain the accuracy, currency, and availability of monitoring information which in turns helps to increase the level of ongoing awareness of the system security and privacy posture in support of organizational risk management decisions.

CA-8(1)enhancement

Independent Penetration Testing Agent or Team

Independent penetration testing agents or teams are individuals or groups who conduct impartial penetration testing of organizational systems. Impartiality implies that penetration testing agents or teams are free from perceived or actual conflicts of interest with respect to the development, operation, or management of the systems that are the targets of th

CA-8(2)enhancement

Red Team Exercises

Red team exercises extend the objectives of penetration testing by examining the security and privacy posture of organizations and the capability to implement effective cyber defenses. Red team exercises simulate attempts by adversaries to compromise mission and business functions and provide a comprehensive assessment of the security and privacy posture of

CA-8(3)enhancement

Facility Penetration Testing

Penetration testing of physical access points can provide information on critical vulnerabilities in the operating environments of organizational systems. Such information can be used to correct weaknesses or deficiencies in physical controls that are necessary to protect organizational systems.

CM-1control

Policy and Procedures

Configuration management policy and procedures address the controls in the CM family that are implemented within systems and organizations. The risk management strategy is an important factor in establishing such policies and procedures. Policies and procedures contribute to security and privacy assurance. Therefore, it is important that security and privacy

CM-2control

Baseline Configuration

Baseline configurations for systems and system components include connectivity, operational, and communications aspects of systems. Baseline configurations are documented, formally reviewed, and agreed-upon specifications for systems or configuration items within those systems. Baseline configurations serve as a basis for future builds, releases, or changes

CM-3control

Configuration Change Control

Configuration change control for organizational systems involves the systematic proposal, justification, implementation, testing, review, and disposition of system changes, including system upgrades and modifications. Configuration change control includes changes to baseline configurations, configuration items of systems, operational procedures, configuratio

CM-4control

Impact Analyses

Organizational personnel with security or privacy responsibilities conduct impact analyses. Individuals conducting impact analyses possess the necessary skills and technical expertise to analyze the changes to systems as well as the security or privacy ramifications. Impact analyses include reviewing security and privacy plans, policies, and procedures to un

CM-5control

Access Restrictions for Change

Changes to the hardware, software, or firmware components of systems or the operational procedures related to the system can potentially have significant effects on the security of the systems or individuals’ privacy. Therefore, organizations permit only qualified and authorized individuals to access systems for purposes of initiating changes. Access restric

CM-6control

Configuration Settings

Configuration settings are the parameters that can be changed in the hardware, software, or firmware components of the system that affect the security and privacy posture or functionality of the system. Information technology products for which configuration settings can be defined include mainframe computers, servers, workstations, operating systems, mobile

CM-7control

Least Functionality

Systems provide a wide variety of functions and services. Some of the functions and services routinely provided by default may not be necessary to support essential organizational missions, functions, or operations. Additionally, it is sometimes convenient to provide multiple services from a single system component, but doing so increases risk over limiting

CM-8control

System Component Inventory

System components are discrete, identifiable information technology assets that include hardware, software, and firmware. Organizations may choose to implement centralized system component inventories that include components from all organizational systems. In such situations, organizations ensure that the inventories include system-specific information requ

CM-9control

Configuration Management Plan

Configuration management activities occur throughout the system development life cycle. As such, there are developmental configuration management activities (e.g., the control of code and software libraries) and operational configuration management activities (e.g., control of installed components and how the components are configured). Configuration managem

CM-10control

Software Usage Restrictions

Software license tracking can be accomplished by manual or automated methods, depending on organizational needs. Examples of contract agreements include software license agreements and non-disclosure agreements.

CM-11control

User-installed Software

If provided the necessary privileges, users can install software in organizational systems. To maintain control over the software installed, organizations identify permitted and prohibited actions regarding software installation. Permitted software installations include updates and security patches to existing software and downloading new applications from o

CM-12control

Information Location

Information location addresses the need to understand where information is being processed and stored. Information location includes identifying where specific information types and information reside in system components and how information is being processed so that information flow can be understood and adequate protection and policy management provided f

CM-13control

Data Action Mapping

Data actions are system operations that process personally identifiable information. The processing of such information encompasses the full information life cycle, which includes collection, generation, transformation, use, disclosure, retention, and disposal. A map of system data actions includes discrete data actions, elements of personally identifiable i

CM-14control

Signed Components

Software and firmware components prevented from installation unless signed with recognized and approved certificates include software and firmware version updates, patches, service packs, device drivers, and basic input/output system updates. Organizations can identify applicable software and firmware components by type, by specific items, or a combination o

CM-2(2)enhancement

Automation Support for Accuracy and Currency

Automated mechanisms that help organizations maintain consistent baseline configurations for systems include configuration management tools, hardware, software, firmware inventory tools, and network management tools. Automated tools can be used at the organization level, mission and business process level, or system level on workstations, servers, notebook c

CM-2(3)enhancement

Retention of Previous Configurations

Retaining previous versions of baseline configurations to support rollback include hardware, software, firmware, configuration files, configuration records, and associated documentation.

CM-2(6)enhancement

Development and Test Environments

Establishing separate baseline configurations for development, testing, and operational environments protects systems from unplanned or unexpected events related to development and testing activities. Separate baseline configurations allow organizations to apply the configuration management that is most appropriate for each type of configuration. For example

CM-2(7)enhancement

Configure Systems and Components for High-risk Areas

When it is known that systems or system components will be in high-risk areas external to the organization, additional controls may be implemented to counter the increased threat in such areas. For example, organizations can take actions for notebook computers used by individuals departing on and returning from travel. Actions include determining the locatio

CM-3(2)enhancement

Testing, Validation, and Documentation of Changes

Changes to systems include modifications to hardware, software, or firmware components and configuration settings defined in [CM-6](#cm-6) . Organizations ensure that testing does not interfere with system operations that support organizational mission and business functions. Individuals or groups conducting tests understand security and privacy policies and

CM-3(3)enhancement

Automated Change Implementation

Automated tools can improve the accuracy, consistency, and availability of configuration baseline information. Automation can also provide data aggregation and data correlation capabilities, alerting mechanisms, and dashboards to support risk-based decision-making within the organization.

CM-3(4)enhancement

Security and Privacy Representatives

Information security and privacy representatives include system security officers, senior agency information security officers, senior agency officials for privacy, or system privacy officers. Representation by personnel with information security and privacy expertise is important because changes to system configurations can have unintended side effects, som

CM-3(5)enhancement

Automated Security Response

Automated security responses include halting selected system functions, halting system processing, and issuing alerts or notifications to organizational personnel when there is an unauthorized modification of a configuration item.

CM-3(6)enhancement

Cryptography Management

The controls referenced in the control enhancement refer to security and privacy controls from the control catalog. Regardless of the cryptographic mechanisms employed, processes and procedures are in place to manage those mechanisms. For example, if system components use certificates for identification and authentication, a process is implemented to address

CM-3(7)enhancement

Review System Changes

Indications that warrant a review of changes to the system and the specific circumstances justifying such reviews may be obtained from activities carried out by organizations during the configuration change process or continuous monitoring process.

CM-4(1)enhancement

Separate Test Environments

A separate test environment requires an environment that is physically or logically separate and distinct from the operational environment. The separation is sufficient to ensure that activities in the test environment do not impact activities in the operational environment and that information in the operational environment is not inadvertently transmitted

CM-4(2)enhancement

Verification of Controls

Implementation in this context refers to installing changed code in the operational system that may have an impact on security or privacy controls.

CM-5(1)enhancement

Automated Access Enforcement and Audit Records

Organizations log system accesses associated with applying configuration changes to ensure that configuration change control is implemented and to support after-the-fact actions should organizations discover any unauthorized changes.

CM-5(4)enhancement

Dual Authorization

Organizations employ dual authorization to help ensure that any changes to selected system components and information cannot occur unless two qualified individuals approve and implement such changes. The two individuals possess the skills and expertise to determine if the proposed changes are correct implementations of approved changes. The individuals are a

CM-5(5)enhancement

Privilege Limitation for Production and Operation

In many organizations, systems support multiple mission and business functions. Limiting privileges to change system components with respect to operational systems is necessary because changes to a system component may have far-reaching effects on mission and business processes supported by the system. The relationships between systems and mission/business p

CM-6(1)enhancement

Automated Management, Application, and Verification

Automated tools (e.g., hardening tools, baseline configuration tools) can improve the accuracy, consistency, and availability of configuration settings information. Automation can also provide data aggregation and data correlation capabilities, alerting mechanisms, and dashboards to support risk-based decision-making within the organization.

CM-6(2)enhancement

Respond to Unauthorized Changes

Responses to unauthorized changes to configuration settings include alerting designated organizational personnel, restoring established configuration settings, or—in extreme cases—halting affected system processing.

CM-7(1)enhancement

Periodic Review

Organizations review functions, ports, protocols, and services provided by systems or system components to determine the functions and services that are candidates for elimination. Such reviews are especially important during transition periods from older technologies to newer technologies (e.g., transition from IPv4 to IPv6). These technology transitions ma

CM-7(2)enhancement

Prevent Program Execution

Prevention of program execution addresses organizational policies, rules of behavior, and/or access agreements that restrict software usage and the terms and conditions imposed by the developer or manufacturer, including software licensing and copyrights. Restrictions include prohibiting auto-execute features, restricting roles allowed to approve program exe

CM-7(3)enhancement

Registration Compliance

Organizations use the registration process to manage, track, and provide oversight for systems and implemented functions, ports, protocols, and services.

CM-7(4)enhancement

Unauthorized Software — Deny-by-exception

Unauthorized software programs can be limited to specific versions or from a specific source. The concept of prohibiting the execution of unauthorized software may also be applied to user actions, system ports and protocols, IP addresses/ranges, websites, and MAC addresses.

CM-7(5)enhancement

Authorized Software — Allow-by-exception

Authorized software programs can be limited to specific versions or from a specific source. To facilitate a comprehensive authorized software process and increase the strength of protection for attacks that bypass application level authorized software, software programs may be decomposed into and monitored at different levels of detail. These levels include

CM-7(6)enhancement

Confined Environments with Limited Privileges

Organizations identify software that may be of concern regarding its origin or potential for containing malicious code. For this type of software, user installations occur in confined environments of operation to limit or contain damage from malicious code that may be executed.

CM-7(8)enhancement

Binary or Machine Executable Code

Binary or machine executable code applies to all sources of binary or machine-executable code, including commercial software and firmware and open-source software. Organizations assess software products without accompanying source code or from sources with limited or no warranty for potential security impacts. The assessments address the fact that software p

CM-7(9)enhancement

Prohibiting The Use of Unauthorized Hardware

Hardware components provide the foundation for organizational systems and the platform for the execution of authorized software programs. Managing the inventory of hardware components and controlling which hardware components are permitted to be installed or connected to organizational systems is essential in order to provide adequate security.

CM-8(1)enhancement

Updates During Installation and Removal

Organizations can improve the accuracy, completeness, and consistency of system component inventories if the inventories are updated as part of component installations or removals or during general system updates. If inventories are not updated at these key times, there is a greater likelihood that the information will not be appropriately captured and docum

CM-8(2)enhancement

Automated Maintenance

Organizations maintain system inventories to the extent feasible. For example, virtual machines can be difficult to monitor because such machines are not visible to the network when not in use. In such cases, organizations maintain as up-to-date, complete, and accurate an inventory as is deemed reasonable. Automated maintenance can be achieved by the impleme

CM-8(3)enhancement

Automated Unauthorized Component Detection

Automated unauthorized component detection is applied in addition to the monitoring for unauthorized remote connections and mobile devices. Monitoring for unauthorized system components may be accomplished on an ongoing basis or by the periodic scanning of systems for that purpose. Automated mechanisms may also be used to prevent the connection of unauthoriz

CM-8(4)enhancement

Accountability Information

Identifying individuals who are responsible and accountable for administering system components ensures that the assigned components are properly administered and that organizations can contact those individuals if some action is required (e.g., when the component is determined to be the source of a breach, needs to be recalled or replaced, or needs to be re

CM-8(6)enhancement

Assessed Configurations and Approved Deviations

Assessed configurations and approved deviations focus on configuration settings established by organizations for system components, the specific components that have been assessed to determine compliance with the required configuration settings, and any approved deviations from established configuration settings.

CM-8(7)enhancement

Centralized Repository

Organizations may implement centralized system component inventories that include components from all organizational systems. Centralized repositories of component inventories provide opportunities for efficiencies in accounting for organizational hardware, software, and firmware assets. Such repositories may also help organizations rapidly identify the loca

CM-8(8)enhancement

Automated Location Tracking

The use of automated mechanisms to track the location of system components can increase the accuracy of component inventories. Such capability may help organizations rapidly identify the location and responsible individuals of system components that have been compromised, breached, or are otherwise in need of mitigation actions. The use of tracking mechanism

CM-9(1)enhancement

Assignment of Responsibility

In the absence of dedicated configuration management teams assigned within organizations, system developers may be tasked with developing configuration management processes using personnel who are not directly involved in system development or system integration. This separation of duties ensures that organizations establish and maintain a sufficient degree

CM-10(1)enhancement

Open-source Software

Open-source software refers to software that is available in source code form. Certain software rights normally reserved for copyright holders are routinely provided under software license agreements that permit individuals to study, change, and improve the software. From a security perspective, the major advantage of open-source software is that it provides

CM-11(3)enhancement

Automated Enforcement and Monitoring

Organizations enforce and monitor compliance with software installation policies using automated mechanisms to more quickly detect and respond to unauthorized software installation which can be an indicator of an internal or external hostile attack.

CM-12(1)enhancement

Automated Tools to Support Information Location

The use of automated tools helps to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the information location capability implemented within the system. Automation also helps organizations manage the data produced during information location activities and share such information across the organization. The output of automated information location tools can be us

CP-1control

Policy and Procedures

Contingency planning policy and procedures address the controls in the CP family that are implemented within systems and organizations. The risk management strategy is an important factor in establishing such policies and procedures. Policies and procedures contribute to security and privacy assurance. Therefore, it is important that security and privacy pro

CP-2control

Contingency Plan

Contingency planning for systems is part of an overall program for achieving continuity of operations for organizational mission and business functions. Contingency planning addresses system restoration and implementation of alternative mission or business processes when systems are compromised or breached. Contingency planning is considered throughout the s

CP-3control

Contingency Training

Contingency training provided by organizations is linked to the assigned roles and responsibilities of organizational personnel to ensure that the appropriate content and level of detail is included in such training. For example, some individuals may only need to know when and where to report for duty during contingency operations and if normal duties are af

CP-4control

Contingency Plan Testing

Methods for testing contingency plans to determine the effectiveness of the plans and identify potential weaknesses include checklists, walk-through and tabletop exercises, simulations (parallel or full interrupt), and comprehensive exercises. Organizations conduct testing based on the requirements in contingency plans and include a determination of the effe

CP-6control

Alternate Storage Site

Alternate storage sites are geographically distinct from primary storage sites and maintain duplicate copies of information and data if the primary storage site is not available. Similarly, alternate processing sites provide processing capability if the primary processing site is not available. Geographically distributed architectures that support contingenc

CP-7control

Alternate Processing Site

Alternate processing sites are geographically distinct from primary processing sites and provide processing capability if the primary processing site is not available. The alternate processing capability may be addressed using a physical processing site or other alternatives, such as failover to a cloud-based service provider or other internally or externall

CP-8control

Telecommunications Services

Telecommunications services (for data and voice) for primary and alternate processing and storage sites are in scope for [CP-8](#cp-8) . Alternate telecommunications services reflect the continuity requirements in contingency plans to maintain essential mission and business functions despite the loss of primary telecommunications services. Organizations may

CP-9control

System Backup

System-level information includes system state information, operating system software, middleware, application software, and licenses. User-level information includes information other than system-level information. Mechanisms employed to protect the integrity of system backups include digital signatures and cryptographic hashes. Protection of system backup

CP-10control

System Recovery and Reconstitution

Recovery is executing contingency plan activities to restore organizational mission and business functions. Reconstitution takes place following recovery and includes activities for returning systems to fully operational states. Recovery and reconstitution operations reflect mission and business priorities; recovery point, recovery time, and reconstitution o

CP-11control

Alternate Communications Protocols

Contingency plans and the contingency training or testing associated with those plans incorporate an alternate communications protocol capability as part of establishing resilience in organizational systems. Switching communications protocols may affect software applications and operational aspects of systems. Organizations assess the potential side effects

CP-12control

Safe Mode

For systems that support critical mission and business functions—including military operations, civilian space operations, nuclear power plant operations, and air traffic control operations (especially real-time operational environments)—organizations can identify certain conditions under which those systems revert to a predefined safe mode of operation. The

CP-13control

Alternative Security Mechanisms

Use of alternative security mechanisms supports system resiliency, contingency planning, and continuity of operations. To ensure mission and business continuity, organizations can implement alternative or supplemental security mechanisms. The mechanisms may be less effective than the primary mechanisms. However, having the capability to readily employ altern

CP-2(1)enhancement

Coordinate with Related Plans

Plans that are related to contingency plans include Business Continuity Plans, Disaster Recovery Plans, Critical Infrastructure Plans, Continuity of Operations Plans, Crisis Communications Plans, Insider Threat Implementation Plans, Data Breach Response Plans, Cyber Incident Response Plans, Breach Response Plans, and Occupant Emergency Plans.

CP-2(2)enhancement

Capacity Planning

Capacity planning is needed because different threats can result in a reduction of the available processing, telecommunications, and support services intended to support essential mission and business functions. Organizations anticipate degraded operations during contingency operations and factor the degradation into capacity planning. For capacity planning,

CP-2(3)enhancement

Resume Mission and Business Functions

Organizations may choose to conduct contingency planning activities to resume mission and business functions as part of business continuity planning or as part of business impact analyses. Organizations prioritize the resumption of mission and business functions. The time period for resuming mission and business functions may be dependent on the severity and

CP-2(5)enhancement

Continue Mission and Business Functions

Organizations may choose to conduct the contingency planning activities to continue mission and business functions as part of business continuity planning or business impact analyses. Primary processing and/or storage sites defined by organizations as part of contingency planning may change depending on the circumstances associated with the contingency.

CP-2(6)enhancement

Alternate Processing and Storage Sites

Organizations may choose to conduct contingency planning activities for alternate processing and storage sites as part of business continuity planning or business impact analyses. Primary processing and/or storage sites defined by organizations as part of contingency planning may change depending on the circumstances associated with the contingency.

CP-2(7)enhancement

Coordinate with External Service Providers

When the capability of an organization to carry out its mission and business functions is dependent on external service providers, developing a comprehensive and timely contingency plan may become more challenging. When mission and business functions are dependent on external service providers, organizations coordinate contingency planning activities with th

CP-2(8)enhancement

Identify Critical Assets

Organizations may choose to identify critical assets as part of criticality analysis, business continuity planning, or business impact analyses. Organizations identify critical system assets so that additional controls can be employed (beyond the controls routinely implemented) to help ensure that organizational mission and business functions can continue to

CP-3(1)enhancement

Simulated Events

The use of simulated events creates an environment for personnel to experience actual threat events, including cyber-attacks that disable websites, ransomware attacks that encrypt organizational data on servers, hurricanes that damage or destroy organizational facilities, or hardware or software failures.

CP-3(2)enhancement

Mechanisms Used in Training Environments

Operational mechanisms refer to processes that have been established to accomplish an organizational goal or a system that supports a particular organizational mission or business objective. Actual mission and business processes, systems, and/or facilities may be used to generate simulated events and enhance the realism of simulated events during contingency

CP-4(1)enhancement

Coordinate with Related Plans

Plans related to contingency planning for organizational systems include Business Continuity Plans, Disaster Recovery Plans, Continuity of Operations Plans, Crisis Communications Plans, Critical Infrastructure Plans, Cyber Incident Response Plans, and Occupant Emergency Plans. Coordination of contingency plan testing does not require organizations to create

CP-4(2)enhancement

Alternate Processing Site

Conditions at the alternate processing site may be significantly different than the conditions at the primary site. Having the opportunity to visit the alternate site and experience the actual capabilities available at the site can provide valuable information on potential vulnerabilities that could affect essential organizational mission and business functi

CP-4(3)enhancement

Automated Testing

Automated mechanisms facilitate thorough and effective testing of contingency plans by providing more complete coverage of contingency issues, selecting more realistic test scenarios and environments, and effectively stressing the system and supported mission and business functions.

CP-4(4)enhancement

Full Recovery and Reconstitution

Recovery is executing contingency plan activities to restore organizational mission and business functions. Reconstitution takes place following recovery and includes activities for returning systems to fully operational states. Organizations establish a known state for systems that includes system state information for hardware, software programs, and data.

CP-4(5)enhancement

Self-challenge

Often, the best method of assessing system resilience is to disrupt the system in some manner. The mechanisms used by the organization could disrupt system functions or system services in many ways, including terminating or disabling critical system components, changing the configuration of system components, degrading critical functionality (e.g., restricti

CP-6(1)enhancement

Separation from Primary Site

Threats that affect alternate storage sites are defined in organizational risk assessments and include natural disasters, structural failures, hostile attacks, and errors of omission or commission. Organizations determine what is considered a sufficient degree of separation between primary and alternate storage sites based on the types of threats that are of

CP-6(2)enhancement

Recovery Time and Recovery Point Objectives

Organizations establish recovery time and recovery point objectives as part of contingency planning. Configuration of the alternate storage site includes physical facilities and the systems supporting recovery operations that ensure accessibility and correct execution.

CP-6(3)enhancement

Accessibility

Area-wide disruptions refer to those types of disruptions that are broad in geographic scope with such determinations made by organizations based on organizational assessments of risk. Explicit mitigation actions include duplicating backup information at other alternate storage sites if access problems occur at originally designated alternate sites or planni

CP-7(1)enhancement

Separation from Primary Site

Threats that affect alternate processing sites are defined in organizational assessments of risk and include natural disasters, structural failures, hostile attacks, and errors of omission or commission. Organizations determine what is considered a sufficient degree of separation between primary and alternate processing sites based on the types of threats th

CP-7(2)enhancement

Accessibility

Area-wide disruptions refer to those types of disruptions that are broad in geographic scope with such determinations made by organizations based on organizational assessments of risk.

CP-7(3)enhancement

Priority of Service

Priority of service agreements refer to negotiated agreements with service providers that ensure that organizations receive priority treatment consistent with their availability requirements and the availability of information resources for logical alternate processing and/or at the physical alternate processing site. Organizations establish recovery time ob

CP-7(4)enhancement

Preparation for Use

Site preparation includes establishing configuration settings for systems at the alternate processing site consistent with the requirements for such settings at the primary site and ensuring that essential supplies and logistical considerations are in place.

CP-7(6)enhancement

Inability to Return to Primary Site

There may be situations that preclude an organization from returning to the primary processing site such as if a natural disaster (e.g., flood or a hurricane) damaged or destroyed a facility and it was determined that rebuilding in the same location was not prudent.

CP-8(1)enhancement

Priority of Service Provisions

Organizations consider the potential mission or business impact in situations where telecommunications service providers are servicing other organizations with similar priority of service provisions. Telecommunications Service Priority (TSP) is a Federal Communications Commission (FCC) program that directs telecommunications service providers (e.g., wireline

CP-8(2)enhancement

Single Points of Failure

In certain circumstances, telecommunications service providers or services may share the same physical lines, which increases the vulnerability of a single failure point. It is important to have provider transparency for the actual physical transmission capability for telecommunication services.

CP-8(3)enhancement

Separation of Primary and Alternate Providers

Threats that affect telecommunications services are defined in organizational assessments of risk and include natural disasters, structural failures, cyber or physical attacks, and errors of omission or commission. Organizations can reduce common susceptibilities by minimizing shared infrastructure among telecommunications service providers and achieving suf

CP-8(4)enhancement

Provider Contingency Plan

Reviews of provider contingency plans consider the proprietary nature of such plans. In some situations, a summary of provider contingency plans may be sufficient evidence for organizations to satisfy the review requirement. Telecommunications service providers may also participate in ongoing disaster recovery exercises in coordination with the Department of

CP-8(5)enhancement

Alternate Telecommunication Service Testing

Alternate telecommunications services testing is arranged through contractual agreements with service providers. The testing may occur in parallel with normal operations to ensure that there is no degradation in organizational missions or functions.

CP-9(1)enhancement

Testing for Reliability and Integrity

Organizations need assurance that backup information can be reliably retrieved. Reliability pertains to the systems and system components where the backup information is stored, the operations used to retrieve the information, and the integrity of the information being retrieved. Independent and specialized tests can be used for each of the aspects of reliab

CP-9(2)enhancement

Test Restoration Using Sampling

Organizations need assurance that system functions can be restored correctly and can support established organizational missions. To ensure that the selected system functions are thoroughly exercised during contingency plan testing, a sample of backup information is retrieved to determine whether the functions are operating as intended. Organizations can det

CP-9(3)enhancement

Separate Storage for Critical Information

Separate storage for critical information applies to all critical information regardless of the type of backup storage media. Critical system software includes operating systems, middleware, cryptographic key management systems, and intrusion detection systems. Security-related information includes inventories of system hardware, software, and firmware compo

CP-9(6)enhancement

Redundant Secondary System

The effect of system backup can be achieved by maintaining a redundant secondary system that mirrors the primary system, including the replication of information. If this type of redundancy is in place and there is sufficient geographic separation between the two systems, the secondary system can also serve as the alternate processing site.

CP-9(7)enhancement

Dual Authorization for Deletion or Destruction

Dual authorization ensures that deletion or destruction of backup information cannot occur unless two qualified individuals carry out the task. Individuals deleting or destroying backup information possess the skills or expertise to determine if the proposed deletion or destruction of information reflects organizational policies and procedures. Dual authoriz

CP-9(8)enhancement

Cryptographic Protection

The selection of cryptographic mechanisms is based on the need to protect the confidentiality and integrity of backup information. The strength of mechanisms selected is commensurate with the security category or classification of the information. Cryptographic protection applies to system backup information in storage at both primary and alternate locations

CP-10(2)enhancement

Transaction Recovery

Transaction-based systems include database management systems and transaction processing systems. Mechanisms supporting transaction recovery include transaction rollback and transaction journaling.

CP-10(6)enhancement

Component Protection

Protection of system recovery and reconstitution components (i.e., hardware, firmware, and software) includes physical and technical controls. Backup and restoration components used for recovery and reconstitution include router tables, compilers, and other system software.

IA-1control

Policy and Procedures

Identification and authentication policy and procedures address the controls in the IA family that are implemented within systems and organizations. The risk management strategy is an important factor in establishing such policies and procedures. Policies and procedures contribute to security and privacy assurance. Therefore, it is important that security an

IA-2control

Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users)

Organizations can satisfy the identification and authentication requirements by complying with the requirements in [HSPD 12](#f16e438e-7114-4144-bfe2-2dfcad8cb2d0) . Organizational users include employees or individuals who organizations consider to have an equivalent status to employees (e.g., contractors and guest researchers). Unique identification and au

IA-3control

Device Identification and Authentication

Devices that require unique device-to-device identification and authentication are defined by type, device, or a combination of type and device. Organization-defined device types include devices that are not owned by the organization. Systems use shared known information (e.g., Media Access Control [MAC], Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol [TCP/

IA-4control

Identifier Management

Common device identifiers include Media Access Control (MAC) addresses, Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, or device-unique token identifiers. The management of individual identifiers is not applicable to shared system accounts. Typically, individual identifiers are the usernames of the system accounts assigned to those individuals. In such instances, the acc

IA-5control

Authenticator Management

Authenticators include passwords, cryptographic devices, biometrics, certificates, one-time password devices, and ID badges. Device authenticators include certificates and passwords. Initial authenticator content is the actual content of the authenticator (e.g., the initial password). In contrast, the requirements for authenticator content contain specific c

IA-6control

Authentication Feedback

Authentication feedback from systems does not provide information that would allow unauthorized individuals to compromise authentication mechanisms. For some types of systems, such as desktops or notebooks with relatively large monitors, the threat (referred to as shoulder surfing) may be significant. For other types of systems, such as mobile devices with s

IA-7control

Cryptographic Module Authentication

Authentication mechanisms may be required within a cryptographic module to authenticate an operator accessing the module and to verify that the operator is authorized to assume the requested role and perform services within that role.

IA-8control

Identification and Authentication (Non-organizational Users)

Non-organizational users include system users other than organizational users explicitly covered by [IA-2](#ia-2) . Non-organizational users are uniquely identified and authenticated for accesses other than those explicitly identified and documented in [AC-14](#ac-14) . Identification and authentication of non-organizational users accessing federal systems m

IA-9control

Service Identification and Authentication

Services that may require identification and authentication include web applications using digital certificates or services or applications that query a database. Identification and authentication methods for system services and applications include information or code signing, provenance graphs, and electronic signatures that indicate the sources of service

IA-10control

Adaptive Authentication

Adversaries may compromise individual authentication mechanisms employed by organizations and subsequently attempt to impersonate legitimate users. To address this threat, organizations may employ specific techniques or mechanisms and establish protocols to assess suspicious behavior. Suspicious behavior may include accessing information that individuals do

IA-11control

Re-authentication

In addition to the re-authentication requirements associated with device locks, organizations may require re-authentication of individuals in certain situations, including when roles, authenticators or credentials change, when security categories of systems change, when the execution of privileged functions occurs, after a fixed time period, or periodically.

IA-12control

Identity Proofing

Identity proofing is the process of collecting, validating, and verifying a user’s identity information for the purposes of establishing credentials for accessing a system. Identity proofing is intended to mitigate threats to the registration of users and the establishment of their accounts. Standards and guidelines specifying identity assurance levels for i

IA-13control

Identity Providers and Authorization Servers

Identity providers, both internal and external to the organization, manage the user, device, and NPE authenticators and issue statements, often called identity assertions, attesting to identities of other systems or systems components. Authorization servers create and issue access tokens to identified and authenticated users and devices that can be used to g

IA-2(1)enhancement

Multi-factor Authentication to Privileged Accounts

Multi-factor authentication requires the use of two or more different factors to achieve authentication. The authentication factors are defined as follows: something you know (e.g., a personal identification number [PIN]), something you have (e.g., a physical authenticator such as a cryptographic private key), or something you are (e.g., a biometric). Multi-

IA-2(2)enhancement

Multi-factor Authentication to Non-privileged Accounts

Multi-factor authentication requires the use of two or more different factors to achieve authentication. The authentication factors are defined as follows: something you know (e.g., a personal identification number [PIN]), something you have (e.g., a physical authenticator such as a cryptographic private key), or something you are (e.g., a biometric). Multi-

IA-2(6)enhancement

Access to Accounts —separate Device

The purpose of requiring a device that is separate from the system to which the user is attempting to gain access for one of the factors during multi-factor authentication is to reduce the likelihood of compromising authenticators or credentials stored on the system. Adversaries may be able to compromise such authenticators or credentials and subsequently im

IA-2(8)enhancement

Access to Accounts — Replay Resistant

Authentication processes resist replay attacks if it is impractical to achieve successful authentications by replaying previous authentication messages. Replay-resistant techniques include protocols that use nonces or challenges such as time synchronous or cryptographic authenticators.

IA-3(1)enhancement

Cryptographic Bidirectional Authentication

A local connection is a connection with a device that communicates without the use of a network. A network connection is a connection with a device that communicates through a network. A remote connection is a connection with a device that communicates through an external network. Bidirectional authentication provides stronger protection to validate the iden

IA-3(3)enhancement

Dynamic Address Allocation

The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) is an example of a means by which clients can dynamically receive network address assignments.

IA-3(4)enhancement

Device Attestation

Device attestation refers to the identification and authentication of a device based on its configuration and known operating state. Device attestation can be determined via a cryptographic hash of the device. If device attestation is the means of identification and authentication, then it is important that patches and updates to the device are handled via a

IA-4(1)enhancement

Prohibit Account Identifiers as Public Identifiers

Prohibiting account identifiers as public identifiers applies to any publicly disclosed account identifier used for communication such as, electronic mail and instant messaging. Prohibiting the use of systems account identifiers that are the same as some public identifier, such as the individual identifier section of an electronic mail address, makes it more

IA-4(4)enhancement

Identify User Status

Characteristics that identify the status of individuals include contractors, foreign nationals, and non-organizational users. Identifying the status of individuals by these characteristics provides additional information about the people with whom organizational personnel are communicating. For example, it might be useful for a government employee to know th

IA-4(5)enhancement

Dynamic Management

In contrast to conventional approaches to identification that presume static accounts for preregistered users, many distributed systems establish identifiers at runtime for entities that were previously unknown. When identifiers are established at runtime for previously unknown entities, organizations can anticipate and provision for the dynamic establishmen

IA-4(6)enhancement

Cross-organization Management

Cross-organization identifier management provides the capability to identify individuals, groups, roles, or devices when conducting cross-organization activities involving the processing, storage, or transmission of information.

IA-4(8)enhancement

Pairwise Pseudonymous Identifiers

A pairwise pseudonymous identifier is an opaque unguessable subscriber identifier generated by an identity provider for use at a specific individual relying party. Generating distinct pairwise pseudonymous identifiers with no identifying information about a subscriber discourages subscriber activity tracking and profiling beyond the operational requirements

IA-4(9)enhancement

Attribute Maintenance and Protection

For each of the entities covered in [IA-2](#ia-2), [IA-3](#ia-3), [IA-8](#ia-8) , and [IA-9](#ia-9) , it is important to maintain the attributes for each authenticated entity on an ongoing basis in a central (protected) store.

IA-5(1)enhancement

Password-based Authentication

Password-based authentication applies to passwords regardless of whether they are used in single-factor or multi-factor authentication. Long passwords or passphrases are preferable over shorter passwords. Enforced composition rules provide marginal security benefits while decreasing usability. However, organizations may choose to establish certain rules for

IA-5(2)enhancement

Public Key-based Authentication

Public key cryptography is a valid authentication mechanism for individuals, machines, and devices. For PKI solutions, status information for certification paths includes certificate revocation lists or certificate status protocol responses. For PIV cards, certificate validation involves the construction and verification of a certification path to the Common

IA-5(5)enhancement

Change Authenticators Prior to Delivery

Changing authenticators prior to the delivery and installation of system components extends the requirement for organizations to change default authenticators upon system installation by requiring developers and/or installers to provide unique authenticators or change default authenticators for system components prior to delivery and/or installation. However

IA-5(6)enhancement

Protection of Authenticators

For systems that contain multiple security categories of information without reliable physical or logical separation between categories, authenticators used to grant access to the systems are protected commensurate with the highest security category of information on the systems. Security categories of information are determined as part of the security categ

IA-5(7)enhancement

No Embedded Unencrypted Static Authenticators

In addition to applications, other forms of static storage include access scripts and function keys. Organizations exercise caution when determining whether embedded or stored authenticators are in encrypted or unencrypted form. If authenticators are used in the manner stored, then those representations are considered unencrypted authenticators.

IA-5(8)enhancement

Multiple System Accounts

When individuals have accounts on multiple systems and use the same authenticators such as passwords, there is the risk that a compromise of one account may lead to the compromise of other accounts. Alternative approaches include having different authenticators (passwords) on all systems, employing a single sign-on or federation mechanism, or using some form

IA-5(9)enhancement

Federated Credential Management

Federation provides organizations with the capability to authenticate individuals and devices when conducting cross-organization activities involving the processing, storage, or transmission of information. Using a specific list of approved external organizations for authentication helps to ensure that those organizations are vetted and trusted.

IA-8(1)enhancement

Acceptance of PIV Credentials from Other Agencies

Acceptance of Personal Identity Verification (PIV) credentials from other federal agencies applies to both logical and physical access control systems. PIV credentials are those credentials issued by federal agencies that conform to FIPS Publication 201 and supporting guidelines. The adequacy and reliability of PIV card issuers are addressed and authorized u

IA-8(2)enhancement

Acceptance of External Authenticators

Acceptance of only NIST-compliant external authenticators applies to organizational systems that are accessible to the public (e.g., public-facing websites). External authenticators are issued by nonfederal government entities and are compliant with [SP 800-63B](#e59c5a7c-8b1f-49ca-8de0-6ee0882180ce) . Approved external authenticators meet or exceed the mini

IA-8(4)enhancement

Use of Defined Profiles

Organizations define profiles for identity management based on open identity management standards. To ensure that open identity management standards are viable, robust, reliable, sustainable, and interoperable as documented, the Federal Government assesses and scopes the standards and technology implementations against applicable laws, executive orders, dire

IA-8(5)enhancement

Acceptance of PIV-I Credentials

Acceptance of PIV-I credentials can be implemented by PIV, PIV-I, and other commercial or external identity providers. The acceptance and verification of PIV-I-compliant credentials apply to both logical and physical access control systems. The acceptance and verification of PIV-I credentials address nonfederal issuers of identity cards that desire to intero

IA-8(6)enhancement

Disassociability

Federated identity solutions can create increased privacy risks due to the tracking and profiling of individuals. Using identifier mapping tables or cryptographic techniques to blind credential service providers and relying parties from each other or to make identity attributes less visible to transmitting parties can reduce these privacy risks.

IA-12(1)enhancement

Supervisor Authorization

Including supervisor or sponsor authorization as part of the registration process provides an additional level of scrutiny to ensure that the user’s management chain is aware of the account, the account is essential to carry out organizational missions and functions, and the user’s privileges are appropriate for the anticipated responsibilities and authoriti

IA-12(2)enhancement

Identity Evidence

Identity evidence, such as documentary evidence or a combination of documents and biometrics, reduces the likelihood of individuals using fraudulent identification to establish an identity or at least increases the work factor of potential adversaries. The forms of acceptable evidence are consistent with the risks to the systems, roles, and privileges associ

IA-12(3)enhancement

Identity Evidence Validation and Verification

Validation and verification of identity evidence increases the assurance that accounts and identifiers are being established for the correct user and authenticators are being bound to that user. Validation refers to the process of confirming that the evidence is genuine and authentic, and the data contained in the evidence is correct, current, and related to

IA-12(4)enhancement

In-person Validation and Verification

In-person proofing reduces the likelihood of fraudulent credentials being issued because it requires the physical presence of individuals, the presentation of physical identity documents, and actual face-to-face interactions with designated registration authorities.

IA-12(5)enhancement

Address Confirmation

To make it more difficult for adversaries to pose as legitimate users during the identity proofing process, organizations can use out-of-band methods to ensure that the individual associated with an address of record is the same individual that participated in the registration. Confirmation can take the form of a temporary enrollment code or a notice of proo

IA-12(6)enhancement

Accept Externally-proofed Identities

To limit unnecessary re-proofing of identities, particularly of non-PIV users, organizations accept proofing conducted at a commensurate level of assurance by other agencies or organizations. Proofing is consistent with organizational security policy and the identity assurance level appropriate for the system, application, or information accessed. Accepting

IA-13(1)enhancement

Protection of Cryptographic Keys

Identity assertions and access tokens are typically digitally signed. The private keys used to sign these assertions and tokens are protected commensurate with the impact of the system and information resources that can be accessed.

IA-13(2)enhancement

Verification of Identity Assertions and Access Tokens

This includes verification of digital signatures protecting identity assertions and access tokens, as well as included metadata. Metadata includes information about the access request such as information unique to user, system or information resource being accessed, or the transaction itself such as time. Protected system and information resources could incl

IA-13(3)enhancement

Token Management

An access token is a piece of data that represents the authorization granted to a user or NPE to access specific systems or information resources. Access tokens enable controlled access to services and resources. Properly managing the lifecycle of access tokens, including their issuance, validation, and revocation, is crucial to maintaining confidentiality o

IA-2(10)enhancement

Single Sign-on

Single sign-on enables users to log in once and gain access to multiple system resources. Organizations consider the operational efficiencies provided by single sign-on capabilities with the risk introduced by allowing access to multiple systems via a single authentication event. Single sign-on can present opportunities to improve system security, for exampl

IA-2(12)enhancement

Acceptance of PIV Credentials

Acceptance of Personal Identity Verification (PIV)-compliant credentials applies to organizations implementing logical access control and physical access control systems. PIV-compliant credentials are those credentials issued by federal agencies that conform to FIPS Publication 201 and supporting guidance documents. The adequacy and reliability of PIV card i

IA-2(13)enhancement

Out-of-band Authentication

Out-of-band authentication refers to the use of two separate communication paths to identify and authenticate users or devices to an information system. The first path (i.e., the in-band path) is used to identify and authenticate users or devices and is generally the path through which information flows. The second path (i.e., the out-of-band path) is used t

IA-5(10)enhancement

Dynamic Credential Binding

Authentication requires some form of binding between an identity and the authenticator that is used to confirm the identity. In conventional approaches, binding is established by pre-provisioning both the identity and the authenticator to the system. For example, the binding between a username (i.e., identity) and a password (i.e., authenticator) is accompli

IA-5(12)enhancement

Biometric Authentication Performance

Unlike password-based authentication, which provides exact matches of user-input passwords to stored passwords, biometric authentication does not provide exact matches. Depending on the type of biometric and the type of collection mechanism, there is likely to be some divergence from the presented biometric and the stored biometric that serves as the basis f

IA-5(13)enhancement

Expiration of Cached Authenticators

Cached authenticators are used to authenticate to the local machine when the network is not available. If cached authentication information is out of date, the validity of the authentication information may be questionable.

IA-5(14)enhancement

Managing Content of PKI Trust Stores

An organization-wide methodology for managing the content of PKI trust stores helps improve the accuracy and currency of PKI-based authentication credentials across the organization.

IA-5(15)enhancement

GSA-approved Products and Services

General Services Administration (GSA)-approved products and services are products and services that have been approved through the GSA conformance program, where applicable, and posted to the GSA Approved Products List. GSA provides guidance for teams to design and build functional and secure systems that comply with Federal Identity, Credential, and Access

IA-5(17)enhancement

Presentation Attack Detection for Biometric Authenticators

Biometric characteristics do not constitute secrets. Such characteristics can be obtained by online web accesses, taking a picture of someone with a camera phone to obtain facial images with or without their knowledge, lifting from objects that someone has touched (e.g., a latent fingerprint), or capturing a high-resolution image (e.g., an iris pattern). Pre

IA-5(18)enhancement

Password Managers

For systems where static passwords are employed, it is often a challenge to ensure that the passwords are suitably complex and that the same passwords are not employed on multiple systems. A password manager is a solution to this problem as it automatically generates and stores strong and different passwords for various accounts. A potential risk of using pa

IR-1control

Policy and Procedures

Incident response policy and procedures address the controls in the IR family that are implemented within systems and organizations. The risk management strategy is an important factor in establishing such policies and procedures. Policies and procedures contribute to security and privacy assurance. Therefore, it is important that security and privacy progra

IR-2control

Incident Response Training

Incident response training is associated with the assigned roles and responsibilities of organizational personnel to ensure that the appropriate content and level of detail are included in such training. For example, users may only need to know who to call or how to recognize an incident; system administrators may require additional training on how to handle

IR-3control

Incident Response Testing

Organizations test incident response capabilities to determine their effectiveness and identify potential weaknesses or deficiencies. Incident response testing includes the use of checklists, walk-through or tabletop exercises, and simulations (parallel or full interrupt). Incident response testing can include a determination of the effects on organizational

IR-4control

Incident Handling

Organizations recognize that incident response capabilities are dependent on the capabilities of organizational systems and the mission and business processes being supported by those systems. Organizations consider incident response as part of the definition, design, and development of mission and business processes and systems. Incident-related information

IR-5control

Incident Monitoring

Documenting incidents includes maintaining records about each incident, the status of the incident, and other pertinent information necessary for forensics as well as evaluating incident details, trends, and handling. Incident information can be obtained from a variety of sources, including network monitoring, incident reports, incident response teams, user

IR-6control

Incident Reporting

The types of incidents reported, the content and timeliness of the reports, and the designated reporting authorities reflect applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines. Incident information can inform risk assessments, control effectiveness assessments, security requirements for acquisitions, and selection

IR-7control

Incident Response Assistance

Incident response support resources provided by organizations include help desks, assistance groups, automated ticketing systems to open and track incident response tickets, and access to forensics services or consumer redress services, when required.

IR-8control

Incident Response Plan

It is important that organizations develop and implement a coordinated approach to incident response. Organizational mission and business functions determine the structure of incident response capabilities. As part of the incident response capabilities, organizations consider the coordination and sharing of information with external organizations, including

IR-9control

Information Spillage Response

Information spillage refers to instances where information is placed on systems that are not authorized to process such information. Information spills occur when information that is thought to be a certain classification or impact level is transmitted to a system and subsequently is determined to be of a higher classification or impact level. At that point,

IR-2(1)enhancement

Simulated Events

Organizations establish requirements for responding to incidents in incident response plans. Incorporating simulated events into incident response training helps to ensure that personnel understand their individual responsibilities and what specific actions to take in crisis situations.

IR-2(2)enhancement

Automated Training Environments

Automated mechanisms can provide a more thorough and realistic incident response training environment. This can be accomplished, for example, by providing more complete coverage of incident response issues, selecting more realistic training scenarios and environments, and stressing the response capability.

IR-2(3)enhancement

Breach

For federal agencies, an incident that involves personally identifiable information is considered a breach. A breach results in the loss of control, compromise, unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized acquisition, or a similar occurrence where a person other than an authorized user accesses or potentially accesses personally identifiable information or an auth

IR-3(1)enhancement

Automated Testing

Organizations use automated mechanisms to more thoroughly and effectively test incident response capabilities. This can be accomplished by providing more complete coverage of incident response issues, selecting realistic test scenarios and environments, and stressing the response capability.

IR-3(2)enhancement

Coordination with Related Plans

Organizational plans related to incident response testing include business continuity plans, disaster recovery plans, continuity of operations plans, contingency plans, crisis communications plans, critical infrastructure plans, and occupant emergency plans.

IR-3(3)enhancement

Continuous Improvement

To help incident response activities function as intended, organizations may use metrics and evaluation criteria to assess incident response programs as part of an effort to continually improve response performance. These efforts facilitate improvement in incident response efficacy and lessen the impact of incidents.

IR-4(1)enhancement

Automated Incident Handling Processes

Automated mechanisms that support incident handling processes include online incident management systems and tools that support the collection of live response data, full network packet capture, and forensic analysis.

IR-4(2)enhancement

Dynamic Reconfiguration

Dynamic reconfiguration includes changes to router rules, access control lists, intrusion detection or prevention system parameters, and filter rules for guards or firewalls. Organizations may perform dynamic reconfiguration of systems to stop attacks, misdirect attackers, and isolate components of systems, thus limiting the extent of the damage from breache

IR-4(3)enhancement

Continuity of Operations

Classes of incidents include malfunctions due to design or implementation errors and omissions, targeted malicious attacks, and untargeted malicious attacks. Incident response actions include orderly system degradation, system shutdown, fall back to manual mode or activation of alternative technology whereby the system operates differently, employing decepti

IR-4(4)enhancement

Information Correlation

Sometimes, a threat event, such as a hostile cyber-attack, can only be observed by bringing together information from different sources, including various reports and reporting procedures established by organizations.

IR-4(5)enhancement

Automatic Disabling of System

Organizations consider whether the capability to automatically disable the system conflicts with continuity of operations requirements specified as part of [CP-2](#cp-2) or [IR-4(3)](#ir-4.3) . Security violations include cyber-attacks that have compromised the integrity of the system or exfiltrated organizational information and serious errors in software p

IR-4(6)enhancement

Insider Threats

Explicit focus on handling incidents involving insider threats provides additional emphasis on this type of threat and the need for specific incident handling capabilities to provide appropriate and timely responses.

IR-4(7)enhancement

Insider Threats — Intra-organization Coordination

Incident handling for insider threat incidents (e.g., preparation, detection and analysis, containment, eradication, and recovery) requires coordination among many organizational entities, including mission or business owners, system owners, human resources offices, procurement offices, personnel offices, physical security offices, senior agency information

IR-4(8)enhancement

Correlation with External Organizations

The coordination of incident information with external organizations—including mission or business partners, military or coalition partners, customers, and developers—can provide significant benefits. Cross-organizational coordination can serve as an important risk management capability. This capability allows organizations to leverage information from a var

IR-4(9)enhancement

Dynamic Response Capability

The dynamic response capability addresses the timely deployment of new or replacement organizational capabilities in response to incidents. This includes capabilities implemented at the mission and business process level and at the system level.

IR-5(1)enhancement

Automated Tracking, Data Collection, and Analysis

Automated mechanisms for tracking incidents and collecting and analyzing incident information include Computer Incident Response Centers or other electronic databases of incidents and network monitoring devices.

IR-6(1)enhancement

Automated Reporting

The recipients of incident reports are specified in [IR-6b](#ir-6_smt.b) . Automated reporting mechanisms include email, posting on websites (with automatic updates), and automated incident response tools and programs.

IR-6(2)enhancement

Vulnerabilities Related to Incidents

Reported incidents that uncover system vulnerabilities are analyzed by organizational personnel including system owners, mission and business owners, senior agency information security officers, senior agency officials for privacy, authorizing officials, and the risk executive (function). The analysis can serve to prioritize and initiate mitigation actions t

IR-6(3)enhancement

Supply Chain Coordination

Organizations involved in supply chain activities include product developers, system integrators, manufacturers, packagers, assemblers, distributors, vendors, and resellers. Entities that provide supply chain governance include the Federal Acquisition Security Council (FASC). Supply chain incidents include compromises or breaches that involve information tec

IR-7(1)enhancement

Automation Support for Availability of Information and Support

Automated mechanisms can provide a push or pull capability for users to obtain incident response assistance. For example, individuals may have access to a website to query the assistance capability, or the assistance capability can proactively send incident response information to users (general distribution or targeted) as part of increasing understanding o

IR-7(2)enhancement

Coordination with External Providers

External providers of a system protection capability include the Computer Network Defense program within the U.S. Department of Defense. External providers help to protect, monitor, analyze, detect, and respond to unauthorized activity within organizational information systems and networks. It may be beneficial to have agreements in place with external provi

IR-8(1)enhancement

Breaches

Organizations may be required by law, regulation, or policy to follow specific procedures relating to breaches, including notice to individuals, affected organizations, and oversight bodies; standards of harm; and mitigation or other specific requirements.

IR-9(2)enhancement

Training

Organizations establish requirements for responding to information spillage incidents in incident response plans. Incident response training on a regular basis helps to ensure that organizational personnel understand their individual responsibilities and what specific actions to take when spillage incidents occur.

IR-9(3)enhancement

Post-spill Operations

Corrective actions for systems contaminated due to information spillages may be time-consuming. Personnel may not have access to the contaminated systems while corrective actions are being taken, which may potentially affect their ability to conduct organizational business.

IR-9(4)enhancement

Exposure to Unauthorized Personnel

Controls include ensuring that personnel who are exposed to spilled information are made aware of the laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines regarding the information and the restrictions imposed based on exposure to such information.

IR-4(10)enhancement

Supply Chain Coordination

Organizations involved in supply chain activities include product developers, system integrators, manufacturers, packagers, assemblers, distributors, vendors, and resellers. Supply chain incidents can occur anywhere through or to the supply chain and include compromises or breaches that involve primary or sub-tier providers, information technology products,

IR-4(11)enhancement

Integrated Incident Response Team

An integrated incident response team is a team of experts that assesses, documents, and responds to incidents so that organizational systems and networks can recover quickly and implement the necessary controls to avoid future incidents. Incident response team personnel include forensic and malicious code analysts, tool developers, systems security and priva

IR-4(12)enhancement

Malicious Code and Forensic Analysis

When conducted carefully in an isolated environment, analysis of malicious code and other residual artifacts of a security incident or breach can give the organization insight into adversary tactics, techniques, and procedures. It can also indicate the identity or some defining characteristics of the adversary. In addition, malicious code analysis can help t

IR-4(13)enhancement

Behavior Analysis

If the organization maintains a deception environment, an analysis of behaviors in that environment, including resources targeted by the adversary and timing of the incident or event, can provide insight into adversarial tactics, techniques, and procedures. External to a deception environment, the analysis of anomalous adversarial behavior (e.g., changes in

IR-4(14)enhancement

Security Operations Center

A security operations center (SOC) is the focal point for security operations and computer network defense for an organization. The purpose of the SOC is to defend and monitor an organization’s systems and networks (i.e., cyber infrastructure) on an ongoing basis. The SOC is also responsible for detecting, analyzing, and responding to cybersecurity incidents

IR-4(15)enhancement

Public Relations and Reputation Repair

It is important for an organization to have a strategy in place for addressing incidents that have been brought to the attention of the general public, have cast the organization in a negative light, or have affected the organization’s constituents (e.g., partners, customers). Such publicity can be extremely harmful to the organization and affect its ability

MA-1control

Policy and Procedures

Maintenance policy and procedures address the controls in the MA family that are implemented within systems and organizations. The risk management strategy is an important factor in establishing such policies and procedures. Policies and procedures contribute to security and privacy assurance. Therefore, it is important that security and privacy programs col

MA-2control

Controlled Maintenance

Controlling system maintenance addresses the information security aspects of the system maintenance program and applies to all types of maintenance to system components conducted by local or nonlocal entities. Maintenance includes peripherals such as scanners, copiers, and printers. Information necessary for creating effective maintenance records includes th

MA-3control

Maintenance Tools

Approving, controlling, monitoring, and reviewing maintenance tools address security-related issues associated with maintenance tools that are not within system authorization boundaries and are used specifically for diagnostic and repair actions on organizational systems. Organizations have flexibility in determining roles for the approval of maintenance too

MA-4control

Nonlocal Maintenance

Nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic activities are conducted by individuals who communicate through either an external or internal network. Local maintenance and diagnostic activities are carried out by individuals who are physically present at the system location and not communicating across a network connection. Authentication techniques used to establish

MA-5control

Maintenance Personnel

Maintenance personnel refers to individuals who perform hardware or software maintenance on organizational systems, while [PE-2](#pe-2) addresses physical access for individuals whose maintenance duties place them within the physical protection perimeter of the systems. Technical competence of supervising individuals relates to the maintenance performed on t

MA-6control

Timely Maintenance

Organizations specify the system components that result in increased risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation when the functionality provided by those components is not operational. Organizational actions to obtain maintenance support include having appropriate contracts in place.

MA-7control

Field Maintenance

Field maintenance is the type of maintenance conducted on a system or system component after the system or component has been deployed to a specific site (i.e., operational environment). In certain instances, field maintenance (i.e., local maintenance at the site) may not be executed with the same degree of rigor or with the same quality control checks as de

MA-2(2)enhancement

Automated Maintenance Activities

The use of automated mechanisms to manage and control system maintenance programs and activities helps to ensure the generation of timely, accurate, complete, and consistent maintenance records.

MA-3(1)enhancement

Inspect Tools

Maintenance tools can be directly brought into a facility by maintenance personnel or downloaded from a vendor’s website. If, upon inspection of the maintenance tools, organizations determine that the tools have been modified in an improper manner or the tools contain malicious code, the incident is handled consistent with organizational policies and procedu

MA-3(2)enhancement

Inspect Media

If, upon inspection of media containing maintenance, diagnostic, and test programs, organizations determine that the media contains malicious code, the incident is handled consistent with organizational incident handling policies and procedures.

MA-3(3)enhancement

Prevent Unauthorized Removal

Organizational information includes all information owned by organizations and any information provided to organizations for which the organizations serve as information stewards.

MA-3(4)enhancement

Restricted Tool Use

Restricting the use of maintenance tools to only authorized personnel applies to systems that are used to carry out maintenance functions.

MA-3(5)enhancement

Execution with Privilege

Maintenance tools that execute with increased system privilege can result in unauthorized access to organizational information and assets that would otherwise be inaccessible.

MA-3(6)enhancement

Software Updates and Patches

Maintenance tools using outdated and/or unpatched software can provide a threat vector for adversaries and result in a significant vulnerability for organizations.

MA-4(1)enhancement

Logging and Review

Audit logging for nonlocal maintenance is enforced by [AU-2](#au-2) . Audit events are defined in [AU-2a](#au-2_smt.a).

MA-4(3)enhancement

Comparable Security and Sanitization

Comparable security capability on systems, diagnostic tools, and equipment providing maintenance services implies that the implemented controls on those systems, tools, and equipment are at least as comprehensive as the controls on the system being serviced.

MA-4(5)enhancement

Approvals and Notifications

Notification may be performed by maintenance personnel. Approval of nonlocal maintenance is accomplished by personnel with sufficient information security and system knowledge to determine the appropriateness of the proposed maintenance.

MA-4(6)enhancement

Cryptographic Protection

Failure to protect nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic communications can result in unauthorized individuals gaining access to organizational information. Unauthorized access during remote maintenance sessions can result in a variety of hostile actions, including malicious code insertion, unauthorized changes to system parameters, and exfiltration of organiz

MA-4(7)enhancement

Disconnect Verification

Verifying the termination of a connection once maintenance is completed ensures that connections established during nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic sessions have been terminated and are no longer available for use.

MA-5(1)enhancement

Individuals Without Appropriate Access

Procedures for individuals who lack appropriate security clearances or who are not U.S. citizens are intended to deny visual and electronic access to classified or controlled unclassified information contained on organizational systems. Procedures for the use of maintenance personnel can be documented in security plans for the systems.

MA-5(2)enhancement

Security Clearances for Classified Systems

Personnel who conduct maintenance on organizational systems may be exposed to classified information during the course of their maintenance activities. To mitigate the inherent risk of such exposure, organizations use maintenance personnel that are cleared (i.e., possess security clearances) to the classification level of the information stored on the system

MA-5(3)enhancement

Citizenship Requirements for Classified Systems

Personnel who conduct maintenance on organizational systems may be exposed to classified information during the course of their maintenance activities. If access to classified information on organizational systems is restricted to U.S. citizens, the same restriction is applied to personnel performing maintenance on those systems.

MA-5(4)enhancement

Foreign Nationals

Personnel who conduct maintenance and diagnostic activities on organizational systems may be exposed to classified information. If non-U.S. citizens are permitted to perform maintenance and diagnostics activities on classified systems, then additional vetting is required to ensure agreements and restrictions are not being violated.

MA-5(5)enhancement

Non-system Maintenance

Personnel who perform maintenance activities in other capacities not directly related to the system include physical plant personnel and custodial personnel.

MA-6(1)enhancement

Preventive Maintenance

Preventive maintenance includes proactive care and the servicing of system components to maintain organizational equipment and facilities in satisfactory operating condition. Such maintenance provides for the systematic inspection, tests, measurements, adjustments, parts replacement, detection, and correction of incipient failures either before they occur or

MA-6(2)enhancement

Predictive Maintenance

Predictive maintenance evaluates the condition of equipment by performing periodic or continuous (online) equipment condition monitoring. The goal of predictive maintenance is to perform maintenance at a scheduled time when the maintenance activity is most cost-effective and before the equipment loses performance within a threshold. The predictive component

MA-6(3)enhancement

Automated Support for Predictive Maintenance

A computerized maintenance management system maintains a database of information about the maintenance operations of organizations and automates the processing of equipment condition data to trigger maintenance planning, execution, and reporting.

MP-1control

Policy and Procedures

Media protection policy and procedures address the controls in the MP family that are implemented within systems and organizations. The risk management strategy is an important factor in establishing such policies and procedures. Policies and procedures contribute to security and privacy assurance. Therefore, it is important that security and privacy program

MP-2control

Media Access

System media includes digital and non-digital media. Digital media includes flash drives, diskettes, magnetic tapes, external or removable hard disk drives (e.g., solid state, magnetic), compact discs, and digital versatile discs. Non-digital media includes paper and microfilm. Denying access to patient medical records in a community hospital unless the indi

MP-3control

Media Marking

Security marking refers to the application or use of human-readable security attributes. Digital media includes diskettes, magnetic tapes, external or removable hard disk drives (e.g., solid state, magnetic), flash drives, compact discs, and digital versatile discs. Non-digital media includes paper and microfilm. Controlled unclassified information is define

MP-4control

Media Storage

System media includes digital and non-digital media. Digital media includes flash drives, diskettes, magnetic tapes, external or removable hard disk drives (e.g., solid state, magnetic), compact discs, and digital versatile discs. Non-digital media includes paper and microfilm. Physically controlling stored media includes conducting inventories, ensuring pro

MP-5control

Media Transport

System media includes digital and non-digital media. Digital media includes flash drives, diskettes, magnetic tapes, external or removable hard disk drives (e.g., solid state and magnetic), compact discs, and digital versatile discs. Non-digital media includes microfilm and paper. Controlled areas are spaces for which organizations provide physical or proced

MP-6control

Media Sanitization

Media sanitization applies to all digital and non-digital system media subject to disposal or reuse, whether or not the media is considered removable. Examples include digital media in scanners, copiers, printers, notebook computers, workstations, network components, mobile devices, and non-digital media (e.g., paper and microfilm). The sanitization process

MP-7control

Media Use

System media includes both digital and non-digital media. Digital media includes diskettes, magnetic tapes, flash drives, compact discs, digital versatile discs, and removable hard disk drives. Non-digital media includes paper and microfilm. Media use protections also apply to mobile devices with information storage capabilities. In contrast to [MP-2](#mp-2)

MP-8control

Media Downgrading

Media downgrading applies to digital and non-digital media subject to release outside of the organization, whether the media is considered removable or not. When applied to system media, the downgrading process removes information from the media, typically by security category or classification level, such that the information cannot be retrieved or reconstr

MP-5(3)enhancement

Custodians

Identified custodians provide organizations with specific points of contact during the media transport process and facilitate individual accountability. Custodial responsibilities can be transferred from one individual to another if an unambiguous custodian is identified.

MP-6(1)enhancement

Review, Approve, Track, Document, and Verify

Organizations review and approve media to be sanitized to ensure compliance with records retention policies. Tracking and documenting actions include listing personnel who reviewed and approved sanitization and disposal actions, types of media sanitized, files stored on the media, sanitization methods used, date and time of the sanitization actions, personne

MP-6(2)enhancement

Equipment Testing

Testing of sanitization equipment and procedures may be conducted by qualified and authorized external entities, including federal agencies or external service providers.

MP-6(3)enhancement

Nondestructive Techniques

Portable storage devices include external or removable hard disk drives (e.g., solid state, magnetic), optical discs, magnetic or optical tapes, flash memory devices, flash memory cards, and other external or removable disks. Portable storage devices can be obtained from untrustworthy sources and contain malicious code that can be inserted into or transferre

MP-6(7)enhancement

Dual Authorization

Organizations employ dual authorization to help ensure that system media sanitization cannot occur unless two technically qualified individuals conduct the designated task. Individuals who sanitize system media possess sufficient skills and expertise to determine if the proposed sanitization reflects applicable federal and organizational standards, policies,

MP-6(8)enhancement

Remote Purging or Wiping of Information

Remote purging or wiping of information protects information on organizational systems and system components if systems or components are obtained by unauthorized individuals. Remote purge or wipe commands require strong authentication to help mitigate the risk of unauthorized individuals purging or wiping the system, component, or device. The purge or wipe

MP-7(2)enhancement

Prohibit Use of Sanitization-resistant Media

Sanitization resistance refers to how resistant media are to non-destructive sanitization techniques with respect to the capability to purge information from media. Certain types of media do not support sanitization commands, or if supported, the interfaces are not supported in a standardized way across these devices. Sanitization-resistant media includes co

MP-8(1)enhancement

Documentation of Process

Organizations can document the media downgrading process by providing information, such as the downgrading technique employed, the identification number of the downgraded media, and the identity of the individual that authorized and/or performed the downgrading action.

MP-8(4)enhancement

Classified Information

Downgrading of classified information uses approved sanitization tools, techniques, and procedures to transfer information confirmed to be unclassified from classified systems to unclassified media.

PE-1control

Policy and Procedures

Physical and environmental protection policy and procedures address the controls in the PE family that are implemented within systems and organizations. The risk management strategy is an important factor in establishing such policies and procedures. Policies and procedures contribute to security and privacy assurance. Therefore, it is important that securit

PE-2control

Physical Access Authorizations

Physical access authorizations apply to employees and visitors. Individuals with permanent physical access authorization credentials are not considered visitors. Authorization credentials include ID badges, identification cards, and smart cards. Organizations determine the strength of authorization credentials needed consistent with applicable laws, executiv

PE-3control

Physical Access Control

Physical access control applies to employees and visitors. Individuals with permanent physical access authorizations are not considered visitors. Physical access controls for publicly accessible areas may include physical access control logs/records, guards, or physical access devices and barriers to prevent movement from publicly accessible areas to non-pub

PE-4control

Access Control for Transmission

Security controls applied to system distribution and transmission lines prevent accidental damage, disruption, and physical tampering. Such controls may also be necessary to prevent eavesdropping or modification of unencrypted transmissions. Security controls used to control physical access to system distribution and transmission lines include disconnected o

PE-5control

Access Control for Output Devices

Controlling physical access to output devices includes placing output devices in locked rooms or other secured areas with keypad or card reader access controls and allowing access to authorized individuals only, placing output devices in locations that can be monitored by personnel, installing monitor or screen filters, and using headphones. Examples of outp

PE-6control

Monitoring Physical Access

Physical access monitoring includes publicly accessible areas within organizational facilities. Examples of physical access monitoring include the employment of guards, video surveillance equipment (i.e., cameras), and sensor devices. Reviewing physical access logs can help identify suspicious activity, anomalous events, or potential threats. The reviews can

PE-8control

Visitor Access Records

Visitor access records include the names and organizations of individuals visiting, visitor signatures, forms of identification, dates of access, entry and departure times, purpose of visits, and the names and organizations of individuals visited. Access record reviews determine if access authorizations are current and are still required to support organizat

PE-9control

Power Equipment and Cabling

Organizations determine the types of protection necessary for the power equipment and cabling employed at different locations that are both internal and external to organizational facilities and environments of operation. Types of power equipment and cabling include internal cabling and uninterruptable power sources in offices or data centers, generators and

PE-10control

Emergency Shutoff

Emergency power shutoff primarily applies to organizational facilities that contain concentrations of system resources, including data centers, mainframe computer rooms, server rooms, and areas with computer-controlled machinery.

PE-11control

Emergency Power

An uninterruptible power supply (UPS) is an electrical system or mechanism that provides emergency power when there is a failure of the main power source. A UPS is typically used to protect computers, data centers, telecommunication equipment, or other electrical equipment where an unexpected power disruption could cause injuries, fatalities, serious mission

PE-12control

Emergency Lighting

The provision of emergency lighting applies primarily to organizational facilities that contain concentrations of system resources, including data centers, server rooms, and mainframe computer rooms. Emergency lighting provisions for the system are described in the contingency plan for the organization. If emergency lighting for the system fails or cannot be

PE-13control

Fire Protection

The provision of fire detection and suppression systems applies primarily to organizational facilities that contain concentrations of system resources, including data centers, server rooms, and mainframe computer rooms. Fire detection and suppression systems that may require an independent energy source include sprinkler systems and smoke detectors. An indep

PE-14control

Environmental Controls

The provision of environmental controls applies primarily to organizational facilities that contain concentrations of system resources (e.g., data centers, mainframe computer rooms, and server rooms). Insufficient environmental controls, especially in very harsh environments, can have a significant adverse impact on the availability of systems and system com

PE-15control

Water Damage Protection

The provision of water damage protection primarily applies to organizational facilities that contain concentrations of system resources, including data centers, server rooms, and mainframe computer rooms. Isolation valves can be employed in addition to or in lieu of master shutoff valves to shut off water supplies in specific areas of concern without affecti

PE-16control

Delivery and Removal

Enforcing authorizations for entry and exit of system components may require restricting access to delivery areas and isolating the areas from the system and media libraries.

PE-17control

Alternate Work Site

Alternate work sites include government facilities or the private residences of employees. While distinct from alternative processing sites, alternate work sites can provide readily available alternate locations during contingency operations. Organizations can define different sets of controls for specific alternate work sites or types of sites depending on

PE-18control

Location of System Components

Physical and environmental hazards include floods, fires, tornadoes, earthquakes, hurricanes, terrorism, vandalism, an electromagnetic pulse, electrical interference, and other forms of incoming electromagnetic radiation. Organizations consider the location of entry points where unauthorized individuals, while not being granted access, might nonetheless be n

PE-19control

Information Leakage

Information leakage is the intentional or unintentional release of data or information to an untrusted environment from electromagnetic signals emanations. The security categories or classifications of systems (with respect to confidentiality), organizational security policies, and risk tolerance guide the selection of controls employed to protect systems ag

PE-20control

Asset Monitoring and Tracking

Asset location technologies can help ensure that critical assets—including vehicles, equipment, and system components—remain in authorized locations. Organizations consult with the Office of the General Counsel and senior agency official for privacy regarding the deployment and use of asset location technologies to address potential privacy concerns.

PE-2(1)enhancement

Access by Position or Role

Role-based facility access includes access by authorized permanent and regular/routine maintenance personnel, duty officers, and emergency medical staff.

PE-21control

Electromagnetic Pulse Protection

An electromagnetic pulse (EMP) is a short burst of electromagnetic energy that is spread over a range of frequencies. Such energy bursts may be natural or man-made. EMP interference may be disruptive or damaging to electronic equipment. Protective measures used to mitigate EMP risk include shielding, surge suppressors, ferro-resonant transformers, and earth

PE-2(2)enhancement

Two Forms of Identification

Acceptable forms of identification include passports, REAL ID-compliant drivers’ licenses, and Personal Identity Verification (PIV) cards. For gaining access to facilities using automated mechanisms, organizations may use PIV cards, key cards, PINs, and biometrics.

PE-22control

Component Marking

Hardware components that may require marking include input and output devices. Input devices include desktop and notebook computers, keyboards, tablets, and smart phones. Output devices include printers, monitors/video displays, facsimile machines, scanners, copiers, and audio devices. Permissions controlling output to the output devices are addressed in [AC

PE-2(3)enhancement

Restrict Unescorted Access

Individuals without required security clearances, access approvals, or need to know are escorted by individuals with appropriate physical access authorizations to ensure that information is not exposed or otherwise compromised.

PE-23control

Facility Location

Physical and environmental hazards include floods, fires, tornadoes, earthquakes, hurricanes, terrorism, vandalism, an electromagnetic pulse, electrical interference, and other forms of incoming electromagnetic radiation. The location of system components within the facility is addressed in [PE-18](#pe-18).

PE-3(1)enhancement

System Access

Control of physical access to the system provides additional physical security for those areas within facilities where there is a concentration of system components.

PE-3(2)enhancement

Facility and Systems

Organizations determine the extent, frequency, and/or randomness of security checks to adequately mitigate risk associated with exfiltration.

PE-3(3)enhancement

Continuous Guards

Employing guards at selected physical access points to the facility provides a more rapid response capability for organizations. Guards also provide the opportunity for human surveillance in areas of the facility not covered by video surveillance.

PE-3(4)enhancement

Lockable Casings

The greatest risk from the use of portable devices—such as smart phones, tablets, and notebook computers—is theft. Organizations can employ lockable, physical casings to reduce or eliminate the risk of equipment theft. Such casings come in a variety of sizes, from units that protect a single notebook computer to full cabinets that can protect multiple server

PE-3(5)enhancement

Tamper Protection

Organizations can implement tamper detection and prevention at selected hardware components or implement tamper detection at some components and tamper prevention at other components. Detection and prevention activities can employ many types of anti-tamper technologies, including tamper-detection seals and anti-tamper coatings. Anti-tamper programs help to d

PE-3(7)enhancement

Physical Barriers

Physical barriers include bollards, concrete slabs, jersey walls, and hydraulic active vehicle barriers.

PE-3(8)enhancement

Access Control Vestibules

An access control vestibule is part of a physical access control system that typically provides a space between two sets of interlocking doors. Vestibules are designed to prevent unauthorized individuals from following authorized individuals into facilities with controlled access. This activity, also known as piggybacking or tailgating, results in unauthoriz

PE-5(2)enhancement

Link to Individual Identity

Methods for linking individual identity to the receipt of output from output devices include installing security functionality on facsimile machines, copiers, and printers. Such functionality allows organizations to implement authentication on output devices prior to the release of output to individuals.

PE-6(1)enhancement

Intrusion Alarms and Surveillance Equipment

Physical intrusion alarms can be employed to alert security personnel when unauthorized access to the facility is attempted. Alarm systems work in conjunction with physical barriers, physical access control systems, and security guards by triggering a response when these other forms of security have been compromised or breached. Physical intrusion alarms can

PE-6(2)enhancement

Automated Intrusion Recognition and Responses

Response actions can include notifying selected organizational personnel or law enforcement personnel. Automated mechanisms implemented to initiate response actions include system alert notifications, email and text messages, and activating door locking mechanisms. Physical access monitoring can be coordinated with intrusion detection systems and system moni

PE-6(3)enhancement

Video Surveillance

Video surveillance focuses on recording activity in specified areas for the purposes of subsequent review, if circumstances so warrant. Video recordings are typically reviewed to detect anomalous events or incidents. Monitoring the surveillance video is not required, although organizations may choose to do so. There may be legal considerations when performin

PE-6(4)enhancement

Monitoring Physical Access to Systems

Monitoring physical access to systems provides additional monitoring for those areas within facilities where there is a concentration of system components, including server rooms, media storage areas, and communications centers. Physical access monitoring can be coordinated with intrusion detection systems and system monitoring capabilities to provide compre

PE-8(1)enhancement

Automated Records Maintenance and Review

Visitor access records may be stored and maintained in a database management system that is accessible by organizational personnel. Automated access to such records facilitates record reviews on a regular basis to determine if access authorizations are current and still required to support organizational mission and business functions.

PE-8(3)enhancement

Limit Personally Identifiable Information Elements

Organizations may have requirements that specify the contents of visitor access records. Limiting personally identifiable information in visitor access records when such information is not needed for operational purposes helps reduce the level of privacy risk created by a system.

PE-9(1)enhancement

Redundant Cabling

Physically separate and redundant power cables ensure that power continues to flow in the event that one of the cables is cut or otherwise damaged.

PE-9(2)enhancement

Automatic Voltage Controls

Automatic voltage controls can monitor and control voltage. Such controls include voltage regulators, voltage conditioners, and voltage stabilizers.

PE-13(1)enhancement

Detection Systems — Automatic Activation and Notification

Organizations can identify personnel, roles, and emergency responders if individuals on the notification list need to have access authorizations or clearances (e.g., to enter to facilities where access is restricted due to the classification or impact level of information within the facility). Notification mechanisms may require independent energy sources to

PE-13(2)enhancement

Suppression Systems — Automatic Activation and Notification

Organizations can identify specific personnel, roles, and emergency responders if individuals on the notification list need to have appropriate access authorizations and/or clearances (e.g., to enter to facilities where access is restricted due to the impact level or classification of information within the facility). Notification mechanisms may require inde

PE-13(4)enhancement

Inspections

Authorized and qualified personnel within the jurisdiction of the organization include state, county, and city fire inspectors and fire marshals. Organizations provide escorts during inspections in situations where the systems that reside within the facilities contain sensitive information.

PE-14(1)enhancement

Automatic Controls

The implementation of automatic environmental controls provides an immediate response to environmental conditions that can damage, degrade, or destroy organizational systems or systems components.

PE-14(2)enhancement

Monitoring with Alarms and Notifications

The alarm or notification may be an audible alarm or a visual message in real time to personnel or roles defined by the organization. Such alarms and notifications can help minimize harm to individuals and damage to organizational assets by facilitating a timely incident response.

PE-15(1)enhancement

Automation Support

Automated mechanisms include notification systems, water detection sensors, and alarms.

PL-1control

Policy and Procedures

Planning policy and procedures for the controls in the PL family implemented within systems and organizations. The risk management strategy is an important factor in establishing such policies and procedures. Policies and procedures contribute to security and privacy assurance. Therefore, it is important that security and privacy programs collaborate on thei

PL-2control

System Security and Privacy Plans

System security and privacy plans are scoped to the system and system components within the defined authorization boundary and contain an overview of the security and privacy requirements for the system and the controls selected to satisfy the requirements. The plans describe the intended application of each selected control in the context of the system with

PL-4control

Rules of Behavior

Rules of behavior represent a type of access agreement for organizational users. Other types of access agreements include nondisclosure agreements, conflict-of-interest agreements, and acceptable use agreements (see [PS-6](#ps-6) ). Organizations consider rules of behavior based on individual user roles and responsibilities and differentiate between rules th

PL-7control

Concept of Operations

The CONOPS may be included in the security or privacy plans for the system or in other system development life cycle documents. The CONOPS is a living document that requires updating throughout the system development life cycle. For example, during system design reviews, the concept of operations is checked to ensure that it remains consistent with the desig

PL-8control

Security and Privacy Architectures

The security and privacy architectures at the system level are consistent with the organization-wide security and privacy architectures described in [PM-7](#pm-7) , which are integral to and developed as part of the enterprise architecture. The architectures include an architectural description, the allocation of security and privacy functionality (including

PL-9control

Central Management

Central management refers to organization-wide management and implementation of selected controls and processes. This includes planning, implementing, assessing, authorizing, and monitoring the organization-defined, centrally managed controls and processes. As the central management of controls is generally associated with the concept of common (inherited) c

PL-10control

Baseline Selection

Control baselines are predefined sets of controls specifically assembled to address the protection needs of a group, organization, or community of interest. Controls are chosen for baselines to either satisfy mandates imposed by laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines or address threats common to all users of the

PL-11control

Baseline Tailoring

The concept of tailoring allows organizations to specialize or customize a set of baseline controls by applying a defined set of tailoring actions. Tailoring actions facilitate such specialization and customization by allowing organizations to develop security and privacy plans that reflect their specific mission and business functions, the environments wher

PL-4(1)enhancement

Social Media and External Site/Application Usage Restrictions

Social media, social networking, and external site/application usage restrictions address rules of behavior related to the use of social media, social networking, and external sites when organizational personnel are using such sites for official duties or in the conduct of official business, when organizational information is involved in social media and soc

PL-8(1)enhancement

Defense in Depth

Organizations strategically allocate security and privacy controls in the security and privacy architectures so that adversaries must overcome multiple controls to achieve their objective. Requiring adversaries to defeat multiple controls makes it more difficult to attack information resources by increasing the work factor of the adversary; it also increases

PL-8(2)enhancement

Supplier Diversity

Information technology products have different strengths and weaknesses. Providing a broad spectrum of products complements the individual offerings. For example, vendors offering malicious code protection typically update their products at different times, often developing solutions for known viruses, Trojans, or worms based on their priorities and developm

PM-1control

Information Security Program Plan

An information security program plan is a formal document that provides an overview of the security requirements for an organization-wide information security program and describes the program management controls and common controls in place or planned for meeting those requirements. An information security program plan can be represented in a single documen

PM-2control

Information Security Program Leadership Role

The senior agency information security officer is an organizational official. For federal agencies (as defined by applicable laws, executive orders, regulations, directives, policies, and standards), this official is the senior agency information security officer. Organizations may also refer to this official as the senior information security officer or chi

PM-3control

Information Security and Privacy Resources

Organizations consider establishing champions for information security and privacy and, as part of including the necessary resources, assign specialized expertise and resources as needed. Organizations may designate and empower an Investment Review Board or similar group to manage and provide oversight for the information security and privacy aspects of the

PM-4control

Plan of Action and Milestones Process

The plan of action and milestones is a key organizational document and is subject to reporting requirements established by the Office of Management and Budget. Organizations develop plans of action and milestones with an organization-wide perspective, prioritizing risk response actions and ensuring consistency with the goals and objectives of the organizatio

PM-5control

System Inventory

[OMB A-130](#27847491-5ce1-4f6a-a1e4-9e483782f0ef) provides guidance on developing systems inventories and associated reporting requirements. System inventory refers to an organization-wide inventory of systems, not system components as described in [CM-8](#cm-8).

PM-6control

Measures of Performance

Measures of performance are outcome-based metrics used by an organization to measure the effectiveness or efficiency of the information security and privacy programs and the controls employed in support of the program. To facilitate security and privacy risk management, organizations consider aligning measures of performance with the organizational risk tole

PM-7control

Enterprise Architecture

The integration of security and privacy requirements and controls into the enterprise architecture helps to ensure that security and privacy considerations are addressed throughout the system development life cycle and are explicitly related to the organization’s mission and business processes. The process of security and privacy requirements integration als

PM-8control

Critical Infrastructure Plan

Protection strategies are based on the prioritization of critical assets and resources. The requirement and guidance for defining critical infrastructure and key resources and for preparing an associated critical infrastructure protection plan are found in applicable laws, executive orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidelines.

PM-9control

Risk Management Strategy

An organization-wide risk management strategy includes an expression of the security and privacy risk tolerance for the organization, security and privacy risk mitigation strategies, acceptable risk assessment methodologies, a process for evaluating security and privacy risk across the organization with respect to the organization’s risk tolerance, and appro

PM-10control

Authorization Process

Authorization processes for organizational systems and environments of operation require the implementation of an organization-wide risk management process and associated security and privacy standards and guidelines. Specific roles for risk management processes include a risk executive (function) and designated authorizing officials for each organizational

PM-11control

Mission and Business Process Definition

Protection needs are technology-independent capabilities that are required to counter threats to organizations, individuals, systems, and the Nation through the compromise of information (i.e., loss of confidentiality, integrity, availability, or privacy). Information protection and personally identifiable information processing needs are derived from the mi

PM-12control

Insider Threat Program

Organizations that handle classified information are required, under Executive Order 13587 [EO 13587](#0af071a6-cf8e-48ee-8c82-fe91efa20f94) and the National Insider Threat Policy [ODNI NITP](#06d74ea9-2178-449c-a9c5-b2980f804ac8) , to establish insider threat programs. The same standards and guidelines that apply to insider threat programs in classified env

PM-13control

Security and Privacy Workforce

Security and privacy workforce development and improvement programs include defining the knowledge, skills, and abilities needed to perform security and privacy duties and tasks; developing role-based training programs for individuals assigned security and privacy roles and responsibilities; and providing standards and guidelines for measuring and building i

PM-14control

Testing, Training, and Monitoring

A process for organization-wide security and privacy testing, training, and monitoring helps ensure that organizations provide oversight for testing, training, and monitoring activities and that those activities are coordinated. With the growing importance of continuous monitoring programs, the implementation of information security and privacy across the th

PM-15control

Security and Privacy Groups and Associations

Ongoing contact with security and privacy groups and associations is important in an environment of rapidly changing technologies and threats. Groups and associations include special interest groups, professional associations, forums, news groups, users’ groups, and peer groups of security and privacy professionals in similar organizations. Organizations sel

PM-16control

Threat Awareness Program

Because of the constantly changing and increasing sophistication of adversaries, especially the advanced persistent threat (APT), it may be more likely that adversaries can successfully breach or compromise organizational systems. One of the best techniques to address this concern is for organizations to share threat information, including threat events (i.e

PM-17control

Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information on External Systems

Controlled unclassified information is defined by the National Archives and Records Administration along with the safeguarding and dissemination requirements for such information and is codified in [32 CFR 2002](#91f992fb-f668-4c91-a50f-0f05b95ccee3) and, specifically for systems external to the federal organization, [32 CFR 2002.14h](https://www.govinfo.gov

PM-18control

Privacy Program Plan

A privacy program plan is a formal document that provides an overview of an organization’s privacy program, including a description of the structure of the privacy program, the resources dedicated to the privacy program, the role of the senior agency official for privacy and other privacy officials and staff, the strategic goals and objectives of the privacy

PM-19control

Privacy Program Leadership Role

The privacy officer is an organizational official. For federal agencies—as defined by applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines—this official is designated as the senior agency official for privacy. Organizations may also refer to this official as the chief privacy officer. The senior agency official for

PM-20control

Dissemination of Privacy Program Information

For federal agencies, the webpage is located at www.[agency].gov/privacy. Federal agencies include public privacy impact assessments, system of records notices, computer matching notices and agreements, [PRIVACT](#18e71fec-c6fd-475a-925a-5d8495cf8455) exemption and implementation rules, privacy reports, privacy policies, instructions for individuals making a

PM-21control

Accounting of Disclosures

The purpose of accounting of disclosures is to allow individuals to learn to whom their personally identifiable information has been disclosed, to provide a basis for subsequently advising recipients of any corrected or disputed personally identifiable information, and to provide an audit trail for subsequent reviews of organizational compliance with conditi

PM-22control

Personally Identifiable Information Quality Management

Personally identifiable information quality management includes steps that organizations take to confirm the accuracy and relevance of personally identifiable information throughout the information life cycle. The information life cycle includes the creation, collection, use, processing, storage, maintenance, dissemination, disclosure, and disposition of per

PM-23control

Data Governance Body

A Data Governance Body can help ensure that the organization has coherent policies and the ability to balance the utility of data with security and privacy requirements. The Data Governance Body establishes policies, procedures, and standards that facilitate data governance so that data, including personally identifiable information, is effectively managed a

PM-24control

Data Integrity Board

A Data Integrity Board is the board of senior officials designated by the head of a federal agency and is responsible for, among other things, reviewing the agency’s proposals to conduct or participate in a matching program and conducting an annual review of all matching programs in which the agency has participated. As a general matter, a matching program i

PM-26control

Complaint Management

Complaints, concerns, and questions from individuals can serve as valuable sources of input to organizations and ultimately improve operational models, uses of technology, data collection practices, and controls. Mechanisms that can be used by the public include telephone hotline, email, or web-based forms. The information necessary for successfully filing c

PM-27control

Privacy Reporting

Through internal and external reporting, organizations promote accountability and transparency in organizational privacy operations. Reporting can also help organizations to determine progress in meeting privacy compliance requirements and privacy controls, compare performance across the federal government, discover vulnerabilities, identify gaps in policy a

PM-28control

Risk Framing

Risk framing is most effective when conducted at the organization level and in consultation with stakeholders throughout the organization including mission, business, and system owners. The assumptions, constraints, risk tolerance, priorities, and trade-offs identified as part of the risk framing process inform the risk management strategy, which in turn inf

PM-30control

Supply Chain Risk Management Strategy

An organization-wide supply chain risk management strategy includes an unambiguous expression of the supply chain risk appetite and tolerance for the organization, acceptable supply chain risk mitigation strategies or controls, a process for consistently evaluating and monitoring supply chain risk, approaches for implementing and communicating the supply cha

PM-31control

Continuous Monitoring Strategy

Continuous monitoring at the organization level facilitates ongoing awareness of the security and privacy posture across the organization to support organizational risk management decisions. The terms "continuous" and "ongoing" imply that organizations assess and monitor their controls and risks at a frequency sufficient to support risk-based decisions. Diff

PM-32control

Purposing

Systems are designed to support a specific mission or business function. However, over time, systems and system components may be used to support services and functions that are outside of the scope of the intended mission or business functions. This can result in exposing information resources to unintended environments and uses that can significantly incre

PM-5(1)enhancement

Inventory of Personally Identifiable Information

An inventory of systems, applications, and projects that process personally identifiable information supports the mapping of data actions, providing individuals with privacy notices, maintaining accurate personally identifiable information, and limiting the processing of personally identifiable information when such information is not needed for operational

PM-7(1)enhancement

Offloading

Not every function or service that a system provides is essential to organizational mission or business functions. Printing or copying is an example of a non-essential but supporting service for an organization. Whenever feasible, such supportive but non-essential functions or services are not co-located with the functions or services that support essential

PM-16(1)enhancement

Automated Means for Sharing Threat Intelligence

To maximize the effectiveness of monitoring, it is important to know what threat observables and indicators the sensors need to be searching for. By using well-established frameworks, services, and automated tools, organizations improve their ability to rapidly share and feed the relevant threat detection signatures into monitoring tools.

PM-20(1)enhancement

Privacy Policies on Websites, Applications, and Digital Services

Organizations post privacy policies on all external-facing websites, mobile applications, and other digital services. Organizations post a link to the relevant privacy policy on any known, major entry points to the website, application, or digital service. In addition, organizations provide a link to the privacy policy on any webpage that collects personally

PM-30(1)enhancement

Suppliers of Critical or Mission-essential Items

The identification and prioritization of suppliers of critical or mission-essential technologies, products, and services is paramount to the mission/business success of organizations. The assessment of suppliers is conducted using supplier reviews (see [SR-6](#sr-6) ) and supply chain risk assessment processes (see [RA-3(1)](#ra-3.1) ). An analysis of supply

PS-1control

Policy and Procedures

Personnel security policy and procedures for the controls in the PS family that are implemented within systems and organizations. The risk management strategy is an important factor in establishing such policies and procedures. Policies and procedures contribute to security and privacy assurance. Therefore, it is important that security and privacy programs

PS-2control

Position Risk Designation

Position risk designations reflect Office of Personnel Management (OPM) policy and guidance. Proper position designation is the foundation of an effective and consistent suitability and personnel security program. The Position Designation System (PDS) assesses the duties and responsibilities of a position to determine the degree of potential damage to the ef

PS-3control

Personnel Screening

Personnel screening and rescreening activities reflect applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, guidelines, and specific criteria established for the risk designations of assigned positions. Examples of personnel screening include background investigations and agency checks. Organizations may define different rescreeni

PS-4control

Personnel Termination

System property includes hardware authentication tokens, system administration technical manuals, keys, identification cards, and building passes. Exit interviews ensure that terminated individuals understand the security constraints imposed by being former employees and that proper accountability is achieved for system-related property. Security topics at e

PS-5control

Personnel Transfer

Personnel transfer applies when reassignments or transfers of individuals are permanent or of such extended duration as to make the actions warranted. Organizations define actions appropriate for the types of reassignments or transfers, whether permanent or extended. Actions that may be required for personnel transfers or reassignments to other positions wit

PS-6control

Access Agreements

Access agreements include nondisclosure agreements, acceptable use agreements, rules of behavior, and conflict-of-interest agreements. Signed access agreements include an acknowledgement that individuals have read, understand, and agree to abide by the constraints associated with organizational systems to which access is authorized. Organizations can use ele

PS-7control

External Personnel Security

External provider refers to organizations other than the organization operating or acquiring the system. External providers include service bureaus, contractors, and other organizations that provide system development, information technology services, testing or assessment services, outsourced applications, and network/security management. Organizations expl

PS-8control

Personnel Sanctions

Organizational sanctions reflect applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines. Sanctions processes are described in access agreements and can be included as part of general personnel policies for organizations and/or specified in security and privacy policies. Organizations consult with the Office of the Gen

PS-9control

Position Descriptions

Specification of security and privacy roles in individual organizational position descriptions facilitates clarity in understanding the security or privacy responsibilities associated with the roles and the role-based security and privacy training requirements for the roles.

PS-3(1)enhancement

Classified Information

Classified information is the most sensitive information that the Federal Government processes, stores, or transmits. It is imperative that individuals have the requisite security clearances and system access authorizations prior to gaining access to such information. Access authorizations are enforced by system access controls (see [AC-3](#ac-3) ) and flow

PS-3(2)enhancement

Formal Indoctrination

Types of classified information that require formal indoctrination include Special Access Program (SAP), Restricted Data (RD), and Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI).

PS-4(1)enhancement

Post-employment Requirements

Organizations consult with the Office of the General Counsel regarding matters of post-employment requirements on terminated individuals.

PS-4(2)enhancement

Automated Actions

In organizations with many employees, not all personnel who need to know about termination actions receive the appropriate notifications, or if such notifications are received, they may not occur in a timely manner. Automated mechanisms can be used to send automatic alerts or notifications to organizational personnel or roles when individuals are terminated.

PS-6(2)enhancement

Classified Information Requiring Special Protection

Classified information that requires special protection includes collateral information, Special Access Program (SAP) information, and Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI). Personnel security criteria reflect applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines.

PS-6(3)enhancement

Post-employment Requirements

Organizations consult with the Office of the General Counsel regarding matters of post-employment requirements on terminated individuals.

PT-1control

Policy and Procedures

Personally identifiable information processing and transparency policy and procedures address the controls in the PT family that are implemented within systems and organizations. The risk management strategy is an important factor in establishing such policies and procedures. Policies and procedures contribute to security and privacy assurance. Therefore, it

PT-2control

Authority to Process Personally Identifiable Information

The processing of personally identifiable information is an operation or set of operations that the information system or organization performs with respect to personally identifiable information across the information life cycle. Processing includes but is not limited to creation, collection, use, processing, storage, maintenance, dissemination, disclosure,

PT-3control

Personally Identifiable Information Processing Purposes

Identifying and documenting the purpose for processing provides organizations with a basis for understanding why personally identifiable information may be processed. The term "process" includes every step of the information life cycle, including creation, collection, use, processing, storage, maintenance, dissemination, disclosure, and disposal. Identifying

PT-4control

Consent

Consent allows individuals to participate in making decisions about the processing of their information and transfers some of the risk that arises from the processing of personally identifiable information from the organization to an individual. Consent may be required by applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, or gui

PT-5control

Privacy Notice

Privacy notices help inform individuals about how their personally identifiable information is being processed by the system or organization. Organizations use privacy notices to inform individuals about how, under what authority, and for what purpose their personally identifiable information is processed, as well as other information such as choices individ

PT-6control

System of Records Notice

The [PRIVACT](#18e71fec-c6fd-475a-925a-5d8495cf8455) requires that federal agencies publish a system of records notice in the Federal Register upon the establishment and/or modification of a [PRIVACT](#18e71fec-c6fd-475a-925a-5d8495cf8455) system of records. As a general matter, a system of records notice is required when an agency maintains a group of any r

PT-7control

Specific Categories of Personally Identifiable Information

Organizations apply any conditions or protections that may be necessary for specific categories of personally identifiable information. These conditions may be required by laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, or guidelines. The requirements may also come from the results of privacy risk assessments that factor in contextual c

PT-8control

Computer Matching Requirements

The [PRIVACT](#18e71fec-c6fd-475a-925a-5d8495cf8455) establishes requirements for federal and non-federal agencies if they engage in a matching program. In general, a matching program is a computerized comparison of records from two or more automated [PRIVACT](#18e71fec-c6fd-475a-925a-5d8495cf8455) systems of records or an automated system of records and aut

PT-2(1)enhancement

Data Tagging

Data tags support the tracking and enforcement of authorized processing by conveying the types of processing that are authorized along with the relevant elements of personally identifiable information throughout the system. Data tags may also support the use of automated tools.

PT-2(2)enhancement

Automation

Automated mechanisms augment verification that only authorized processing is occurring.

PT-3(1)enhancement

Data Tagging

Data tags support the tracking of processing purposes by conveying the purposes along with the relevant elements of personally identifiable information throughout the system. By conveying the processing purposes in a data tag along with the personally identifiable information as the information transits a system, a system owner or operator can identify wheth

PT-3(2)enhancement

Automation

Automated mechanisms augment tracking of the processing purposes.

PT-4(1)enhancement

Tailored Consent

While some processing may be necessary for the basic functionality of the product or service, other processing may not. In these circumstances, organizations allow individuals to select how specific personally identifiable information elements may be processed. More tailored consent may help reduce privacy risk, increase individual satisfaction, and avoid ad

PT-4(2)enhancement

Just-in-time Consent

Just-in-time consent enables individuals to participate in how their personally identifiable information is being processed at the time or in conjunction with specific types of data processing when such participation may be most useful to the individual. Individual assumptions about how personally identifiable information is being processed might not be accu

PT-4(3)enhancement

Revocation

Revocation of consent enables individuals to exercise control over their initial consent decision when circumstances change. Organizations consider usability factors in enabling easy-to-use revocation capabilities.

PT-5(1)enhancement

Just-in-time Notice

Just-in-time notices inform individuals of how organizations process their personally identifiable information at a time when such notices may be most useful to the individuals. Individual assumptions about how personally identifiable information will be processed might not be accurate or reliable if time has passed since the organization last presented noti

PT-5(2)enhancement

Privacy Act Statements

If a federal agency asks individuals to supply information that will become part of a system of records, the agency is required to provide a [PRIVACT](#18e71fec-c6fd-475a-925a-5d8495cf8455) statement on the form used to collect the information or on a separate form that can be retained by the individual. The agency provides a [PRIVACT](#18e71fec-c6fd-475a-92

PT-6(1)enhancement

Routine Uses

A [PRIVACT](#18e71fec-c6fd-475a-925a-5d8495cf8455) routine use is a particular kind of disclosure of a record outside of the federal agency maintaining the system of records. A routine use is an exception to the [PRIVACT](#18e71fec-c6fd-475a-925a-5d8495cf8455) prohibition on the disclosure of a record in a system of records without the prior written consent

PT-6(2)enhancement

Exemption Rules

The [PRIVACT](#18e71fec-c6fd-475a-925a-5d8495cf8455) includes two sets of provisions that allow federal agencies to claim exemptions from certain requirements in the statute. In certain circumstances, these provisions allow agencies to promulgate regulations to exempt a system of records from select provisions of the [PRIVACT](#18e71fec-c6fd-475a-925a-5d8495

PT-7(1)enhancement

Social Security Numbers

Federal law and policy establish specific requirements for organizations’ processing of Social Security numbers. Organizations take steps to eliminate unnecessary uses of Social Security numbers and other sensitive information and observe any particular requirements that apply.

PT-7(2)enhancement

First Amendment Information

The [PRIVACT](#18e71fec-c6fd-475a-925a-5d8495cf8455) limits agencies’ ability to process information that describes how individuals exercise rights guaranteed by the First Amendment. Organizations consult with the senior agency official for privacy and legal counsel regarding these requirements.

RA-1control

Policy and Procedures

Risk assessment policy and procedures address the controls in the RA family that are implemented within systems and organizations. The risk management strategy is an important factor in establishing such policies and procedures. Policies and procedures contribute to security and privacy assurance. Therefore, it is important that security and privacy programs

RA-2control

Security Categorization

Security categories describe the potential adverse impacts or negative consequences to organizational operations, organizational assets, and individuals if organizational information and systems are compromised through a loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability. Security categorization is also a type of asset loss characterization in systems secur

RA-3control

Risk Assessment

Risk assessments consider threats, vulnerabilities, likelihood, and impact to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation. Risk assessments also consider risk from external parties, including contractors who operate systems on behalf of the organization, individuals who access organizational systems, service provide

RA-5control

Vulnerability Monitoring and Scanning

Security categorization of information and systems guides the frequency and comprehensiveness of vulnerability monitoring (including scans). Organizations determine the required vulnerability monitoring for system components, ensuring that the potential sources of vulnerabilities—such as infrastructure components (e.g., switches, routers, guards, sensors), n

RA-6control

Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Survey

A technical surveillance countermeasures survey is a service provided by qualified personnel to detect the presence of technical surveillance devices and hazards and to identify technical security weaknesses that could be used in the conduct of a technical penetration of the surveyed facility. Technical surveillance countermeasures surveys also provide evalu

RA-7control

Risk Response

Organizations have many options for responding to risk including mitigating risk by implementing new controls or strengthening existing controls, accepting risk with appropriate justification or rationale, sharing or transferring risk, or avoiding risk. The risk tolerance of the organization influences risk response decisions and actions. Risk response addre

RA-8control

Privacy Impact Assessments

A privacy impact assessment is an analysis of how personally identifiable information is handled to ensure that handling conforms to applicable privacy requirements, determine the privacy risks associated with an information system or activity, and evaluate ways to mitigate privacy risks. A privacy impact assessment is both an analysis and a formal document

RA-9control

Criticality Analysis

Not all system components, functions, or services necessarily require significant protections. For example, criticality analysis is a key tenet of supply chain risk management and informs the prioritization of protection activities. The identification of critical system components and functions considers applicable laws, executive orders, regulations, direct

RA-10control

Threat Hunting

Threat hunting is an active means of cyber defense in contrast to traditional protection measures, such as firewalls, intrusion detection and prevention systems, quarantining malicious code in sandboxes, and Security Information and Event Management technologies and systems. Cyber threat hunting involves proactively searching organizational systems, networks

RA-2(1)enhancement

Impact-level Prioritization

Organizations apply the "high-water mark" concept to each system categorized in accordance with [FIPS 199](#628d22a1-6a11-4784-bc59-5cd9497b5445) , resulting in systems designated as low impact, moderate impact, or high impact. Organizations that desire additional granularity in the system impact designations for risk-based decision-making, can further parti

RA-3(1)enhancement

Supply Chain Risk Assessment

Supply chain-related events include disruption, use of defective components, insertion of counterfeits, theft, malicious development practices, improper delivery practices, and insertion of malicious code. These events can have a significant impact on the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of a system and its information and, therefore, can also adv

RA-3(2)enhancement

Use of All-source Intelligence

Organizations employ all-source intelligence to inform engineering, acquisition, and risk management decisions. All-source intelligence consists of information derived from all available sources, including publicly available or open-source information, measurement and signature intelligence, human intelligence, signals intelligence, and imagery intelligence.

RA-3(3)enhancement

Dynamic Threat Awareness

The threat awareness information that is gathered feeds into the organization’s information security operations to ensure that procedures are updated in response to the changing threat environment. For example, at higher threat levels, organizations may change the privilege or authentication thresholds required to perform certain operations.

RA-3(4)enhancement

Predictive Cyber Analytics

A properly resourced Security Operations Center (SOC) or Computer Incident Response Team (CIRT) may be overwhelmed by the volume of information generated by the proliferation of security tools and appliances unless it employs advanced automation and analytics to analyze the data. Advanced automation and analytics capabilities are typically supported by artif

RA-5(2)enhancement

Update Vulnerabilities to Be Scanned

Due to the complexity of modern software, systems, and other factors, new vulnerabilities are discovered on a regular basis. It is important that newly discovered vulnerabilities are added to the list of vulnerabilities to be scanned to ensure that the organization can take steps to mitigate those vulnerabilities in a timely manner.

RA-5(3)enhancement

Breadth and Depth of Coverage

The breadth of vulnerability scanning coverage can be expressed as a percentage of components within the system, by the particular types of systems, by the criticality of systems, or by the number of vulnerabilities to be checked. Conversely, the depth of vulnerability scanning coverage can be expressed as the level of the system design that the organization

RA-5(4)enhancement

Discoverable Information

Discoverable information includes information that adversaries could obtain without compromising or breaching the system, such as by collecting information that the system is exposing or by conducting extensive web searches. Corrective actions include notifying appropriate organizational personnel, removing designated information, or changing the system to m

RA-5(5)enhancement

Privileged Access

In certain situations, the nature of the vulnerability scanning may be more intrusive, or the system component that is the subject of the scanning may contain classified or controlled unclassified information, such as personally identifiable information. Privileged access authorization to selected system components facilitates more thorough vulnerability sca

RA-5(6)enhancement

Automated Trend Analyses

Using automated mechanisms to analyze multiple vulnerability scans over time can help determine trends in system vulnerabilities and identify patterns of attack.

RA-5(8)enhancement

Review Historic Audit Logs

Reviewing historic audit logs to determine if a recently detected vulnerability in a system has been previously exploited by an adversary can provide important information for forensic analyses. Such analyses can help identify, for example, the extent of a previous intrusion, the trade craft employed during the attack, organizational information exfiltrated

RA-5(10)enhancement

Correlate Scanning Information

An attack vector is a path or means by which an adversary can gain access to a system in order to deliver malicious code or exfiltrate information. Organizations can use attack trees to show how hostile activities by adversaries interact and combine to produce adverse impacts or negative consequences to systems and organizations. Such information, together w

RA-5(11)enhancement

Public Disclosure Program

The reporting channel is publicly discoverable and contains clear language authorizing good-faith research and the disclosure of vulnerabilities to the organization. The organization does not condition its authorization on an expectation of indefinite non-disclosure to the public by the reporting entity but may request a specific time period to properly reme

SA-1control

Policy and Procedures

System and services acquisition policy and procedures address the controls in the SA family that are implemented within systems and organizations. The risk management strategy is an important factor in establishing such policies and procedures. Policies and procedures contribute to security and privacy assurance. Therefore, it is important that security and

SA-2control

Allocation of Resources

Resource allocation for information security and privacy includes funding for system and services acquisition, sustainment, and supply chain-related risks throughout the system development life cycle.

SA-3control

System Development Life Cycle

A system development life cycle process provides the foundation for the successful development, implementation, and operation of organizational systems. The integration of security and privacy considerations early in the system development life cycle is a foundational principle of systems security engineering and privacy engineering. To apply the required co

SA-4control

Acquisition Process

Security and privacy functional requirements are typically derived from the high-level security and privacy requirements described in [SA-2](#sa-2) . The derived requirements include security and privacy capabilities, functions, and mechanisms. Strength requirements associated with such capabilities, functions, and mechanisms include degree of correctness, c

SA-5control

System Documentation

System artifacts and documentation created by the developer helps organizational personnel understand the implementation and operation of controls. Organizations consider establishing specific measures to determine the quality and completeness of the content provided. System documentation may be used to delineate roles, responsibilities and expectations of t

SA-8control

Security and Privacy Engineering Principles

Systems security and privacy engineering principles are closely related to and implemented throughout the system development life cycle (see [SA-3](#sa-3) ). Organizations can apply systems security and privacy engineering principles to new systems under development or to systems undergoing upgrades. For existing systems, organizations apply systems security

SA-9control

External System Services

External system services are provided by an external provider, and the organization has no direct control over the implementation of the required controls or the assessment of control effectiveness. Organizations establish relationships with external service providers in a variety of ways, including through business partnerships, contracts, interagency agree

SA-10control

Developer Configuration Management

Organizations consider the quality and completeness of configuration management activities conducted by developers as direct evidence of applying effective security controls. Controls include protecting the master copies of material used to generate security-relevant portions of the system hardware, software, and firmware from unauthorized modification or de

SA-11control

Developer Testing and Evaluation

Developmental testing and evaluation confirms that the required controls are implemented correctly, operating as intended, enforcing the desired security and privacy policies, and meeting established security and privacy requirements. Security properties of systems and the privacy of individuals may be affected by the interconnection of system components or

SA-15control

Development Process, Standards, and Tools

Development tools include programming languages and computer-aided design systems. Reviews of development processes include the use of maturity models to determine the potential effectiveness of such processes. Maintaining the integrity of changes to tools and processes facilitates effective supply chain risk assessment and mitigation. Such integrity require

SA-16control

Developer-provided Training

Developer-provided training applies to external and internal (in-house) developers. Training personnel is essential to ensuring the effectiveness of the controls implemented within organizational systems. Types of training include web-based and computer-based training, classroom-style training, and hands-on training (including micro-training). Organizations

SA-17control

Developer Security and Privacy Architecture and Design

Developer security and privacy architecture and design are directed at external developers, although they could also be applied to internal (in-house) development. In contrast, [PL-8](#pl-8) is directed at internal developers to ensure that organizations develop a security and privacy architecture that is integrated with the enterprise architecture. The dist

SA-20control

Customized Development of Critical Components

Organizations determine that certain system components likely cannot be trusted due to specific threats to and vulnerabilities in those components for which there are no viable security controls to adequately mitigate risk. Reimplementation or custom development of such components may satisfy requirements for higher assurance and is carried out by initiating

SA-21control

Developer Screening

Developer screening is directed at external developers. Internal developer screening is addressed by [PS-3](#ps-3) . Because the system, system component, or system service may be used in critical activities essential to the national or economic security interests of the United States, organizations have a strong interest in ensuring that developers are trus

SA-22control

Unsupported System Components

Support for system components includes software patches, firmware updates, replacement parts, and maintenance contracts. An example of unsupported components includes when vendors no longer provide critical software patches or product updates, which can result in an opportunity for adversaries to exploit weaknesses in the installed components. Exceptions to

SA-23control

Specialization

It is often necessary for a system or system component that supports mission-essential services or functions to be enhanced to maximize the trustworthiness of the resource. Sometimes this enhancement is done at the design level. In other instances, it is done post-design, either through modifications of the system in question or by augmenting the system with

SA-24control

Design For Cyber Resiliency

Cyber resiliency is critical to ensuring the survivability of mission critical systems and high value assets. Cyber resiliency focuses on limiting the damage from adversity or the conditions that can cause a loss of assets. Damage can affect: (1) organizations (e.g., loss of reputation, increased existential risk); (2) missions or business functions (e.g., d

SA-3(1)enhancement

Manage Preproduction Environment

The preproduction environment includes development, test, and integration environments. The program protection planning processes established by the Department of Defense are examples of managing the preproduction environment for defense contractors. Criticality analysis and the application of controls on developers also contribute to a more secure system de

SA-3(2)enhancement

Use of Live or Operational Data

Live data is also referred to as operational data. The use of live or operational data in preproduction (i.e., development, test, and integration) environments can result in significant risks to organizations. In addition, the use of personally identifiable information in testing, research, and training increases the risk of unauthorized disclosure or misuse

SA-3(3)enhancement

Technology Refresh

Technology refresh planning may encompass hardware, software, firmware, processes, personnel skill sets, suppliers, service providers, and facilities. The use of obsolete or nearing obsolete technology may increase the security and privacy risks associated with unsupported components, counterfeit or repurposed components, components unable to implement secur

SA-4(1)enhancement

Functional Properties of Controls

Functional properties of security and privacy controls describe the functionality (i.e., security or privacy capability, functions, or mechanisms) visible at the interfaces of the controls and specifically exclude functionality and data structures internal to the operation of the controls.

SA-4(2)enhancement

Design and Implementation Information for Controls

Organizations may require different levels of detail in the documentation for the design and implementation of controls in organizational systems, system components, or system services based on mission and business requirements, requirements for resiliency and trustworthiness, and requirements for analysis and testing. Systems can be partitioned into multipl

SA-4(3)enhancement

Development Methods, Techniques, and Practices

Following a system development life cycle that includes state-of-the-practice software development methods, systems engineering methods, systems security and privacy engineering methods, and quality control processes helps to reduce the number and severity of latent errors within systems, system components, and system services. Reducing the number and severi

SA-4(5)enhancement

System, Component, and Service Configurations

Examples of security configurations include the U.S. Government Configuration Baseline (USGCB), Security Technical Implementation Guides (STIGs), and any limitations on functions, ports, protocols, and services. Security characteristics can include requiring that default passwords have been changed.

SA-4(6)enhancement

Use of Information Assurance Products

Commercial off-the-shelf IA or IA-enabled information technology products used to protect classified information by cryptographic means may be required to use NSA-approved key management. See [NSA CSFC](#3d575737-98cb-459d-b41c-d7e82b73ad78).

SA-4(7)enhancement

NIAP-approved Protection Profiles

See [NIAP CCEVS](#795aff72-3e6c-4b6b-a80a-b14d84b7f544) for additional information on NIAP. See [NIST CMVP](#1acdc775-aafb-4d11-9341-dc6a822e9d38) for additional information on FIPS-validated cryptographic modules.

SA-4(8)enhancement

Continuous Monitoring Plan for Controls

The objective of continuous monitoring plans is to determine if the planned, required, and deployed controls within the system, system component, or system service continue to be effective over time based on the inevitable changes that occur. Developer continuous monitoring plans include a sufficient level of detail such that the information can be incorpora

SA-4(9)enhancement

Functions, Ports, Protocols, and Services in Use

The identification of functions, ports, protocols, and services early in the system development life cycle (e.g., during the initial requirements definition and design stages) allows organizations to influence the design of the system, system component, or system service. This early involvement in the system development life cycle helps organizations avoid o

SA-8(1)enhancement

Clear Abstractions

The principle of clear abstractions states that a system has simple, well-defined interfaces and functions that provide a consistent and intuitive view of the data and how the data is managed. The clarity, simplicity, necessity, and sufficiency of the system interfaces— combined with a precise definition of their functional behavior—promotes ease of analysis

SA-8(2)enhancement

Least Common Mechanism

The principle of least common mechanism states that the amount of mechanism common to more than one user and depended on by all users is minimized [POPEK74](#79453f84-26a4-4995-8257-d32d37aefea3) . Mechanism minimization implies that different components of a system refrain from using the same mechanism to access a system resource. Every shared mechanism (es

SA-8(3)enhancement

Modularity and Layering

The principles of modularity and layering are fundamental across system engineering disciplines. Modularity and layering derived from functional decomposition are effective in managing system complexity by making it possible to comprehend the structure of the system. Modular decomposition, or refinement in system design, is challenging and resists general st

SA-8(4)enhancement

Partially Ordered Dependencies

The principle of partially ordered dependencies states that the synchronization, calling, and other dependencies in the system are partially ordered. A fundamental concept in system design is layering, whereby the system is organized into well-defined, functionally related modules or components. The layers are linearly ordered with respect to inter-layer dep

SA-8(5)enhancement

Efficiently Mediated Access

The principle of efficiently mediated access states that policy enforcement mechanisms utilize the least common mechanism available while satisfying stakeholder requirements within expressed constraints. The mediation of access to system resources (i.e., CPU, memory, devices, communication ports, services, infrastructure, data, and information) is often the

SA-8(6)enhancement

Minimized Sharing

The principle of minimized sharing states that no computer resource is shared between system components (e.g., subjects, processes, functions) unless it is absolutely necessary to do so. Minimized sharing helps to simplify system design and implementation. In order to protect user-domain resources from arbitrary active entities, no resource is shared unless

SA-8(7)enhancement

Reduced Complexity

The principle of reduced complexity states that the system design is as simple and small as possible. A small and simple design is more understandable, more analyzable, and less prone to error. The reduced complexity principle applies to any aspect of a system, but it has particular importance for security due to the various analyses performed to obtain evid

SA-8(8)enhancement

Secure Evolvability

The principle of secure evolvability states that a system is developed to facilitate the maintenance of its security properties when there are changes to the system’s structure, interfaces, interconnections (i.e., system architecture), functionality, or configuration (i.e., security policy enforcement). Changes include a new, enhanced, or upgraded system cap

SA-8(9)enhancement

Trusted Components

The principle of trusted components states that a component is trustworthy to at least a level commensurate with the security dependencies it supports (i.e., how much it is trusted to perform its security functions by other components). This principle enables the composition of components such that trustworthiness is not inadvertently diminished and the trus

SA-9(1)enhancement

Risk Assessments and Organizational Approvals

Information security services include the operation of security devices, such as firewalls or key management services as well as incident monitoring, analysis, and response. Risks assessed can include system, mission or business, security, privacy, or supply chain risks.

SA-9(2)enhancement

Identification of Functions, Ports, Protocols, and Services

Information from external service providers regarding the specific functions, ports, protocols, and services used in the provision of such services can be useful when the need arises to understand the trade-offs involved in restricting certain functions and services or blocking certain ports and protocols.

SA-9(3)enhancement

Establish and Maintain Trust Relationship with Providers

Trust relationships between organizations and external service providers reflect the degree of confidence that the risk from using external services is at an acceptable level. Trust relationships can help organizations gain increased levels of confidence that service providers are providing adequate protection for the services rendered and can also be useful

SA-9(4)enhancement

Consistent Interests of Consumers and Providers

As organizations increasingly use external service providers, it is possible that the interests of the service providers may diverge from organizational interests. In such situations, simply having the required technical, management, or operational controls in place may not be sufficient if the providers that implement and manage those controls are not opera

SA-9(5)enhancement

Processing, Storage, and Service Location

The location of information processing, information and data storage, or system services can have a direct impact on the ability of organizations to successfully execute their mission and business functions. The impact occurs when external providers control the location of processing, storage, or services. The criteria that external providers use for the sel

SA-9(6)enhancement

Organization-controlled Cryptographic Keys

Maintaining exclusive control of cryptographic keys in an external system prevents decryption of organizational data by external system staff. Organizational control of cryptographic keys can be implemented by encrypting and decrypting data inside the organization as data is sent to and received from the external system or by employing a component that permi

SA-9(7)enhancement

Organization-controlled Integrity Checking

Storage of organizational information in an external system could limit visibility into the security status of its data. The ability of the organization to verify and validate the integrity of its stored data without transferring it out of the external system provides such visibility.

SA-9(8)enhancement

Processing and Storage Location — U.S. Jurisdiction

The geographic location of information processing and data storage can have a direct impact on the ability of organizations to successfully execute their mission and business functions. A compromise or breach of high impact information and systems can have severe or catastrophic adverse impacts on organizational assets and operations, individuals, other orga

SA-10(1)enhancement

Software and Firmware Integrity Verification

Software and firmware integrity verification allows organizations to detect unauthorized changes to software and firmware components using developer-provided tools, techniques, and mechanisms. The integrity checking mechanisms can also address counterfeiting of software and firmware components. Organizations verify the integrity of software and firmware comp

SA-10(2)enhancement

Alternative Configuration Management Processes

Alternate configuration management processes may be required when organizations use commercial off-the-shelf information technology products. Alternate configuration management processes include organizational personnel who review and approve proposed changes to systems, system components, and system services and conduct security and privacy impact analyses

SA-10(3)enhancement

Hardware Integrity Verification

Hardware integrity verification allows organizations to detect unauthorized changes to hardware components using developer-provided tools, techniques, methods, and mechanisms. Organizations may verify the integrity of hardware components with hard-to-copy labels, verifiable serial numbers provided by developers, and by requiring the use of anti-tamper techno

SA-10(4)enhancement

Trusted Generation

The trusted generation of descriptions, source code, and object code addresses authorized changes to hardware, software, and firmware components between versions during development. The focus is on the efficacy of the configuration management process by the developer to ensure that newly generated versions of security-relevant hardware descriptions, source c

SA-10(5)enhancement

Mapping Integrity for Version Control

Mapping integrity for version control addresses changes to hardware, software, and firmware components during both initial development and system development life cycle updates. Maintaining the integrity between the master copies of security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware (including designs, hardware drawings, source code) and the equivalent data

SA-10(6)enhancement

Trusted Distribution

The trusted distribution of security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware updates help to ensure that the updates are correct representations of the master copies maintained by the developer and have not been tampered with during distribution.

SA-10(7)enhancement

Security and Privacy Representatives

Information security and privacy representatives can include system security officers, senior agency information security officers, senior agency officials for privacy, and system privacy officers. Representation by personnel with information security and privacy expertise is important because changes to system configurations can have unintended side effects

SA-11(1)enhancement

Static Code Analysis

Static code analysis provides a technology and methodology for security reviews and includes checking for weaknesses in the code as well as for the incorporation of libraries or other included code with known vulnerabilities or that are out-of-date and not supported. Static code analysis can be used to identify vulnerabilities and enforce secure coding pract

SA-11(2)enhancement

Threat Modeling and Vulnerability Analyses

Systems, system components, and system services may deviate significantly from the functional and design specifications created during the requirements and design stages of the system development life cycle. Therefore, updates to threat modeling and vulnerability analyses of those systems, system components, and system services during development and prior t

SA-11(4)enhancement

Manual Code Reviews

Manual code reviews are usually reserved for the critical software and firmware components of systems. Manual code reviews are effective at identifying weaknesses that require knowledge of the application’s requirements or context that, in most cases, is unavailable to automated analytic tools and techniques, such as static and dynamic analysis. The benefits

SA-11(5)enhancement

Penetration Testing

Penetration testing is an assessment methodology in which assessors, using all available information technology product or system documentation and working under specific constraints, attempt to circumvent the implemented security and privacy features of information technology products and systems. Useful information for assessors who conduct penetration tes

SA-11(6)enhancement

Attack Surface Reviews

Attack surfaces of systems and system components are exposed areas that make those systems more vulnerable to attacks. Attack surfaces include any accessible areas where weaknesses or deficiencies in the hardware, software, and firmware components provide opportunities for adversaries to exploit vulnerabilities. Attack surface reviews ensure that developers

SA-11(7)enhancement

Verify Scope of Testing and Evaluation

Verifying that testing and evaluation provides complete coverage of required controls can be accomplished by a variety of analytic techniques ranging from informal to formal. Each of these techniques provides an increasing level of assurance that corresponds to the degree of formality of the analysis. Rigorously demonstrating control coverage at the highest

SA-11(8)enhancement

Dynamic Code Analysis

Dynamic code analysis provides runtime verification of software programs using tools capable of monitoring programs for memory corruption, user privilege issues, and other potential security problems. Dynamic code analysis employs runtime tools to ensure that security functionality performs in the way it was designed. A type of dynamic analysis, known as fuz

SA-11(9)enhancement

Interactive Application Security Testing

Interactive (also known as instrumentation-based) application security testing is a method of detecting vulnerabilities by observing applications as they run during testing. The use of instrumentation relies on direct measurements of the actual running applications and uses access to the code, user interaction, libraries, frameworks, backend connections, and

SA-15(1)enhancement

Quality Metrics

Organizations use quality metrics to establish acceptable levels of system quality. Metrics can include quality gates, which are collections of completion criteria or sufficiency standards that represent the satisfactory execution of specific phases of the system development project. For example, a quality gate may require the elimination of all compiler war

SA-15(2)enhancement

Security and Privacy Tracking Tools

System development teams select and deploy security and privacy tracking tools, including vulnerability or work item tracking systems that facilitate assignment, sorting, filtering, and tracking of completed work items or tasks associated with development processes.

SA-15(3)enhancement

Criticality Analysis

Criticality analysis performed by the developer provides input to the criticality analysis performed by organizations. Developer input is essential to organizational criticality analysis because organizations may not have access to detailed design documentation for system components that are developed as commercial off-the-shelf products. Such design documen

SA-15(5)enhancement

Attack Surface Reduction

Attack surface reduction is closely aligned with threat and vulnerability analyses and system architecture and design. Attack surface reduction is a means of reducing risk to organizations by giving attackers less opportunity to exploit weaknesses or deficiencies (i.e., potential vulnerabilities) within systems, system components, and system services. Attack

SA-15(6)enhancement

Continuous Improvement

Developers of systems, system components, and system services consider the effectiveness and efficiency of their development processes for meeting quality objectives and addressing the security and privacy capabilities in current threat environments.

SA-15(7)enhancement

Automated Vulnerability Analysis

Automated tools can be more effective at analyzing exploitable weaknesses or deficiencies in large and complex systems, prioritizing vulnerabilities by severity, and providing recommendations for risk mitigations.

SA-15(8)enhancement

Reuse of Threat and Vulnerability Information

Analysis of vulnerabilities found in similar software applications can inform potential design and implementation issues for systems under development. Similar systems or system components may exist within developer organizations. Vulnerability information is available from a variety of public and private sector sources, including the NIST National Vulnerabi

SA-17(1)enhancement

Formal Policy Model

Formal models describe specific behaviors or security and privacy policies using formal languages, thus enabling the correctness of those behaviors and policies to be formally proven. Not all components of systems can be modeled. Generally, formal specifications are scoped to the behaviors or policies of interest, such as nondiscretionary access control poli

SA-17(2)enhancement

Security-relevant Components

The security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware represent the portion of the system, component, or service that is trusted to perform correctly to maintain required security properties.

SA-17(3)enhancement

Formal Correspondence

Correspondence is an important part of the assurance gained through modeling. It demonstrates that the implementation is an accurate transformation of the model, and that any additional code or implementation details that are present have no impact on the behaviors or policies being modeled. Formal methods can be used to show that the high-level security pro

SA-17(4)enhancement

Informal Correspondence

Correspondence is an important part of the assurance gained through modeling. It demonstrates that the implementation is an accurate transformation of the model, and that additional code or implementation detail has no impact on the behaviors or policies being modeled. Consistency between the descriptive top-level specification (i.e., high-level/low-level de

SA-17(5)enhancement

Conceptually Simple Design

The principle of reduced complexity states that the system design is as simple and small as possible (see [SA-8(7)](#sa-8.7) ). A small and simple design is easier to understand and analyze and is also less prone to error (see [AC-25](#ac-25), [SA-8(13)](#sa-8.13) ). The principle of reduced complexity applies to any aspect of a system, but it has particular

SA-17(6)enhancement

Structure for Testing

Applying the security design principles in [SP 800-160-1](#e3cc0520-a366-4fc9-abc2-5272db7e3564) promotes complete, consistent, and comprehensive testing and evaluation of systems, system components, and services. The thoroughness of such testing contributes to the evidence produced to generate an effective assurance case or argument as to the trustworthines

SA-17(7)enhancement

Structure for Least Privilege

The principle of least privilege states that each component is allocated sufficient privileges to accomplish its specified functions but no more (see [SA-8(14)](#sa-8.14) ). Applying the principle of least privilege limits the scope of the component’s actions, which has two desirable effects. First, the security impact of a failure, corruption, or misuse of

SA-17(8)enhancement

Orchestration

Security resources that are distributed, located at different layers or in different system elements, or are implemented to support different aspects of trustworthiness can interact in unforeseen or incorrect ways. Adverse consequences can include cascading failures, interference, or coverage gaps. Coordination of the behavior of security resources (e.g., by

SA-17(9)enhancement

Design Diversity

Design diversity is achieved by supplying the same requirements specification to multiple developers, each of whom is responsible for developing a variant of the system or system component that meets the requirements. Variants can be in software design, in hardware design, or in both hardware and a software design. Differences in the designs of the variants

SA-4(10)enhancement

Use of Approved PIV Products

Products on the FIPS 201-approved products list meet NIST requirements for Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal Employees and Contractors. PIV cards are used for multi-factor authentication in systems and organizations.

SA-4(11)enhancement

System of Records

When, by contract, an organization provides for the operation of a system of records to accomplish an organizational mission or function, the organization, consistent with its authority, causes the requirements of the [PRIVACT](#18e71fec-c6fd-475a-925a-5d8495cf8455) to be applied to the system of records.

SA-4(12)enhancement

Data Ownership

Contractors who operate a system that contains data owned by an organization initiating the contract have policies and procedures in place to remove the data from their systems and/or return the data in a time frame defined by the contract.

SA-8(10)enhancement

Hierarchical Trust

The principle of hierarchical trust for components builds on the principle of trusted components and states that the security dependencies in a system will form a partial ordering if they preserve the principle of trusted components. The partial ordering provides the basis for trustworthiness reasoning or an assurance case (assurance argument) when composing

SA-8(11)enhancement

Inverse Modification Threshold

The principle of inverse modification threshold builds on the principle of trusted components and the principle of hierarchical trust and states that the degree of protection provided to a component is commensurate with its trustworthiness. As the trust placed in a component increases, the protection against unauthorized modification of the component also in

SA-8(12)enhancement

Hierarchical Protection

The principle of hierarchical protection states that a component need not be protected from more trustworthy components. In the degenerate case of the most trusted component, it protects itself from all other components. For example, if an operating system kernel is deemed the most trustworthy component in a system, then it protects itself from all untrusted

SA-8(13)enhancement

Minimized Security Elements

The principle of minimized security elements states that the system does not have extraneous trusted components. The principle of minimized security elements has two aspects: the overall cost of security analysis and the complexity of security analysis. Trusted components are generally costlier to construct and implement, owing to the increased rigor of deve

SA-8(14)enhancement

Least Privilege

The principle of least privilege states that each system component is allocated sufficient privileges to accomplish its specified functions but no more. Applying the principle of least privilege limits the scope of the component’s actions, which has two desirable effects: the security impact of a failure, corruption, or misuse of the component will have a mi

SA-8(15)enhancement

Predicate Permission

The principle of predicate permission states that system designers consider requiring multiple authorized entities to provide consent before a highly critical operation or access to highly sensitive data, information, or resources is allowed to proceed. [SALTZER75](#c9495d6e-ef64-4090-8509-e58c3b9009ff) originally named predicate permission the separation of

SA-8(16)enhancement

Self-reliant Trustworthiness

The principle of self-reliant trustworthiness states that systems minimize their reliance on other systems for their own trustworthiness. A system is trustworthy by default, and any connection to an external entity is used to supplement its function. If a system were required to maintain a connection with another external entity in order to maintain its trus

SA-8(17)enhancement

Secure Distributed Composition

The principle of secure distributed composition states that the composition of distributed components that enforce the same system security policy result in a system that enforces that policy at least as well as the individual components do. Many of the design principles for secure systems deal with how components can or should interact. The need to create o

SA-8(18)enhancement

Trusted Communications Channels

The principle of trusted communication channels states that when composing a system where there is a potential threat to communications between components (i.e., the interconnections between components), each communication channel is trustworthy to a level commensurate with the security dependencies it supports (i.e., how much it is trusted by other componen

SA-8(19)enhancement

Continuous Protection

The principle of continuous protection states that components and data used to enforce the security policy have uninterrupted protection that is consistent with the security policy and the security architecture assumptions. No assurances that the system can provide the confidentiality, integrity, availability, and privacy protections for its design capabilit

SA-8(20)enhancement

Secure Metadata Management

The principle of secure metadata management states that metadata are "first class" objects with respect to security policy when the policy requires either complete protection of information or that the security subsystem be self-protecting. The principle of secure metadata management is driven by the recognition that a system, subsystem, or component cannot

SA-8(21)enhancement

Self-analysis

The principle of self-analysis states that a system component is able to assess its internal state and functionality to a limited extent at various stages of execution, and that this self-analysis capability is commensurate with the level of trustworthiness invested in the system. At the system level, self-analysis can be achieved through hierarchical assess

SA-8(22)enhancement

Accountability and Traceability

The principle of accountability and traceability states that it is possible to trace security-relevant actions (i.e., subject-object interactions) to the entity on whose behalf the action is being taken. The principle of accountability and traceability requires a trustworthy infrastructure that can record details about actions that affect system security (e.

SA-8(23)enhancement

Secure Defaults

The principle of secure defaults states that the default configuration of a system (including its constituent subsystems, components, and mechanisms) reflects a restrictive and conservative enforcement of security policy. The principle of secure defaults applies to the initial (i.e., default) configuration of a system as well as to the security engineering a

SA-8(24)enhancement

Secure Failure and Recovery

The principle of secure failure and recovery states that neither a failure in a system function or mechanism nor any recovery action in response to failure leads to a violation of security policy. The principle of secure failure and recovery parallels the principle of continuous protection to ensure that a system is capable of detecting (within limits) actua

SA-8(25)enhancement

Economic Security

The principle of economic security states that security mechanisms are not costlier than the potential damage that could occur from a security breach. This is the security-relevant form of the cost-benefit analyses used in risk management. The cost assumptions of cost-benefit analysis prevent the system designer from incorporating security mechanisms of grea

SA-8(26)enhancement

Performance Security

The principle of performance security states that security mechanisms are constructed so that they do not degrade system performance unnecessarily. Stakeholder and system design requirements for performance and security are precisely articulated and prioritized. For the system implementation to meet its design requirements and be found acceptable to stakehol

SA-8(27)enhancement

Human Factored Security

The principle of human factored security states that the user interface for security functions and supporting services is intuitive, user-friendly, and provides feedback for user actions that affect such policy and its enforcement. The mechanisms that enforce security policy are not intrusive to the user and are designed not to degrade user efficiency. Secur

SA-8(28)enhancement

Acceptable Security

The principle of acceptable security requires that the level of privacy and performance that the system provides is consistent with the users’ expectations. The perception of personal privacy may affect user behavior, morale, and effectiveness. Based on the organizational privacy policy and the system design, users should be able to restrict their actions to

SA-8(29)enhancement

Repeatable and Documented Procedures

The principle of repeatable and documented procedures states that the techniques and methods employed to construct a system component permit the same component to be completely and correctly reconstructed at a later time. Repeatable and documented procedures support the development of a component that is identical to the component created earlier, which may

SA-8(30)enhancement

Procedural Rigor

The principle of procedural rigor states that the rigor of a system life cycle process is commensurate with its intended trustworthiness. Procedural rigor defines the scope, depth, and detail of the system life cycle procedures. Rigorous system life cycle procedures contribute to the assurance that the system is correct and free of unintended functionality i

SA-8(31)enhancement

Secure System Modification

The principle of secure system modification states that system modification maintains system security with respect to the security requirements and risk tolerance of stakeholders. Upgrades or modifications to systems can transform secure systems into systems that are not secure. The procedures for system modification ensure that if the system is to maintain

SA-8(32)enhancement

Sufficient Documentation

The principle of sufficient documentation states that organizational personnel with responsibilities to interact with the system are provided with adequate documentation and other information such that the personnel contribute to rather than detract from system security. Despite attempts to comply with principles such as human factored security and acceptabl

SA-8(33)enhancement

Minimization

The principle of minimization states that organizations should only process personally identifiable information that is directly relevant and necessary to accomplish an authorized purpose and should only maintain personally identifiable information for as long as is necessary to accomplish the purpose. Organizations have processes in place, consistent with a

SA-15(10)enhancement

Incident Response Plan

The incident response plan provided by developers may provide information not readily available to organizations and be incorporated into organizational incident response plans. Developer information may also be extremely helpful, such as when organizations respond to vulnerabilities in commercial off-the-shelf products.

SA-15(11)enhancement

Archive System or Component

Archiving system or system components requires the developer to retain key development artifacts, including hardware specifications, source code, object code, and relevant documentation from the development process that can provide a readily available configuration baseline for system and component upgrades or modifications.

SA-15(12)enhancement

Minimize Personally Identifiable Information

Organizations can minimize the risk to an individual’s privacy by using techniques such as de-identification or synthetic data. Limiting the use of personally identifiable information in development and test environments helps reduce the level of privacy risk created by a system.

SA-15(13)enhancement

Logging Syntax

In support of better incident response and the ability to more quickly reconstruct security-related actions, identifying specific requirements for secure logging facilitates the ability to connect application-produced audit event logs with operational data. Event types are consistent with the event types defined in [AU-02](#au-2).

SC-1control

Policy and Procedures

System and communications protection policy and procedures address the controls in the SC family that are implemented within systems and organizations. The risk management strategy is an important factor in establishing such policies and procedures. Policies and procedures contribute to security and privacy assurance. Therefore, it is important that security

SC-2control

Separation of System and User Functionality

System management functionality includes functions that are necessary to administer databases, network components, workstations, or servers. These functions typically require privileged user access. The separation of user functions from system management functions is physical or logical. Organizations may separate system management functions from user functi

SC-3control

Security Function Isolation

Security functions are isolated from nonsecurity functions by means of an isolation boundary implemented within a system via partitions and domains. The isolation boundary controls access to and protects the integrity of the hardware, software, and firmware that perform system security functions. Systems implement code separation in many ways, such as throug

SC-4control

Information in Shared System Resources

Preventing unauthorized and unintended information transfer via shared system resources stops information produced by the actions of prior users or roles (or the actions of processes acting on behalf of prior users or roles) from being available to current users or roles (or current processes acting on behalf of current users or roles) that obtain access to

SC-5control

Denial-of-service Protection

Denial-of-service events may occur due to a variety of internal and external causes, such as an attack by an adversary or a lack of planning to support organizational needs with respect to capacity and bandwidth. Such attacks can occur across a wide range of network protocols (e.g., IPv4, IPv6). A variety of technologies are available to limit or eliminate t

SC-6control

Resource Availability

Priority protection prevents lower-priority processes from delaying or interfering with the system that services higher-priority processes. Quotas prevent users or processes from obtaining more than predetermined amounts of resources.

SC-7control

Boundary Protection

Managed interfaces include gateways, routers, firewalls, guards, network-based malicious code analysis, virtualization systems, or encrypted tunnels implemented within a security architecture. Subnetworks that are physically or logically separated from internal networks are referred to as demilitarized zones or DMZs. Restricting or prohibiting interfaces wit

SC-8control

Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity

Protecting the confidentiality and integrity of transmitted information applies to internal and external networks as well as any system components that can transmit information, including servers, notebook computers, desktop computers, mobile devices, printers, copiers, scanners, facsimile machines, and radios. Unprotected communication paths are exposed to

SC-10control

Network Disconnect

Network disconnect applies to internal and external networks. Terminating network connections associated with specific communications sessions includes de-allocating TCP/IP address or port pairs at the operating system level and de-allocating the networking assignments at the application level if multiple application sessions are using a single operating sys

SC-11control

Trusted Path

Trusted paths are mechanisms by which users can communicate (using input devices such as keyboards) directly with the security functions of systems with the requisite assurance to support security policies. Trusted path mechanisms can only be activated by users or the security functions of organizational systems. User responses that occur via trusted paths a

SC-12control

Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management

Cryptographic key management and establishment can be performed using manual procedures or automated mechanisms with supporting manual procedures. Organizations define key management requirements in accordance with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines and specify appropriate options, parameters, and

SC-13control

Cryptographic Protection

Cryptography can be employed to support a variety of security solutions, including the protection of classified information and controlled unclassified information, the provision and implementation of digital signatures, and the enforcement of information separation when authorized individuals have the necessary clearances but lack the necessary formal acces

SC-15control

Collaborative Computing Devices and Applications

Collaborative computing devices and applications include remote meeting devices and applications, networked white boards, cameras, and microphones. The explicit indication of use includes signals to users when collaborative computing devices and applications are activated.

SC-16control

Transmission of Security and Privacy Attributes

Security and privacy attributes can be explicitly or implicitly associated with the information contained in organizational systems or system components. Attributes are abstractions that represent the basic properties or characteristics of an entity with respect to protecting information or the management of personally identifiable information. Attributes ar

SC-17control

Public Key Infrastructure Certificates

Public key infrastructure (PKI) certificates are certificates with visibility external to organizational systems and certificates related to the internal operations of systems, such as application-specific time services. In cryptographic systems with a hierarchical structure, a trust anchor is an authoritative source (i.e., a certificate authority) for which

SC-18control

Mobile Code

Mobile code includes any program, application, or content that can be transmitted across a network (e.g., embedded in an email, document, or website) and executed on a remote system. Decisions regarding the use of mobile code within organizational systems are based on the potential for the code to cause damage to the systems if used maliciously. Mobile code

SC-20control

Secure Name/Address Resolution Service (Authoritative Source)

Providing authoritative source information enables external clients, including remote Internet clients, to obtain origin authentication and integrity verification assurances for the host/service name to network address resolution information obtained through the service. Systems that provide name and address resolution services include domain name system (DN

SC-2(1)enhancement

Interfaces for Non-privileged Users

Preventing the presentation of system management functionality at interfaces to non-privileged users ensures that system administration options, including administrator privileges, are not available to the general user population. Restricting user access also prohibits the use of the grey-out option commonly used to eliminate accessibility to such informatio

SC-21control

Secure Name/Address Resolution Service (Recursive or Caching Resolver)

Each client of name resolution services either performs this validation on its own or has authenticated channels to trusted validation providers. Systems that provide name and address resolution services for local clients include recursive resolving or caching domain name system (DNS) servers. DNS client resolvers either perform validation of DNSSEC signatur

SC-2(2)enhancement

Disassociability

If a system is compromised, storing applications and software separately from state information about users’ interactions with an application may better protect individuals’ privacy.

SC-22control

Architecture and Provisioning for Name/Address Resolution Service

Systems that provide name and address resolution services include domain name system (DNS) servers. To eliminate single points of failure in systems and enhance redundancy, organizations employ at least two authoritative domain name system servers—one configured as the primary server and the other configured as the secondary server. Additionally, organizatio

SC-23control

Session Authenticity

Protecting session authenticity addresses communications protection at the session level, not at the packet level. Such protection establishes grounds for confidence at both ends of communications sessions in the ongoing identities of other parties and the validity of transmitted information. Authenticity protection includes protecting against "man-in-the-mi

SC-24control

Fail in Known State

Failure in a known state addresses security concerns in accordance with the mission and business needs of organizations. Failure in a known state prevents the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information in the event of failures of organizational systems or system components. Failure in a known safe state helps to prevent systems from f

SC-25control

Thin Nodes

The deployment of system components with minimal functionality reduces the need to secure every endpoint and may reduce the exposure of information, systems, and services to attacks. Reduced or minimal functionality includes diskless nodes and thin client technologies.

SC-26control

Decoys

Decoys (i.e., honeypots, honeynets, or deception nets) are established to attract adversaries and deflect attacks away from the operational systems that support organizational mission and business functions. Use of decoys requires some supporting isolation measures to ensure that any deflected malicious code does not infect organizational systems. Depending

SC-27control

Platform-independent Applications

Platforms are combinations of hardware, firmware, and software components used to execute software applications. Platforms include operating systems, the underlying computer architectures, or both. Platform-independent applications are applications with the capability to execute on multiple platforms. Such applications promote portability and reconstitution

SC-28control

Protection of Information at Rest

Information at rest refers to the state of information when it is not in process or in transit and is located on system components. Such components include internal or external hard disk drives, storage area network devices, or databases. However, the focus of protecting information at rest is not on the type of storage device or frequency of access but rath

SC-29control

Heterogeneity

Increasing the diversity of information technologies within organizational systems reduces the impact of potential exploitations or compromises of specific technologies. Such diversity protects against common mode failures, including those failures induced by supply chain attacks. Diversity in information technologies also reduces the likelihood that the mea

SC-30control

Concealment and Misdirection

Concealment and misdirection techniques can significantly reduce the targeting capabilities of adversaries (i.e., window of opportunity and available attack surface) to initiate and complete attacks. For example, virtualization techniques provide organizations with the ability to disguise systems, potentially reducing the likelihood of successful attacks wit

SC-3(1)enhancement

Hardware Separation

Hardware separation mechanisms include hardware ring architectures that are implemented within microprocessors and hardware-enforced address segmentation used to support logically distinct storage objects with separate attributes (i.e., readable, writeable).

SC-31control

Covert Channel Analysis

Developers are in the best position to identify potential areas within systems that might lead to covert channels. Covert channel analysis is a meaningful activity when there is the potential for unauthorized information flows across security domains, such as in the case of systems that contain export-controlled information and have connections to external n

SC-3(2)enhancement

Access and Flow Control Functions

Security function isolation occurs because of implementation. The functions can still be scanned and monitored. Security functions that are potentially isolated from access and flow control enforcement functions include auditing, intrusion detection, and malicious code protection functions.

SC-32control

System Partitioning

System partitioning is part of a defense-in-depth protection strategy. Organizations determine the degree of physical separation of system components. Physical separation options include physically distinct components in separate racks in the same room, critical components in separate rooms, and geographical separation of critical components. Security catego

SC-3(3)enhancement

Minimize Nonsecurity Functionality

Where it is not feasible to achieve strict isolation of nonsecurity functions from security functions, it is necessary to take actions to minimize nonsecurity-relevant functions within the security function boundary. Nonsecurity functions contained within the isolation boundary are considered security-relevant because errors or malicious code in the software

SC-3(4)enhancement

Module Coupling and Cohesiveness

The reduction of inter-module interactions helps to constrain security functions and manage complexity. The concepts of coupling and cohesion are important with respect to modularity in software design. Coupling refers to the dependencies that one module has on other modules. Cohesion refers to the relationship between functions within a module. Best practic

SC-34control

Non-modifiable Executable Programs

The operating environment for a system contains the code that hosts applications, including operating systems, executives, or virtual machine monitors (i.e., hypervisors). It can also include certain applications that run directly on hardware platforms. Hardware-enforced, read-only media include Compact Disc-Recordable (CD-R) and Digital Versatile Disc-Recor

SC-3(5)enhancement

Layered Structures

The implementation of layered structures with minimized interactions among security functions and non-looping layers (i.e., lower-layer functions do not depend on higher-layer functions) enables the isolation of security functions and the management of complexity.

SC-35control

External Malicious Code Identification

External malicious code identification differs from decoys in [SC-26](#sc-26) in that the components actively probe networks, including the Internet, in search of malicious code contained on external websites. Like decoys, the use of external malicious code identification techniques requires some supporting isolation measures to ensure that any malicious cod

SC-36control

Distributed Processing and Storage

Distributing processing and storage across multiple physical locations or logical domains provides a degree of redundancy or overlap for organizations. The redundancy and overlap increase the work factor of adversaries to adversely impact organizational operations, assets, and individuals. The use of distributed processing and storage does not assume a singl

SC-37control

Out-of-band Channels

Out-of-band channels include local, non-network accesses to systems; network paths physically separate from network paths used for operational traffic; or non-electronic paths, such as the U.S. Postal Service. The use of out-of-band channels is contrasted with the use of in-band channels (i.e., the same channels) that carry routine operational traffic. Out-o

SC-38control

Operations Security

Operations security (OPSEC) is a systematic process by which potential adversaries can be denied information about the capabilities and intentions of organizations by identifying, controlling, and protecting generally unclassified information that specifically relates to the planning and execution of sensitive organizational activities. The OPSEC process inv

SC-39control

Process Isolation

Systems can maintain separate execution domains for each executing process by assigning each process a separate address space. Each system process has a distinct address space so that communication between processes is performed in a manner controlled through the security functions, and one process cannot modify the executing code of another process. Maintai

SC-40control

Wireless Link Protection

Wireless link protection applies to internal and external wireless communication links that may be visible to individuals who are not authorized system users. Adversaries can exploit the signal parameters of wireless links if such links are not adequately protected. There are many ways to exploit the signal parameters of wireless links to gain intelligence,

SC-41control

Port and I/O Device Access

Connection ports include Universal Serial Bus (USB), Thunderbolt, and Firewire (IEEE 1394). Input/output (I/O) devices include compact disc and digital versatile disc drives. Disabling or removing such connection ports and I/O devices helps prevent the exfiltration of information from systems and the introduction of malicious code from those ports or devices

SC-4(2)enhancement

Multilevel or Periods Processing

Changes in processing levels can occur during multilevel or periods processing with information at different classification levels or security categories. It can also occur during serial reuse of hardware components at different classification levels. Organization-defined procedures can include approved sanitization processes for electronically stored inform

SC-42control

Sensor Capability and Data

Sensor capability and data applies to types of systems or system components characterized as mobile devices, such as cellular telephones, smart phones, and tablets. Mobile devices often include sensors that can collect and record data regarding the environment where the system is in use. Sensors that are embedded within mobile devices include microphones, ca

SC-43control

Usage Restrictions

Usage restrictions apply to all system components including but not limited to mobile code, mobile devices, wireless access, and wired and wireless peripheral components (e.g., copiers, printers, scanners, optical devices, and other similar technologies). The usage restrictions and implementation guidelines are based on the potential for system components to

SC-44control

Detonation Chambers

Detonation chambers, also known as dynamic execution environments, allow organizations to open email attachments, execute untrusted or suspicious applications, and execute Universal Resource Locator requests in the safety of an isolated environment or a virtualized sandbox. Protected and isolated execution environments provide a means of determining whether

SC-45control

System Time Synchronization

Time synchronization of system clocks is essential for the correct execution of many system services, including identification and authentication processes that involve certificates and time-of-day restrictions as part of access control. Denial of service or failure to deny expired credentials may result without properly synchronized clocks within and betwee

SC-46control

Cross Domain Policy Enforcement

For logical policy enforcement mechanisms, organizations avoid creating a logical path between interfaces to prevent the ability to bypass the policy enforcement mechanism. For physical policy enforcement mechanisms, the robustness of physical isolation afforded by the physical implementation of policy enforcement to preclude the presence of logical covert c

SC-47control

Alternate Communications Paths

An incident, whether adversarial- or nonadversarial-based, can disrupt established communications paths used for system operations and organizational command and control. Alternate communications paths reduce the risk of all communications paths being affected by the same incident. To compound the problem, the inability of organizational officials to obtain

SC-48control

Sensor Relocation

Adversaries may take various paths and use different approaches as they move laterally through an organization (including its systems) to reach their target or as they attempt to exfiltrate information from the organization. The organization often only has a limited set of monitoring and detection capabilities, and they may be focused on the critical or like

SC-49control

Hardware-enforced Separation and Policy Enforcement

System owners may require additional strength of mechanism and robustness to ensure domain separation and policy enforcement for specific types of threats and environments of operation. Hardware-enforced separation and policy enforcement provide greater strength of mechanism than software-enforced separation and policy enforcement.

SC-5(1)enhancement

Restrict Ability to Attack Other Systems

Restricting the ability of individuals to launch denial-of-service attacks requires the mechanisms commonly used for such attacks to be unavailable. Individuals of concern include hostile insiders or external adversaries who have breached or compromised the system and are using it to launch a denial-of-service attack. Organizations can restrict the ability o

SC-5(2)enhancement

Capacity, Bandwidth, and Redundancy

Managing capacity ensures that sufficient capacity is available to counter flooding attacks. Managing capacity includes establishing selected usage priorities, quotas, partitioning, or load balancing.

SC-5(3)enhancement

Detection and Monitoring

Organizations consider the utilization and capacity of system resources when managing risk associated with a denial of service due to malicious attacks. Denial-of-service attacks can originate from external or internal sources. System resources that are sensitive to denial of service include physical disk storage, memory, and CPU cycles. Techniques used to p

SC-7(3)enhancement

Access Points

Limiting the number of external network connections facilitates monitoring of inbound and outbound communications traffic. The Trusted Internet Connection [DHS TIC](#4f42ee6e-86cc-403b-a51f-76c2b4f81b54) initiative is an example of a federal guideline that requires limits on the number of external network connections. Limiting the number of external network

SC-7(4)enhancement

External Telecommunications Services

External telecommunications services can provide data and/or voice communications services. Examples of control plane traffic include Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) routing, Domain Name System (DNS), and management protocols. See [SP 800-189](#f5edfe51-d1f2-422e-9b27-5d0e90b49c72) for additional information on the use of the resource public key infrastructure

SC-7(5)enhancement

Deny by Default — Allow by Exception

Denying by default and allowing by exception applies to inbound and outbound network communications traffic. A deny-all, permit-by-exception network communications traffic policy ensures that only those system connections that are essential and approved are allowed. Deny by default, allow by exception also applies to a system that is connected to an external

SC-7(7)enhancement

Split Tunneling for Remote Devices

Split tunneling is the process of allowing a remote user or device to establish a non-remote connection with a system and simultaneously communicate via some other connection to a resource in an external network. This method of network access enables a user to access remote devices and simultaneously, access uncontrolled networks. Split tunneling might be de

SC-7(8)enhancement

Route Traffic to Authenticated Proxy Servers

External networks are networks outside of organizational control. A proxy server is a server (i.e., system or application) that acts as an intermediary for clients requesting system resources from non-organizational or other organizational servers. System resources that may be requested include files, connections, web pages, or services. Client requests esta

SC-7(9)enhancement

Restrict Threatening Outgoing Communications Traffic

Detecting outgoing communications traffic from internal actions that may pose threats to external systems is known as extrusion detection. Extrusion detection is carried out within the system at managed interfaces. Extrusion detection includes the analysis of incoming and outgoing communications traffic while searching for indications of internal threats to

SC-8(1)enhancement

Cryptographic Protection

Encryption protects information from unauthorized disclosure and modification during transmission. Cryptographic mechanisms that protect the confidentiality and integrity of information during transmission include TLS and IPSec. Cryptographic mechanisms used to protect information integrity include cryptographic hash functions that have applications in digit

SC-8(2)enhancement

Pre- and Post-transmission Handling

Information can be unintentionally or maliciously disclosed or modified during preparation for transmission or during reception, including during aggregation, at protocol transformation points, and during packing and unpacking. Such unauthorized disclosures or modifications compromise the confidentiality or integrity of the information.

SC-8(3)enhancement

Cryptographic Protection for Message Externals

Cryptographic protection for message externals addresses protection from the unauthorized disclosure of information. Message externals include message headers and routing information. Cryptographic protection prevents the exploitation of message externals and applies to internal and external networks or links that may be visible to individuals who are not au

SC-8(4)enhancement

Conceal or Randomize Communications

Concealing or randomizing communication patterns addresses protection from unauthorized disclosure of information. Communication patterns include frequency, periods, predictability, and amount. Changes to communications patterns can reveal information with intelligence value, especially when combined with other available information related to the mission an

SC-8(5)enhancement

Protected Distribution System

The purpose of a protected distribution system is to deter, detect, and/or make difficult physical access to the communication lines that carry national security information.

SC-11(1)enhancement

Irrefutable Communications Path

An irrefutable communications path permits the system to initiate a trusted path, which necessitates that the user can unmistakably recognize the source of the communication as a trusted system component. For example, the trusted path may appear in an area of the display that other applications cannot access or be based on the presence of an identifier that

SC-12(1)enhancement

Availability

Escrowing of encryption keys is a common practice for ensuring availability in the event of key loss. A forgotten passphrase is an example of losing a cryptographic key.

SC-12(2)enhancement

Symmetric Keys

[SP 800-56A](#20957dbb-6a1e-40a2-b38a-66f67d33ac2e), [SP 800-56B](#0d083d8a-5cc6-46f1-8d79-3081d42bcb75) , and [SP 800-56C](#eef62b16-c796-4554-955c-505824135b8a) provide guidance on cryptographic key establishment schemes and key derivation methods. [SP 800-57-1](#110e26af-4765-49e1-8740-6750f83fcda1), [SP 800-57-2](#e7942589-e267-4a5a-a3d9-f39a7aae81f0) ,

SC-12(3)enhancement

Asymmetric Keys

[SP 800-56A](#20957dbb-6a1e-40a2-b38a-66f67d33ac2e), [SP 800-56B](#0d083d8a-5cc6-46f1-8d79-3081d42bcb75) , and [SP 800-56C](#eef62b16-c796-4554-955c-505824135b8a) provide guidance on cryptographic key establishment schemes and key derivation methods. [SP 800-57-1](#110e26af-4765-49e1-8740-6750f83fcda1), [SP 800-57-2](#e7942589-e267-4a5a-a3d9-f39a7aae81f0) ,

SC-12(6)enhancement

Physical Control of Keys

For organizations that use external service providers (e.g., cloud service or data center providers), physical control of cryptographic keys provides additional assurance that information stored by such external providers is not subject to unauthorized disclosure or modification.

SC-15(1)enhancement

Physical or Logical Disconnect

Failing to disconnect from collaborative computing devices can result in subsequent compromises of organizational information. Providing easy methods to disconnect from such devices after a collaborative computing session ensures that participants carry out the disconnect activity without having to go through complex and tedious procedures. Disconnect from c

SC-15(3)enhancement

Disabling and Removal in Secure Work Areas

Failing to disable or remove collaborative computing devices and applications from systems or system components can result in compromises of information, including eavesdropping on conversations. A Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) is an example of a secure work area.

SC-15(4)enhancement

Explicitly Indicate Current Participants

Explicitly indicating current participants prevents unauthorized individuals from participating in collaborative computing sessions without the explicit knowledge of other participants.

SC-16(1)enhancement

Integrity Verification

Part of verifying the integrity of transmitted information is ensuring that security and privacy attributes that are associated with such information have not been modified in an unauthorized manner. Unauthorized modification of security or privacy attributes can result in a loss of integrity for transmitted information.

SC-16(2)enhancement

Anti-spoofing Mechanisms

Some attack vectors operate by altering the security attributes of an information system to intentionally and maliciously implement an insufficient level of security within the system. The alteration of attributes leads organizations to believe that a greater number of security functions are in place and operational than have actually been implemented.

SC-16(3)enhancement

Cryptographic Binding

Cryptographic mechanisms and techniques can provide strong security and privacy attribute binding to transmitted information to help ensure the integrity of such information.

SC-18(1)enhancement

Identify Unacceptable Code and Take Corrective Actions

Corrective actions when unacceptable mobile code is detected include blocking, quarantine, or alerting administrators. Blocking includes preventing the transmission of word processing files with embedded macros when such macros have been determined to be unacceptable mobile code.

SC-18(4)enhancement

Prevent Automatic Execution

Actions enforced before executing mobile code include prompting users prior to opening email attachments or clicking on web links. Preventing the automatic execution of mobile code includes disabling auto-execute features on system components that employ portable storage devices, such as compact discs, digital versatile discs, and universal serial bus device

SC-23(3)enhancement

Unique System-generated Session Identifiers

Generating unique session identifiers curtails the ability of adversaries to reuse previously valid session IDs. Employing the concept of randomness in the generation of unique session identifiers protects against brute-force attacks to determine future session identifiers.

SC-23(5)enhancement

Allowed Certificate Authorities

Reliance on certificate authorities for the establishment of secure sessions includes the use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) certificates. These certificates, after verification by their respective certificate authorities, facilitate the establishment of protected sessions between web clients and web servers.

SC-28(1)enhancement

Cryptographic Protection

The selection of cryptographic mechanisms is based on the need to protect the confidentiality and integrity of organizational information. The strength of mechanism is commensurate with the security category or classification of the information. Organizations have the flexibility to encrypt information on system components or media or encrypt data structures

SC-28(2)enhancement

Offline Storage

Removing organizational information from online storage to offline storage eliminates the possibility of individuals gaining unauthorized access to the information through a network. Therefore, organizations may choose to move information to offline storage in lieu of protecting such information in online storage.

SC-28(3)enhancement

Cryptographic Keys

A Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is an example of a hardware-protected data store that can be used to protect cryptographic keys.

SC-29(1)enhancement

Virtualization Techniques

While frequent changes to operating systems and applications can pose significant configuration management challenges, the changes can result in an increased work factor for adversaries to conduct successful attacks. Changing virtual operating systems or applications, as opposed to changing actual operating systems or applications, provides virtual changes t

SC-30(2)enhancement

Randomness

Randomness introduces increased levels of uncertainty for adversaries regarding the actions that organizations take to defend their systems against attacks. Such actions may impede the ability of adversaries to correctly target information resources of organizations that support critical missions or business functions. Uncertainty may also cause adversaries

SC-30(3)enhancement

Change Processing and Storage Locations

Adversaries target critical mission and business functions and the systems that support those mission and business functions while also trying to minimize the exposure of their existence and tradecraft. The static, homogeneous, and deterministic nature of organizational systems targeted by adversaries make such systems more susceptible to attacks with less a

SC-30(4)enhancement

Misleading Information

Employing misleading information is intended to confuse potential adversaries regarding the nature and extent of controls deployed by organizations. Thus, adversaries may employ incorrect and ineffective attack techniques. One technique for misleading adversaries is for organizations to place misleading information regarding the specific controls deployed in

SC-30(5)enhancement

Concealment of System Components

By hiding, disguising, or concealing critical system components, organizations may be able to decrease the probability that adversaries target and successfully compromise those assets. Potential means to hide, disguise, or conceal system components include the configuration of routers or the use of encryption or virtualization techniques.

SC-31(2)enhancement

Maximum Bandwidth

The complete elimination of covert channels, especially covert timing channels, is usually not possible without significant performance impacts.

SC-31(3)enhancement

Measure Bandwidth in Operational Environments

Measuring covert channel bandwidth in specified operational environments helps organizations determine how much information can be covertly leaked before such leakage adversely affects mission or business functions. Covert channel bandwidth may be significantly different when measured in settings that are independent of the specific environments of operation

SC-34(1)enhancement

No Writable Storage

Disallowing writeable storage eliminates the possibility of malicious code insertion via persistent, writeable storage within the designated system components. The restriction applies to fixed and removable storage, with the latter being addressed either directly or as specific restrictions imposed through access controls for mobile devices.

SC-34(2)enhancement

Integrity Protection on Read-only Media

Controls prevent the substitution of media into systems or the reprogramming of programmable read-only media prior to installation into the systems. Integrity protection controls include a combination of prevention, detection, and response.

SC-36(1)enhancement

Polling Techniques

Distributed processing and/or storage may be used to reduce opportunities for adversaries to compromise the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of organizational information and systems. However, the distribution of processing and storage components does not prevent adversaries from compromising one or more of the components. Polling compares the pro

SC-36(2)enhancement

Synchronization

[SC-36](#sc-36) and [CP-9(6)](#cp-9.6) require the duplication of systems or system components in distributed locations. The synchronization of duplicated and redundant services and data helps to ensure that information contained in the distributed locations can be used in the mission or business functions of organizations, as needed.

SC-37(1)enhancement

Ensure Delivery and Transmission

Techniques employed by organizations to ensure that only designated systems or individuals receive certain information, system components, or devices include sending authenticators via an approved courier service but requiring recipients to show some form of government-issued photographic identification as a condition of receipt.

SC-39(1)enhancement

Hardware Separation

Hardware-based separation of system processes is generally less susceptible to compromise than software-based separation, thus providing greater assurance that the separation will be enforced. Hardware separation mechanisms include hardware memory management.

SC-40(1)enhancement

Electromagnetic Interference

The implementation of cryptographic mechanisms for electromagnetic interference protects systems against intentional jamming that might deny or impair communications by ensuring that wireless spread spectrum waveforms used to provide anti-jam protection are not predictable by unauthorized individuals. The implementation of cryptographic mechanisms may also c

SC-40(2)enhancement

Reduce Detection Potential

The implementation of cryptographic mechanisms to reduce detection potential is used for covert communications and to protect wireless transmitters from geo-location. It also ensures that the spread spectrum waveforms used to achieve a low probability of detection are not predictable by unauthorized individuals. Mission requirements, projected threats, conce

SC-40(3)enhancement

Imitative or Manipulative Communications Deception

The implementation of cryptographic mechanisms to identify and reject imitative or manipulative communications ensures that the signal parameters of wireless transmissions are not predictable by unauthorized individuals. Such unpredictability reduces the probability of imitative or manipulative communications deception based on signal parameters alone.

SC-40(4)enhancement

Signal Parameter Identification

The implementation of cryptographic mechanisms to prevent the identification of wireless transmitters protects against the unique identification of wireless transmitters for the purposes of intelligence exploitation by ensuring that anti-fingerprinting alterations to signal parameters are not predictable by unauthorized individuals. It also provides anonymit

SC-42(2)enhancement

Authorized Use

Information collected by sensors for a specific authorized purpose could be misused for some unauthorized purpose. For example, GPS sensors that are used to support traffic navigation could be misused to track the movements of individuals. Measures to mitigate such activities include additional training to help ensure that authorized individuals do not abuse

SC-42(4)enhancement

Notice of Collection

Awareness that organizational sensors are collecting data enables individuals to more effectively engage in managing their privacy. Measures can include conventional written notices and sensor configurations that make individuals directly or indirectly aware through other devices that the sensor is collecting information. The usability and efficacy of the no

SC-42(5)enhancement

Collection Minimization

Although policies to control for authorized use can be applied to information once it is collected, minimizing the collection of information that is not needed mitigates privacy risk at the system entry point and mitigates the risk of policy control failures. Sensor configurations include the obscuring of human features, such as blurring or pixelating flesh

SC-7(10)enhancement

Prevent Exfiltration

Prevention of exfiltration applies to both the intentional and unintentional exfiltration of information. Techniques used to prevent the exfiltration of information from systems may be implemented at internal endpoints, external boundaries, and across managed interfaces and include adherence to protocol formats, monitoring for beaconing activity from systems

SC-7(11)enhancement

Restrict Incoming Communications Traffic

General source address validation techniques are applied to restrict the use of illegal and unallocated source addresses as well as source addresses that should only be used within the system. The restriction of incoming communications traffic provides determinations that source and destination address pairs represent authorized or allowed communications. De

SC-7(12)enhancement

Host-based Protection

Host-based boundary protection mechanisms include host-based firewalls. System components that employ host-based boundary protection mechanisms include servers, workstations, notebook computers, and mobile devices.

SC-7(14)enhancement

Protect Against Unauthorized Physical Connections

Systems that operate at different security categories or classification levels may share common physical and environmental controls, since the systems may share space within the same facilities. In practice, it is possible that these separate systems may share common equipment rooms, wiring closets, and cable distribution paths. Protection against unauthoriz

SC-7(15)enhancement

Networked Privileged Accesses

Privileged access provides greater accessibility to system functions, including security functions. Adversaries attempt to gain privileged access to systems through remote access to cause adverse mission or business impacts, such as by exfiltrating information or bringing down a critical system capability. Routing networked, privileged access requests throug

SC-7(16)enhancement

Prevent Discovery of System Components

Preventing the discovery of system components representing a managed interface helps protect network addresses of those components from discovery through common tools and techniques used to identify devices on networks. Network addresses are not available for discovery and require prior knowledge for access. Preventing the discovery of components and devices

SC-7(17)enhancement

Automated Enforcement of Protocol Formats

System components that enforce protocol formats include deep packet inspection firewalls and XML gateways. The components verify adherence to protocol formats and specifications at the application layer and identify vulnerabilities that cannot be detected by devices operating at the network or transport layers.

SC-7(18)enhancement

Fail Secure

Fail secure is a condition achieved by employing mechanisms to ensure that in the event of operational failures of boundary protection devices at managed interfaces, systems do not enter into unsecure states where intended security properties no longer hold. Managed interfaces include routers, firewalls, and application gateways that reside on protected subn

SC-7(19)enhancement

Block Communication from Non-organizationally Configured Hosts

Communication clients independently configured by end users and external service providers include instant messaging clients and video conferencing software and applications. Traffic blocking does not apply to communication clients that are configured by organizations to perform authorized functions.

SC-7(20)enhancement

Dynamic Isolation and Segregation

The capability to dynamically isolate certain internal system components is useful when it is necessary to partition or separate system components of questionable origin from components that possess greater trustworthiness. Component isolation reduces the attack surface of organizational systems. Isolating selected system components can also limit the damage

SC-7(21)enhancement

Isolation of System Components

Organizations can isolate system components that perform different mission or business functions. Such isolation limits unauthorized information flows among system components and provides the opportunity to deploy greater levels of protection for selected system components. Isolating system components with boundary protection mechanisms provides the capabili

SC-7(24)enhancement

Personally Identifiable Information

Managing the processing of personally identifiable information is an important aspect of protecting an individual’s privacy. Applying, monitoring for, and documenting exceptions to processing rules ensure that personally identifiable information is processed only in accordance with established privacy requirements.

SC-7(25)enhancement

Unclassified National Security System Connections

A direct connection is a dedicated physical or virtual connection between two or more systems. Organizations typically do not have complete control over external networks, including the Internet. Boundary protection devices (e.g., firewalls, gateways, and routers) mediate communications and information flows between unclassified national security systems and

SC-7(26)enhancement

Classified National Security System Connections

A direct connection is a dedicated physical or virtual connection between two or more systems. Organizations typically do not have complete control over external networks, including the Internet. Boundary protection devices (e.g., firewalls, gateways, and routers) mediate communications and information flows between classified national security systems and e

SC-7(27)enhancement

Unclassified Non-national Security System Connections

A direct connection is a dedicated physical or virtual connection between two or more systems. Organizations typically do not have complete control over external networks, including the Internet. Boundary protection devices (e.g., firewalls, gateways, and routers) mediate communications and information flows between unclassified non-national security systems

SC-7(28)enhancement

Connections to Public Networks

A direct connection is a dedicated physical or virtual connection between two or more systems. A public network is a network accessible to the public, including the Internet and organizational extranets with public access.

SC-7(29)enhancement

Separate Subnets to Isolate Functions

Separating critical system components and functions from other noncritical system components and functions through separate subnetworks may be necessary to reduce susceptibility to a catastrophic or debilitating breach or compromise that results in system failure. For example, physically separating the command and control function from the in-flight entertai

SI-1control

Policy and Procedures

System and information integrity policy and procedures address the controls in the SI family that are implemented within systems and organizations. The risk management strategy is an important factor in establishing such policies and procedures. Policies and procedures contribute to security and privacy assurance. Therefore, it is important that security and

SI-2control

Flaw Remediation

The need to remediate system flaws applies to all types of software and firmware. Organizations identify systems affected by software flaws, including potential vulnerabilities resulting from those flaws, and report this information to designated organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities. Organizations consider establish

SI-3control

Malicious Code Protection

System entry and exit points include firewalls, remote access servers, workstations, electronic mail servers, web servers, proxy servers, notebook computers, and mobile devices. Malicious code includes viruses, worms, Trojan horses, and spyware. Malicious code can also be encoded in various formats contained within compressed or hidden files or hidden in fil

SI-4control

System Monitoring

System monitoring includes external and internal monitoring. External monitoring includes the observation of events occurring at external interfaces to the system. Internal monitoring includes the observation of events occurring within the system. Organizations monitor systems by observing audit activities in real time or by observing other system aspects su

SI-5control

Security Alerts, Advisories, and Directives

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) generates security alerts and advisories to maintain situational awareness throughout the Federal Government. Security directives are issued by OMB or other designated organizations with the responsibility and authority to issue such directives. Compliance with security directives is essential due t

SI-6control

Security and Privacy Function Verification

Transitional states for systems include system startup, restart, shutdown, and abort. System notifications include hardware indicator lights, electronic alerts to system administrators, and messages to local computer consoles. In contrast to security function verification, privacy function verification ensures that privacy functions operate as expected and a

SI-7control

Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity

Unauthorized changes to software, firmware, and information can occur due to errors or malicious activity. Software includes operating systems (with key internal components, such as kernels or drivers), middleware, and applications. Firmware interfaces include Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) and Basic Input/Output System (BIOS). Information incl

SI-8control

Spam Protection

System entry and exit points include firewalls, remote-access servers, electronic mail servers, web servers, proxy servers, workstations, notebook computers, and mobile devices. Spam can be transported by different means, including email, email attachments, and web accesses. Spam protection mechanisms include signature definitions.

SI-10control

Information Input Validation

Checking the valid syntax and semantics of system inputs—including character set, length, numerical range, and acceptable values—verifies that inputs match specified definitions for format and content. For example, if the organization specifies that numerical values between 1-100 are the only acceptable inputs for a field in a given application, inputs of "3

SI-11control

Error Handling

Organizations consider the structure and content of error messages. The extent to which systems can handle error conditions is guided and informed by organizational policy and operational requirements. Exploitable information includes stack traces and implementation details; erroneous logon attempts with passwords mistakenly entered as the username; mission

SI-12control

Information Management and Retention

Information management and retention requirements cover the full life cycle of information, in some cases extending beyond system disposal. Information to be retained may also include policies, procedures, plans, reports, data output from control implementation, and other types of administrative information. The National Archives and Records Administration (

SI-13control

Predictable Failure Prevention

While MTTF is primarily a reliability issue, predictable failure prevention is intended to address potential failures of system components that provide security capabilities. Failure rates reflect installation-specific consideration rather than the industry-average. Organizations define the criteria for the substitution of system components based on the MTTF

SI-14control

Non-persistence

Implementation of non-persistent components and services mitigates risk from advanced persistent threats (APTs) by reducing the targeting capability of adversaries (i.e., window of opportunity and available attack surface) to initiate and complete attacks. By implementing the concept of non-persistence for selected system components, organizations can provid

SI-15control

Information Output Filtering

Certain types of attacks, including SQL injections, produce output results that are unexpected or inconsistent with the output results that would be expected from software programs or applications. Information output filtering focuses on detecting extraneous content, preventing such extraneous content from being displayed, and then alerting monitoring tools

SI-16control

Memory Protection

Some adversaries launch attacks with the intent of executing code in non-executable regions of memory or in memory locations that are prohibited. Controls employed to protect memory include data execution prevention and address space layout randomization. Data execution prevention controls can either be hardware-enforced or software-enforced with hardware en

SI-17control

Fail-safe Procedures

Failure conditions include the loss of communications among critical system components or between system components and operational facilities. Fail-safe procedures include alerting operator personnel and providing specific instructions on subsequent steps to take. Subsequent steps may include doing nothing, reestablishing system settings, shutting down proc

SI-18control

Personally Identifiable Information Quality Operations

Personally identifiable information quality operations include the steps that organizations take to confirm the accuracy and relevance of personally identifiable information throughout the information life cycle. The information life cycle includes the creation, collection, use, processing, storage, maintenance, dissemination, disclosure, and disposal of per

SI-19control

De-identification

De-identification is the general term for the process of removing the association between a set of identifying data and the data subject. Many datasets contain information about individuals that can be used to distinguish or trace an individual’s identity, such as name, social security number, date and place of birth, mother’s maiden name, or biometric recor

SI-20control

Tainting

Many cyber-attacks target organizational information, or information that the organization holds on behalf of other entities (e.g., personally identifiable information), and exfiltrate that data. In addition, insider attacks and erroneous user procedures can remove information from the system that is in violation of the organizational policies. Tainting appr

SI-21control

Information Refresh

Retaining information for longer than it is needed makes it an increasingly valuable and enticing target for adversaries. Keeping information available for the minimum period of time needed to support organizational missions or business functions reduces the opportunity for adversaries to compromise, capture, and exfiltrate that information.

SI-22control

Information Diversity

Actions taken by a system service or a function are often driven by the information it receives. Corruption, fabrication, modification, or deletion of that information could impact the ability of the service function to properly carry out its intended actions. By having multiple sources of input, the service or function can continue operation if one source i

SI-2(3)enhancement

Time to Remediate Flaws and Benchmarks for Corrective Actions

Organizations determine the time it takes on average to correct system flaws after such flaws have been identified and subsequently establish organizational benchmarks (i.e., time frames) for taking corrective actions. Benchmarks can be established by the type of flaw or the severity of the potential vulnerability if the flaw can be exploited.

SI-23control

Information Fragmentation

One objective of the advanced persistent threat is to exfiltrate valuable information. Once exfiltrated, there is generally no way for the organization to recover the lost information. Therefore, organizations may consider dividing the information into disparate elements and distributing those elements across multiple systems or system components and locatio

SI-2(5)enhancement

Automatic Software and Firmware Updates

Due to system integrity and availability concerns, organizations consider the methodology used to carry out automatic updates. Organizations balance the need to ensure that the updates are installed as soon as possible with the need to maintain configuration management and control with any mission or operational impacts that automatic updates might impose (i

SI-2(6)enhancement

Removal of Previous Versions of Software and Firmware

Previous versions of software or firmware components that are not removed from the system after updates have been installed may be exploited by adversaries. Some products may automatically remove previous versions of software and firmware from the system.

SI-2(7)enhancement

Root Cause Analysis

Root cause analysis includes a wide range of approaches, tools, and techniques to systematically identify the underlying cause of issues or failures to systems and systems components (hardware, software, and firmware). Organizations consider the severity of the incident to determine what root cause analysis method is used and how quickly implementation of th

SI-3(4)enhancement

Updates Only by Privileged Users

Protection mechanisms for malicious code are typically categorized as security-related software and, as such, are only updated by organizational personnel with appropriate access privileges.

SI-3(8)enhancement

Detect Unauthorized Commands

Detecting unauthorized commands can be applied to critical interfaces other than kernel-based interfaces, including interfaces with virtual machines and privileged applications. Unauthorized operating system commands include commands for kernel functions from system processes that are not trusted to initiate such commands as well as commands for kernel funct

SI-4(1)enhancement

System-wide Intrusion Detection System

Linking individual intrusion detection tools into a system-wide intrusion detection system provides additional coverage and effective detection capabilities. The information contained in one intrusion detection tool can be shared widely across the organization, making the system-wide detection capability more robust and powerful.

SI-4(2)enhancement

Automated Tools and Mechanisms for Real-time Analysis

Automated tools and mechanisms include host-based, network-based, transport-based, or storage-based event monitoring tools and mechanisms or security information and event management (SIEM) technologies that provide real-time analysis of alerts and notifications generated by organizational systems. Automated monitoring techniques can create unintended privac

SI-4(3)enhancement

Automated Tool and Mechanism Integration

Using automated tools and mechanisms to integrate intrusion detection tools and mechanisms into access and flow control mechanisms facilitates a rapid response to attacks by enabling the reconfiguration of mechanisms in support of attack isolation and elimination.

SI-4(4)enhancement

Inbound and Outbound Communications Traffic

Unusual or unauthorized activities or conditions related to system inbound and outbound communications traffic includes internal traffic that indicates the presence of malicious code or unauthorized use of legitimate code or credentials within organizational systems or propagating among system components, signaling to external systems, and the unauthorized e

SI-4(5)enhancement

System-generated Alerts

Alerts may be generated from a variety of sources, including audit records or inputs from malicious code protection mechanisms, intrusion detection or prevention mechanisms, or boundary protection devices such as firewalls, gateways, and routers. Alerts can be automated and may be transmitted telephonically, by electronic mail messages, or by text messaging.

SI-4(9)enhancement

Testing of Monitoring Tools and Mechanisms

Testing intrusion-monitoring tools and mechanisms is necessary to ensure that the tools and mechanisms are operating correctly and continue to satisfy the monitoring objectives of organizations. The frequency and depth of testing depends on the types of tools and mechanisms used by organizations and the methods of deployment.

SI-5(1)enhancement

Automated Alerts and Advisories

The significant number of changes to organizational systems and environments of operation requires the dissemination of security-related information to a variety of organizational entities that have a direct interest in the success of organizational mission and business functions. Based on information provided by security alerts and advisories, changes may b

SI-6(3)enhancement

Report Verification Results

Organizational personnel with potential interest in the results of the verification of security and privacy functions include systems security officers, senior agency information security officers, and senior agency officials for privacy.

SI-7(1)enhancement

Integrity Checks

Security-relevant events include the identification of new threats to which organizational systems are susceptible and the installation of new hardware, software, or firmware. Transitional states include system startup, restart, shutdown, and abort.

SI-7(2)enhancement

Automated Notifications of Integrity Violations

The employment of automated tools to report system and information integrity violations and to notify organizational personnel in a timely matter is essential to effective risk response. Personnel with an interest in system and information integrity violations include mission and business owners, system owners, senior agency information security official, se

SI-7(3)enhancement

Centrally Managed Integrity Tools

Centrally managed integrity verification tools provides greater consistency in the application of such tools and can facilitate more comprehensive coverage of integrity verification actions.

SI-7(5)enhancement

Automated Response to Integrity Violations

Organizations may define different integrity-checking responses by type of information, specific information, or a combination of both. Types of information include firmware, software, and user data. Specific information includes boot firmware for certain types of machines. The automatic implementation of controls within organizational systems includes rever

SI-7(6)enhancement

Cryptographic Protection

Cryptographic mechanisms used to protect integrity include digital signatures and the computation and application of signed hashes using asymmetric cryptography, protecting the confidentiality of the key used to generate the hash, and using the public key to verify the hash information. Organizations that employ cryptographic mechanisms also consider cryptog

SI-7(7)enhancement

Integration of Detection and Response

Integrating detection and response helps to ensure that detected events are tracked, monitored, corrected, and available for historical purposes. Maintaining historical records is important for being able to identify and discern adversary actions over an extended time period and for possible legal actions. Security-relevant changes include unauthorized chang

SI-7(9)enhancement

Verify Boot Process

Ensuring the integrity of boot processes is critical to starting system components in known, trustworthy states. Integrity verification mechanisms provide a level of assurance that only trusted code is executed during boot processes.

SI-8(2)enhancement

Automatic Updates

Using automated mechanisms to update spam protection mechanisms helps to ensure that updates occur on a regular basis and provide the latest content and protection capabilities.

SI-8(3)enhancement

Continuous Learning Capability

Learning mechanisms include Bayesian filters that respond to user inputs that identify specific traffic as spam or legitimate by updating algorithm parameters and thereby more accurately separating types of traffic.

SI-10(1)enhancement

Manual Override Capability

In certain situations, such as during events that are defined in contingency plans, a manual override capability for input validation may be needed. Manual overrides are used only in limited circumstances and with the inputs defined by the organization.

SI-10(2)enhancement

Review and Resolve Errors

Resolution of input validation errors includes correcting systemic causes of errors and resubmitting transactions with corrected input. Input validation errors are those related to the information inputs defined by the organization in the base control ( [SI-10](#si-10)).

SI-10(3)enhancement

Predictable Behavior

A common vulnerability in organizational systems is unpredictable behavior when invalid inputs are received. Verification of system predictability helps ensure that the system behaves as expected when invalid inputs are received. This occurs by specifying system responses that allow the system to transition to known states without adverse, unintended side ef

SI-10(4)enhancement

Timing Interactions

In addressing invalid system inputs received across protocol interfaces, timing interactions become relevant, where one protocol needs to consider the impact of the error response on other protocols in the protocol stack. For example, 802.11 standard wireless network protocols do not interact well with Transmission Control Protocols (TCP) when packets are dr

SI-10(5)enhancement

Restrict Inputs to Trusted Sources and Approved Formats

Restricting the use of inputs to trusted sources and in trusted formats applies the concept of authorized or permitted software to information inputs. Specifying known trusted sources for information inputs and acceptable formats for such inputs can reduce the probability of malicious activity. The information inputs are those defined by the organization in

SI-10(6)enhancement

Injection Prevention

Untrusted data injections may be prevented using a parameterized interface or output escaping (output encoding). Parameterized interfaces separate data from code so that injections of malicious or unintended data cannot change the semantics of commands being sent. Output escaping uses specified characters to inform the interpreter’s parser whether data is tr

SI-12(1)enhancement

Limit Personally Identifiable Information Elements

Limiting the use of personally identifiable information throughout the information life cycle when the information is not needed for operational purposes helps to reduce the level of privacy risk created by a system. The information life cycle includes information creation, collection, use, processing, storage, maintenance, dissemination, disclosure, and dis

SI-12(2)enhancement

Minimize Personally Identifiable Information in Testing, Training, and Research

Organizations can minimize the risk to an individual’s privacy by employing techniques such as de-identification or synthetic data. Limiting the use of personally identifiable information throughout the information life cycle when the information is not needed for research, testing, or training helps reduce the level of privacy risk created by a system. Risk

SI-12(3)enhancement

Information Disposal

Organizations can minimize both security and privacy risks by disposing of information when it is no longer needed. The disposal or destruction of information applies to originals as well as copies and archived records, including system logs that may contain personally identifiable information.

SI-13(1)enhancement

Transferring Component Responsibilities

Transferring primary system component responsibilities to other substitute components prior to primary component failure is important to reduce the risk of degraded or debilitated mission or business functions. Making such transfers based on a percentage of mean time to failure allows organizations to be proactive based on their risk tolerance. However, the

SI-13(3)enhancement

Manual Transfer Between Components

For example, if the MTTF for a system component is 100 days and the MTTF percentage defined by the organization is 90 percent, the manual transfer would occur after 90 days.

SI-13(5)enhancement

Failover Capability

Failover refers to the automatic switchover to an alternate system upon the failure of the primary system. Failover capability includes incorporating mirrored system operations at alternate processing sites or periodic data mirroring at regular intervals defined by the recovery time periods of organizations.

SI-14(1)enhancement

Refresh from Trusted Sources

Trusted sources include software and data from write-once, read-only media or from selected offline secure storage facilities.

SI-14(2)enhancement

Non-persistent Information

Retaining information longer than is needed makes the information a potential target for advanced adversaries searching for high value assets to compromise through unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized modification, or exfiltration. For system-related information, unnecessary retention provides advanced adversaries information that can assist in their reconn

SI-14(3)enhancement

Non-persistent Connectivity

Persistent connections to systems can provide advanced adversaries with paths to move laterally through systems and potentially position themselves closer to high value assets. Limiting the availability of such connections impedes the adversary’s ability to move freely through organizational systems.

SI-18(1)enhancement

Automation Support

The use of automated mechanisms to improve data quality may inadvertently create privacy risks. Automated tools may connect to external or otherwise unrelated systems, and the matching of records between these systems may create linkages with unintended consequences. Organizations assess and document these risks in their privacy impact assessments and make d

SI-18(2)enhancement

Data Tags

Data tagging personally identifiable information includes tags that note processing permissions, authority to process, de-identification, impact level, information life cycle stage, and retention or last updated dates. Employing data tags for personally identifiable information can support the use of automation tools to correct or delete relevant personally

SI-18(3)enhancement

Collection

Individuals or their designated representatives can be sources of correct personally identifiable information. Organizations consider contextual factors that may incentivize individuals to provide correct data versus false data. Additional steps may be necessary to validate collected information based on the nature and context of the personally identifiable

SI-18(4)enhancement

Individual Requests

Inaccurate personally identifiable information maintained by organizations may cause problems for individuals, especially in those business functions where inaccurate information may result in inappropriate decisions or the denial of benefits and services to individuals. Even correct information, in certain circumstances, can cause problems for individuals t

SI-18(5)enhancement

Notice of Correction or Deletion

When personally identifiable information is corrected or deleted, organizations take steps to ensure that all authorized recipients of such information, and the individual with whom the information is associated or their designated representatives, are informed of the corrected or deleted information.

SI-19(1)enhancement

Collection

If a data source contains personally identifiable information but the information will not be used, the dataset can be de-identified when it is created by not collecting the data elements that contain the personally identifiable information. For example, if an organization does not intend to use the social security number of an applicant, then application fo

SI-19(2)enhancement

Archiving

Datasets can be archived for many reasons. The envisioned purposes for the archived dataset are specified, and if personally identifiable information elements are not required, the elements are not archived. For example, social security numbers may have been collected for record linkage, but the archived dataset may include the required elements from the lin

SI-19(3)enhancement

Release

Prior to releasing a dataset, a data custodian considers the intended uses of the dataset and determines if it is necessary to release personally identifiable information. If the personally identifiable information is not necessary, the information can be removed using de-identification techniques.

SI-19(4)enhancement

Removal, Masking, Encryption, Hashing, or Replacement of Direct Identifiers

There are many possible processes for removing direct identifiers from a dataset. Columns in a dataset that contain a direct identifier can be removed. In masking, the direct identifier is transformed into a repeating character, such as XXXXXX or 999999. Identifiers can be encrypted or hashed so that the linked records remain linked. In the case of encryptio

SI-19(5)enhancement

Statistical Disclosure Control

Many types of statistical analyses can result in the disclosure of information about individuals even if only summary information is provided. For example, if a school that publishes a monthly table with the number of minority students enrolled, reports that it has 10-19 such students in January, and subsequently reports that it has 20-29 such students in Ma

SI-19(6)enhancement

Differential Privacy

The mathematical definition for differential privacy holds that the result of a dataset analysis should be approximately the same before and after the addition or removal of a single data record (which is assumed to be the data from a single individual). In its most basic form, differential privacy applies only to online query systems. However, it can also b

SI-19(7)enhancement

Validated Algorithms and Software

Algorithms that appear to remove personally identifiable information from a dataset may in fact leave information that is personally identifiable or data that is re-identifiable. Software that is claimed to implement a validated algorithm may contain bugs or implement a different algorithm. Software may de-identify one type of data, such as integers, but not

SI-19(8)enhancement

Motivated Intruder

A motivated intruder test is a test in which an individual or group takes a data release and specified resources and attempts to re-identify one or more individuals in the de-identified dataset. Such tests specify the amount of inside knowledge, computational resources, financial resources, data, and skills that intruders possess to conduct the tests. A moti

SI-3(10)enhancement

Malicious Code Analysis

The use of malicious code analysis tools provides organizations with a more in-depth understanding of adversary tradecraft (i.e., tactics, techniques, and procedures) and the functionality and purpose of specific instances of malicious code. Understanding the characteristics of malicious code facilitates effective organizational responses to current and futu

SI-4(10)enhancement

Visibility of Encrypted Communications

Organizations balance the need to encrypt communications traffic to protect data confidentiality with the need to maintain visibility into such traffic from a monitoring perspective. Organizations determine whether the visibility requirement applies to internal encrypted traffic, encrypted traffic intended for external destinations, or a subset of the traffi

SI-4(11)enhancement

Analyze Communications Traffic Anomalies

Organization-defined interior points include subnetworks and subsystems. Anomalies within organizational systems include large file transfers, long-time persistent connections, attempts to access information from unexpected locations, the use of unusual protocols and ports, the use of unmonitored network protocols (e.g., IPv6 usage during IPv4 transition), a

SI-4(12)enhancement

Automated Organization-generated Alerts

Organizational personnel on the system alert notification list include system administrators, mission or business owners, system owners, senior agency information security officer, senior agency official for privacy, system security officers, or privacy officers. Automated organization-generated alerts are the security alerts generated by organizations and t

SI-4(13)enhancement

Analyze Traffic and Event Patterns

Identifying and understanding common communications traffic and event patterns help organizations provide useful information to system monitoring devices to more effectively identify suspicious or anomalous traffic and events when they occur. Such information can help reduce the number of false positives and false negatives during system monitoring.

SI-4(14)enhancement

Wireless Intrusion Detection

Wireless signals may radiate beyond organizational facilities. Organizations proactively search for unauthorized wireless connections, including the conduct of thorough scans for unauthorized wireless access points. Wireless scans are not limited to those areas within facilities containing systems but also include areas outside of facilities to verify that u

SI-4(15)enhancement

Wireless to Wireline Communications

Wireless networks are inherently less secure than wired networks. For example, wireless networks are more susceptible to eavesdroppers or traffic analysis than wireline networks. When wireless to wireline communications exist, the wireless network could become a port of entry into the wired network. Given the greater facility of unauthorized network access v

SI-4(16)enhancement

Correlate Monitoring Information

Correlating information from different system monitoring tools and mechanisms can provide a more comprehensive view of system activity. Correlating system monitoring tools and mechanisms that typically work in isolation—including malicious code protection software, host monitoring, and network monitoring—can provide an organization-wide monitoring view and m

SI-4(17)enhancement

Integrated Situational Awareness

Correlating monitoring information from a more diverse set of information sources helps to achieve integrated situational awareness. Integrated situational awareness from a combination of physical, cyber, and supply chain monitoring activities enhances the capability of organizations to more quickly detect sophisticated attacks and investigate the methods an

SI-4(19)enhancement

Risk for Individuals

Indications of increased risk from individuals can be obtained from different sources, including personnel records, intelligence agencies, law enforcement organizations, and other sources. The monitoring of individuals is coordinated with the management, legal, security, privacy, and human resource officials who conduct such monitoring. Monitoring is conduct

SI-4(20)enhancement

Privileged Users

Privileged users have access to more sensitive information, including security-related information, than the general user population. Access to such information means that privileged users can potentially do greater damage to systems and organizations than non-privileged users. Therefore, implementing additional monitoring on privileged users helps to ensure

SI-4(21)enhancement

Probationary Periods

During probationary periods, employees do not have permanent employment status within organizations. Without such status or access to information that is resident on the system, additional monitoring can help identify any potentially malicious activity or inappropriate behavior.

SI-4(22)enhancement

Unauthorized Network Services

Unauthorized or unapproved network services include services in service-oriented architectures that lack organizational verification or validation and may therefore be unreliable or serve as malicious rogues for valid services.

SI-4(23)enhancement

Host-based Devices

Host-based monitoring collects information about the host (or system in which it resides). System components in which host-based monitoring can be implemented include servers, notebook computers, and mobile devices. Organizations may consider employing host-based monitoring mechanisms from multiple product developers or vendors.

SI-4(24)enhancement

Indicators of Compromise

Indicators of compromise (IOC) are forensic artifacts from intrusions that are identified on organizational systems at the host or network level. IOCs provide valuable information on systems that have been compromised. IOCs can include the creation of registry key values. IOCs for network traffic include Universal Resource Locator or protocol elements that i

SI-4(25)enhancement

Optimize Network Traffic Analysis

Encrypted traffic, asymmetric routing architectures, capacity and latency limitations, and transitioning from older to newer technologies (e.g., IPv4 to IPv6 network protocol transition) may result in blind spots for organizations when analyzing network traffic. Collecting, decrypting, pre-processing, and distributing only relevant traffic to monitoring devi

SI-7(10)enhancement

Protection of Boot Firmware

Unauthorized modifications to boot firmware may indicate a sophisticated, targeted attack. These types of targeted attacks can result in a permanent denial of service or a persistent malicious code presence. These situations can occur if the firmware is corrupted or if the malicious code is embedded within the firmware. System components can protect the inte

SI-7(12)enhancement

Integrity Verification

Organizations verify the integrity of user-installed software prior to execution to reduce the likelihood of executing malicious code or programs that contains errors from unauthorized modifications. Organizations consider the source of the software, ensuring the software and updates come from authorized sources and/or sites, and the practicality of approach

SI-7(15)enhancement

Code Authentication

Cryptographic authentication includes verifying that software or firmware components have been digitally signed using certificates recognized and approved by organizations. Code signing is an effective method to protect against malicious code. Organizations that employ cryptographic mechanisms also consider cryptographic key management solutions.

SI-7(16)enhancement

Time Limit on Process Execution Without Supervision

Placing a time limit on process execution without supervision is intended to apply to processes for which typical or normal execution periods can be determined and situations in which organizations exceed such periods. Supervision includes timers on operating systems, automated responses, and manual oversight and response when system process anomalies occur.

SI-7(17)enhancement

Runtime Application Self-protection

Runtime application self-protection employs runtime instrumentation to detect and block the exploitation of software vulnerabilities by taking advantage of information from the software in execution. Runtime exploit prevention differs from traditional perimeter-based protections such as guards and firewalls which can only detect and block attacks by using ne

SR-1control

Policy and Procedures

Supply chain risk management policy and procedures address the controls in the SR family as well as supply chain-related controls in other families that are implemented within systems and organizations. The risk management strategy is an important factor in establishing such policies and procedures. Policies and procedures contribute to security and privacy

SR-2control

Supply Chain Risk Management Plan

The dependence on products, systems, and services from external providers, as well as the nature of the relationships with those providers, present an increasing level of risk to an organization. Threat actions that may increase security or privacy risks include unauthorized production, the insertion or use of counterfeits, tampering, theft, insertion of mal

SR-3control

Supply Chain Controls and Processes

Supply chain elements include organizations, entities, or tools employed for the research and development, design, manufacturing, acquisition, delivery, integration, operations and maintenance, and disposal of systems and system components. Supply chain processes include hardware, software, and firmware development processes; shipping and handling procedures

SR-4control

Provenance

Every system and system component has a point of origin and may be changed throughout its existence. Provenance is the chronology of the origin, development, ownership, location, and changes to a system or system component and associated data. It may also include personnel and processes used to interact with or make modifications to the system, component, or

SR-5control

Acquisition Strategies, Tools, and Methods

The use of the acquisition process provides an important vehicle to protect the supply chain. There are many useful tools and techniques available, including obscuring the end use of a system or system component, using blind or filtered buys, requiring tamper-evident packaging, or using trusted or controlled distribution. The results from a supply chain risk

SR-6control

Supplier Assessments and Reviews

An assessment and review of supplier risk includes security and supply chain risk management processes, foreign ownership, control or influence (FOCI), and the ability of the supplier to effectively assess subordinate second-tier and third-tier suppliers and contractors. The reviews may be conducted by the organization or by an independent third party. The r

SR-7control

Supply Chain Operations Security

Supply chain OPSEC expands the scope of OPSEC to include suppliers and potential suppliers. OPSEC is a process that includes identifying critical information, analyzing friendly actions related to operations and other activities to identify actions that can be observed by potential adversaries, determining indicators that potential adversaries might obtain t

SR-8control

Notification Agreements

The establishment of agreements and procedures facilitates communications among supply chain entities. Early notification of compromises and potential compromises in the supply chain that can potentially adversely affect or have adversely affected organizational systems or system components is essential for organizations to effectively respond to such incide

SR-9control

Tamper Resistance and Detection

Anti-tamper technologies, tools, and techniques provide a level of protection for systems, system components, and services against many threats, including reverse engineering, modification, and substitution. Strong identification combined with tamper resistance and/or tamper detection is essential to protecting systems and components during distribution and

SR-10control

Inspection of Systems or Components

The inspection of systems or systems components for tamper resistance and detection addresses physical and logical tampering and is applied to systems and system components removed from organization-controlled areas. Indications of a need for inspection include changes in packaging, specifications, factory location, or entity in which the part is purchased,

SR-11control

Component Authenticity

Sources of counterfeit components include manufacturers, developers, vendors, and contractors. Anti-counterfeiting policies and procedures support tamper resistance and provide a level of protection against the introduction of malicious code. External reporting organizations include CISA.

SR-12control

Component Disposal

Data, documentation, tools, or system components can be disposed of at any time during the system development life cycle (not only in the disposal or retirement phase of the life cycle). For example, disposal can occur during research and development, design, prototyping, or operations/maintenance and include methods such as disk cleaning, removal of cryptog

SR-2(1)enhancement

Establish SCRM Team

To implement supply chain risk management plans, organizations establish a coordinated, team-based approach to identify and assess supply chain risks and manage these risks by using programmatic and technical mitigation techniques. The team approach enables organizations to conduct an analysis of their supply chain, communicate with internal and external par

SR-3(1)enhancement

Diverse Supply Base

Diversifying the supply of systems, system components, and services can reduce the probability that adversaries will successfully identify and target the supply chain and can reduce the impact of a supply chain event or compromise. Identifying multiple suppliers for replacement components can reduce the probability that the replacement component will become

SR-3(2)enhancement

Limitation of Harm

Controls that can be implemented to reduce the probability of adversaries successfully identifying and targeting the supply chain include avoiding the purchase of custom or non-standardized configurations, employing approved vendor lists with standing reputations in industry, following pre-agreed maintenance schedules and update and patch delivery mechanisms

SR-3(3)enhancement

Sub-tier Flow Down

To manage supply chain risk effectively and holistically, it is important that organizations ensure that supply chain risk management controls are included at all tiers in the supply chain. This includes ensuring that Tier 1 (prime) contractors have implemented processes to facilitate the "flow down" of supply chain risk management controls to sub-tier contr

SR-4(1)enhancement

Identity

Knowing who and what is in the supply chains of organizations is critical to gaining visibility into supply chain activities. Visibility into supply chain activities is also important for monitoring and identifying high-risk events and activities. Without reasonable visibility into supply chains elements, processes, and personnel, it is very difficult for or

SR-4(2)enhancement

Track and Trace

Tracking the unique identification of systems and system components during development and transport activities provides a foundational identity structure for the establishment and maintenance of provenance. For example, system components may be labeled using serial numbers or tagged using radio-frequency identification tags. Labels and tags can help provide

SR-4(3)enhancement

Validate as Genuine and Not Altered

For many systems and system components, especially hardware, there are technical means to determine if the items are genuine or have been altered, including optical and nanotechnology tagging, physically unclonable functions, side-channel analysis, cryptographic hash verifications or digital signatures, and visible anti-tamper labels or stickers. Controls ca

SR-4(4)enhancement

Supply Chain Integrity — Pedigree

Authoritative information regarding the internal composition of system components and the provenance of technology, products, and services provides a strong basis for trust. The validation of the internal composition and provenance of technologies, products, and services is referred to as the pedigree. For microelectronics, this includes material composition

SR-5(1)enhancement

Adequate Supply

Adversaries can attempt to impede organizational operations by disrupting the supply of critical system components or corrupting supplier operations. Organizations may track systems and component mean time to failure to mitigate the loss of temporary or permanent system function. Controls to ensure that adequate supplies of critical system components include

SR-5(2)enhancement

Assessments Prior to Selection, Acceptance, Modification, or Update

Organizational personnel or independent, external entities conduct assessments of systems, components, products, tools, and services to uncover evidence of tampering, unintentional and intentional vulnerabilities, or evidence of non-compliance with supply chain controls. These include malicious code, malicious processes, defective software, backdoors, and co

SR-6(1)enhancement

Testing and Analysis

Relationships between entities and procedures within the supply chain, including development and delivery, are considered. Supply chain elements include organizations, entities, or tools that are used for the research and development, design, manufacturing, acquisition, delivery, integration, operations, maintenance, and disposal of systems, system component

SR-9(1)enhancement

Multiple Stages of System Development Life Cycle

The system development life cycle includes research and development, design, manufacturing, acquisition, delivery, integration, operations and maintenance, and disposal. Organizations use a combination of hardware and software techniques for tamper resistance and detection. Organizations use obfuscation and self-checking to make reverse engineering and modif

SR-11(3)enhancement

Anti-counterfeit Scanning

The type of component determines the type of scanning to be conducted (e.g., web application scanning if the component is a web application).

Source and interpretation boundary

Official NIST statements, discussions, parameters, relationships, and assessment material are presented as source content. Bare Metal Cyber implementation perspectives are separately labeled and are educational—not a substitute for tailoring, legal advice, an authorizing official, or the official publication.